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Preface
This report presents the results and recommendations of a comprehensive study of
the shadow economy in Serbia prepared by the Foundation for the Advancement of
Economics for the USAID Business Enabling Project (BEP). The report is based on
the results of an analysis of the relevant statistical data, information obtained from
the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business carried out on a sample of registered
businesses and entrepreneurs in Serbia, as well as the findings of qualitative
research covering the key stakeholders.
The overall goal of this study is to develop a strategy and specific recommen-
dations that will enhance the formalisation of the shadow economy in order to
improve the competitiveness of the Serbian economy and contribute to economic
growth. The specific objectives of this study are as follows:
• To increase awareness of the actual size of the shadow economy and its impact
on the business community by estimating its aggregate size and its distribution
across key business sectors and different regions in Serbia.
• To identify the main causes of the shadow economy, especially in terms of the
types of informal activities that are being undertaken and the reasons businesses
are engaging in those activities, so that policy recommendations and actions for
the formalisation of the shadow economy will address its root causes.
• To develop a strategy for the formalisation of the shadow economy and to
provide specific recommendations, policies, and programmes concerning fiscal
and labour market policy and financial sector development that will enhance the
formalisation of the shadow economy, improve the competitiveness of the
Serbian economy, and contribute to economic growth.
Many institutions and individuals provided assistance and support during our
work on this report. We are very grateful to USAID, which provided financial
support for this research project, and to the team of the USAID Business Enabling
Project for their outstanding cooperation during the preparation of the report and
their valuable suggestions, which proved extremely useful in producing the final
draft. Thanks are also due to Ipsos Strategic Marketing, which conducted the
Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, for their professional assistance
v
and suggestions regarding the survey questionnaire. We owe a great debt of
gratitude to Prof. Boško Živković for his invaluable suggestions and selfless
assistance in our efforts to shed more light on this subject, and to Dr. Aleksandra
Nojković for her help in collecting and analysing data for the econometric assess-
ment of the shadow economy in Central and Eastern Europe and Serbia.
Furthermore, the editors of this volume would like to extend their thanks to the
Springer team for the smooth cooperation in finalising this book. We are very
grateful to the Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, which supported this
publication, under the projects of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technol-
ogy of the Republic of Serbia (No. 179005, 179065) and FREN (Foundation for the
Advancement of the Economics). Our special gratitude goes to Prof. Branko
Urošević, Prof. Branislav Boričić, Prof. Božidar Cerović (Faculty of Economics,
University of Belgrade) and Dr. Jelena Žarković Rakić (FREN), who recognised the
importance of this publication. Without their support, this e-book would not have
been possible.
Finally, we are very grateful for the comments received from the reviewers of
the book, Prof. Barry Reilly, Dr. Peter Sanfey and Prof. Branko Urošević.
Belgrade, Serbia Gorana Krstić
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Milojko Arsić and Gorana Krstić
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Gorana Krstić, Friedrich Schneider, Mihail Arandarenko, Milojko Arsić,
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References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Contributors
Mihail Arandarenko Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, Belgrade,
Serbia
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Irena Janković Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia
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The shadow economy is one of the biggest challenges to the Serbian economy, with
its consequences in terms of tax evasion, labour market distortion, unfair compe-
tition, and inefficient allocation of resources. In many transition countries and in
Serbia it is a major obstacle to the development of a strong business sector and to
the building of a well-functioning market economy. Even though the shadow
economy is still an important safety net for many individuals and households in
Serbia, the disadvantages for workers, business, and society at large far outweigh
the advantages.
During the economic crisis in Serbia since 2008 the need to deeply understand
the shadow economy and to find ways to reduce it through formalisation has
become acute. In times of crisis it becomes more apparent that the shadow economy
is not only a consequence but also a cause of the greater decline in gross domestic
product, and can spread the crisis further. Thus, the overall goal of this study is to
develop a strategy and specific recommendations that will enhance the
formalisation of the shadow economy in order to improve the competitiveness of
the Serbian economy and contribute to economic growth.
We define the shadow economy as the ensemble of all market-based legal
production activities that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for
one or more reasons: to evade payment of income, value added, or other taxes; to
evade payment of social security contributions; to evade certain legal labour market
standards, such as the minimum wage, maximum working hours, safety standards,
etc.; and to evade certain administrative procedures, such as completing statistical
questionnaires or administrative forms (Schneider et al. 2010).
G. Krstić (*)
Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: gkrstic@ekof.bg.ac.rs
© The Author(s) 2015
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For the purpose of this research, a special Survey on Conditions for Doing
Business in Serbia was designed and implemented on a representative sample of
1,251 registered businesses and entrepreneurs in Serbia. This survey allows us to
explore the shadow economy in Serbia from the business perspective for the first
time, as all previous research has been based on household surveys.
In this study we apply an approach that combines elements of macro- and micro-
economic analysis using all relevant statistical data, data from the survey on
registered businesses and entrepreneurs, and qualitative research involving inter-
views with key informants and stakeholders. More specifically, the macro estimates
of the shadow economy are based on two methods: the MIMIC approach (multiple
indicators, multiple causes) and the Household Tax Compliance approach. Micro-
estimates are based on the survey data, identifying the types of shadow economy
that exist within the formal sector across the various sectors of economic activity,
region, firm size, and other business characteristics. In addition to estimating the
extent of the shadow economy we also estimated the tax evasion gap—the differ-
ence between evaded taxes and statutory tax liabilities.
It is worth mentioning that in 2013–2014, after the final version of the study was
completed in March 2013, the Serbian government implemented a few of the
proposed policy measures for formalising the shadow economy presented in the
study.
The report is organized as follows. The next chapter by Mihail Arandarenko
reviews the various negative consequences and positive effects of the shadow
economy in Serbia over the last decade. Chapter 3 by Gorana Krstić describes the
design and methodology of the survey of registered businesses and entrepreneurs.
Chapter 4 by Milojko Arsić, Mihail Arandarenko, Branko Radulović, Saša
Ranđelović, and Irena Janković identifies the main causes of the shadow economy
concerning the tax system, labour market institutions, and the financial sector, as
well as other institutional and economic causes of the shadow economy. Chapter 5
by Friedrich Schneider, Gorana Krstić, Milojko Arsić, and Saša Ranđelović pre-
sents estimates of the shadow economy in Serbia using different methods, while
Chap. 6 by Gorana Krstić and Branko Radulović introduces estimates of the main
types of shadow economy among business entities, determinants of their participa-
tion in the shadow economy, and the impact of competition from the informal
sector on businesses. Chapter 7 by Milojko Arsić and Gorana Krstić provides
estimates of the potential fiscal effects of reducing the shadow economy to the
level observed in more developed countries and the effects that formalisation of the
shadow economy can have on economic growth. Chapter 8 by Mihail Arandarenko
reviews the institutional capacity, inter-governmental coordination, and policy
framework for fighting shadow economic activity. Chapter 9 by Gorana Krstić,
Friedrich Schneider, Mihail Arandarenko, Milojko Arsić, Branko Radulović, Saša
Ranđelović, and Irena Janković presents the main findings and specific recommen-
dations, policies, and programmes concerning fiscal and labour market policy and
financial sector development to enhance the formalisation of the shadow economy.
Chapter 10 by Gorana Krstić, Friedrich Schneider, Mihail Arandarenko, Milojko
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Arsić, Branko Radulović, Saša Ranđelović and Irena Janković provides an execu-
tive summary.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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1 Introduction 3
Chapter 2
The Shadow Economy: Challenges
to Economic and Social Policy
Mihail Arandarenko
2.1 Features of the Shadow Economy
The shadow economy is a multi-dimensional, multi-faceted phenomenon, which
inevitably accompanies formal economies throughout the world. However, its
characteristics and dimensions can be vastly different: from relatively benign,
stable, and acceptable to extremely destructive to the economic tissue and long-
term economic growth. In countries where shadow economies are present to a large
extent or where they show upward trends, these informal sectors are invariably a
symptom of deeper disturbances in the economic structure, regulation, and
institutions.
In an environment dominated by the economic crisis—present in Serbia since
2008 both statistically and, particularly, in the public’s perception—the need to
deeply understand the shadow economy and find ways to reduce it through
formalisation grows acute. In times of crisis it becomes more apparent that the
shadow economy can be not only a consequence but also a cause of greater decline
in the gross domestic product, and can spread the crisis further. The shadow
economy becomes part of a vicious circle where one of the consequences of
recession is flight from formal to shadow trading, which reduces tax revenue,
thus increasing the fiscal deficit. The growing deficit must, in turn, be compensated
for by higher tax rates: higher taxes drive more companies and workers into the
shadow economy, or, even more devastatingly, out of the economy altogether. This
downward spiral keeps repeating itself, always at a lower level of GDP and
employment. The empirical mechanisms behind this vicious circle are complex,
and include the impact of inflation, declining real wages, and growing unemploy-
ment on the increase of the informal economy, and vice versa.
M. Arandarenko (*)
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On the other hand, in an abstract economic context the shadow economy can be
viewed as a specific market ‘anti-institution’. In this light it can be claimed that the
shadow economy can eliminate tax and other wedges that institutions create
between labour supply and labour demand or product supply and product demand,
thereby creating employment or products that would otherwise not have been
created, and extending the cost-effectiveness margin for both individuals and
businesses.
In a hypothetical market free of taxes and other costs associated with the running
of institutions, all economic activity is ‘in the shadow’. In reality, formal and
informal economies exist in parallel, which introduces distortions and allocates
resources sub-optimally. Schneider and Enste (2000) underline the ambivalence of
the effects of the shadow economy on the formal economy. On the one hand, the
informal economy leads to allocation distortions because resources and production
factors are not used as efficiently as possible. On the other hand, income generated
in the shadow economy is mainly spent in the formal economy (as much as three-
quarters, according to surveys carried out in Germany), which has a stimulating
effect on it.
In order to be efficient, measures designed to foster the formalisation of the
shadow economy have to be based on knowledge of the causes and structure of
informal activity. A particular problem in designing these measures is that infor-
mation about the shadow economy is necessarily unreliable and incomplete. Fur-
ther, the shadow economy is inherently very heterogeneous, while economic policy
measures, to be implementable in practice, should be simple and, in the main,
universally applicable—at any rate, less selective than is desirable from the point of
view of optimal targeting.
From the standpoint of economic and social effects, and given the need to
develop a formalisation strategy for the shadow economy, it is very important to
have a clear perspective of the dominant character of the shadow economy in any
particular country and to know whether it is primarily a consequence of voluntary
or forced exit, or of exclusion. Voluntary exit means that particular individuals,
with specific preferences and mind-sets (say, strong individualists or people more
likely to take risks), decide to engage in economic activity outside of the formal
economy, even though they are able to find employment in the formal sector.
Voluntary exit from the formal economy with the aim of maximising profits or
personal income can be reinforced by inadequate penal policy or the lack of
implementation of legal sanctions. Forced exit means that individuals or firms are
pressured to leave the formal economy due to their own failure in the market,
negative trends in the business environment, or rigid regulation. For these entities
the shadow economy is the last resort. Exclusion means that certain individuals or
groups have never been part of the formal economy, nor have ever had any realistic
opportunity to join it.
The two main groups of entities engaged in the shadow economy are businesses
and the population. ‘Diagnosing’ the shadow economy, as a precondition for
successfully tackling it, entails answering many specific structural questions that
relate to both of these large groups of stakeholders. It is important to learn more
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about the levels of education and human capital of the segments of the population
that participate in the shadow economy, as well as their geographical distribution
and structure by type of locality (urban/rural population), structure by age, gender,
and social status, the average amount and distribution of wages in the shadow
economy, and working hours and modes of employment (primary vs. secondary or
supplementary).
Detailed structural information is also needed on businesses and entrepreneurs.
These include both basic data (total revenue, profit, number of employees, industry,
registration status, etc.) and information on participation in the shadow economy,
ranging from evasion of taxes and other dues payable to the state, to
non-compliance with regulations and standards that entail expenses.
More information is available on the participation of the population in the
Serbian shadow economy than on businesses, owing to regular semi-annual Labour
Force Surveys carried out by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. The
survey implemented in this study, aimed primarily at businesses and entrepreneurs,
will therefore fill a major void in the available knowledge base for pursuing
evidence-based economic and social policies designed to formalise the shadow
economy.
2.2 Brief History of the Shadow Economy in Serbia
Over the last quarter of a century Serbia’s economy has undergone tectonic
changes. In the late 1980s the economic system was still based on socialist self-
management, rooted in self-managing socially owned businesses. There was a
shadow economy, but it was confined to the then-small private sector and house-
holds, mainly in agriculture and through supplementary work. This situation
underwent fundamental change from the early 1990s as the federal state
disintegrated: business legislation was amended in the ‘first transition’ while initial
privatisation took place; hyperinflation ravaged the country between 1992 and
1994; international sanctions were introduced in 1992—with Serbia virtually living
in a state of war. All of these factors contributed to the creation of a lawless business
environment in which the shadow economy flourished. In the 1990s even the central
authorities operated informally in many important aspects of the economy such as
customs and foreign trade. The parallel existence of private, social, and state
property stimulated a great deal of abuse. Faced with loss of income or even
property, households turned in large numbers to the shadow economy as their
primary or supplementary source of income. Workers, although generally retaining
formal jobs, nonetheless lost reasonable or indeed any wages, and supplemented
them by finding employment in the shadow economy. Many businesses also turned
to the shadow economy, with socially owned companies largely evading the
payment of payroll taxes, while the newly established private firms often evaded
taxes and failed to declare their employees. Parallel trade in consumer goods,
particularly those subject to excise duty, reached extreme levels.
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Estimates of the extent of the shadow economy in the 1990s on the one hand
show extremely high levels and on the other substantial volatility. The halting of
hyperinflation in 1994 and the removal of most of the sanctions imposed by the
international community resulted in a drop in the volume of the informal economy
after the 1993 peak when the share of the shadow economy reached 54.4 % of GDP.
In 1995 this figure declined to 40.8 %, and fell again to 34.5 % in 1997 (Krstić
et al. 1998). In all likelihood the relative size of the shadow economy grew again
after the bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999.
Macroeconomic stabilisation and economic reforms, including European inte-
gration, begun after the ousting of the Milošević regime in 2000, had been expected
to bring about a quick decline in the extent of the shadow economy. This, however,
failed to materialise, both in terms of the reduction seen and the time it took for
improvements to take place. There are several potential explanations for this.
Firstly, the period after 2000 was marked by accelerating transition, including
mass privatisation and restructuring, which introduced additional instability. Sec-
ondly, there are strong arguments in favour of the claim that inappropriate taxation
policy, particularly in the field of labour taxation,1 incentivised flight into the
informal sector rather than the formalisation of businesses and employment. Fur-
ther, inefficient and selective law enforcement was the hallmark of this entire
period, which again failed to create sufficient incentives for entities to leave the
shadow economy.
Yet it cannot be disputed that the 2000s saw changes in the relative size and
character of the shadow economy. The development of the shadow economy over
the last decade has been studied more extensively from the point of view of
households than from that of businesses. It can be monitored through the three
waves of the Living Standards Measurement Study (2002, 2003, 2007) and, since
2008, through semi-annual Labour Force Surveys as well.
Informal employment can be defined in various ways. Basically, people working
without formal contracts and unable to exercise their social insurance rights are
employed informally. They may work for a wage, be self-employed, or work as
helping members of households—with this last category being informal by
definition.
Krstić and Sanfey (2011) compared data on informal employment obtained from
the Living Standards Measurement Survey at two points in time, 2002 and 2007,
which correspond to the early and mature phase, respectively, of Serbia’s post-2000
transition. By their own admission, they obtained counterintuitive results that
indicate that the level of informal employment increased significantly over those
5 years, from 28 % of total employment in 2002 to 35 % in 2007. Secondly, they
also found that the informal nature of employment was a significant determinant of
inequality in 2007, but not so in 2002—in other words, transition saw a ‘dipping’ of
1 This primarily refers to the very high tax burden at low wage levels, which resulted in very high
average and marginal tax rates for the minimum wage, the natural point of entry into the formal
economy. This issue will be dealt with in greater detail in Chap. 3.
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informal employment towards the bottom of the wage distribution, in parallel with
the growth in its volume. Thus the authors found that informal workers earned less
than formal workers in monthly net amounts, even when all other characteristics
were controlled for. In an endeavour to discover the potential causes of the increase
in informal employment and the rise in the advantage enjoyed by the wages of
formal workers, the authors point to the regressive labour taxation system as one of
the likely causes of these unexpected and unfavourable trends.
Although the Labour Force Survey as carried out prior to 2008 did not contain
questions that would enable employment to unambiguously be categorised into one
of two mutually exclusive categories—formal or informal—efforts were made to
estimate informal employment using Labour Force Survey data. Thus, under a
World Bank (2006) classification, the group of those in informal employment
includes: (1) self-employed people without a university degree; (2) all helping
members of households; and (3) salaried employees and owners of private compa-
nies with fewer than ten staff. All salaried employees of state and socially owned
businesses are deemed to be formally employed. According to the definition used in
this World Bank report, Serbia’s informal sector was very large in 2005, comprising
43 % of all those in employment and 27 % of all salaried employees. Although
informal economy is overestimated by the arbitrary inclusion of the micro-business
and entrepreneurs in the informal economy, the structural findings are distinctive
and for the most part convincing, and are also borne out by other analyses. The
study also found that informal employment is linked to low income, poverty, and
vulnerability. Further, there is an above-average share of the young and the
undereducated among those in informal employment. Professional experience and
wages are much lower in the informal than in the formal economy. The wage
premium for those in formal work stood at around 20 %.
Interestingly, data from the 2008 Labour Force Survey show much lower levels
of informal employment than those presented above. Another interesting finding,
available since the Labour Force Survey made it possible to monitor informal
employment, is that informal employment was slower to decline during the crisis.
Thus, as shown in Table 2.1, the share of informal employment in total adult
employment according to the 2008 Labour Force Survey stood at 23 %. This figure
dropped to 21 % in 2009, fell again to 19.6 % in 2010, only to decline yet again to
just 17 % by April 2012.
It should be borne in mind that, under the definition used by the Statistical Office
of the Republic of Serbia, informal employment includes: (1) workers at
unregistered privately held companies; (2) workers at registered companies
employed without a written contract and without paid social insurance contribu-
tions; and (3) helping family members. Krstić (2012) uses a more standard defini-
tion, which also includes workers employed under a written contract but without
paid contributions. Consequently, this study found greater rates of informal
employment, as shown in Table 2.2.
A finding of this study, which is both interesting and difficult to explain, is the
substantial decline in informal work seen since the start of this crisis. It does not fit
2 The Shadow Economy: Challenges to Economic and Social Policy 9
into the standard assumption of the counter-cyclical or at least ambivalent character
of informal employment.
A newer comparative study carried out by the International Labour Organisation
(ILO 2011) found that Serbia had the lowest level of non-agricultural informal
employment among a group of 44 mostly middle- and lower-income countries.
Data for Serbia were collected using the Labour Force Survey, which, it was
recently claimed, has categorisation issues that probably make it underestimate
the actual number of those in informal employment (Krstić 2012). Nevertheless, the
conclusion that the level of non-agricultural informal employment in Serbia is
lower than would be expected based on its GDP is certainly valid—placing Serbia
among countries with relatively low levels of non-agricultural informal employ-
ment (ILO 2011).
Be that as it may, research into the informal economy from the population
standpoint undoubtedly shows that the informal sector has substantially changed
in character over the last decade. Let us note that the standard theoretical explana-
tion for informal employment (at least for salaried employment) is that both the
employee and the employer have an interest in splitting the ‘excess’ that appears
when the payment of social contributions is evaded. In this context, an informal
wage is greater than a salary in addition to which contributions must be paid, but, in
terms of total labour costs, it is lower than the total labour costs of a formal salary.
While at the beginning of the decade the informal sector, obviously taking its cue
from the disorderly 1990s, comprised employees with widely varying and not
necessarily inferior characteristics, who did not earn less than their formal coun-
terparts (see, for instance, the findings of Lokshin and Jovanović 2003), by the end
Table 2.1 Serbia: Labour market and informal employment indicators, 2006–2012
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Participation rate (%) 63.6 63.4 62.7 60.6 59.0 59.9 59.7
Employment rate (%) 49.8 51.5 53.7 50.4 47.2 45.3 44.2
Unemployment rate (%) 21.6 18.8 14.4 16.9 20.0 24.4 26.1
Informal employment (in % of population
aged 15 years and over)
– – 23.0 20.6 19.6 17.8 17.0
Source: Labour Force Survey, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia







Informal employment (in % of total employment,
15+)
25.8 25.1 24.1
Informal employment (in % of total employment,
15–64)
23.1 22.5 21.8
Informal employment outside agriculture 9.2 9.5 8.5
Source: Krstić (2012); Estimates based on panel observations. Labour Force Survey, Statistical
Office of the Republic of Serbia
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of the 2000s it was no smaller in size but its structure had taken a dramatic turn for
the worse, as had its exposure to discrimination and poverty. If this had been a
sector of voluntary ‘exit’ at the beginning of the decade, by its end it had become
predominantly a sector of ‘exclusion’ (cf. Oviedo et al. 2009).
Findings about the volume, structure, and features of informal employment are
of great importance in designing economic and social policies aimed at tackling the
shadow economy. Data available from the Labour Force Survey, as well as deeper
research based on various sources that we have presented in brief, indicate that
informal employment is today primarily the last refuge of those forced out of the
formal economy during the transition and traditionally excluded groups. Conse-
quently, when developing and implementing measures to formalise informal
employment, incentives should take precedence over sanctions.
Why did we need this brief summary of the development of the shadow economy
in Serbia? It was needed because it serves as a reminder of the multi-faceted,
heterogeneous, and simultaneously stubborn, deeply rooted nature of this phenom-
enon. In the early 1990s the shadow economy became an acceptable survival
mechanism for businesses, entrepreneurs, and households, in answer to the multiple
shocks that they faced. At the time, liberal economists mainly underlined the
positive role of neo-liberal economics in co-ordinating the market and fostering
entrepreneurship. Yet the shadow economy mangled the rules and institutions of the
market economy, incentivised corruption, and undermined fiscal morality and the
trust of the population in the state. In various forms, the entire society took part in
the shadow economy. For instance, the official foreign currency exchange rate
usually deviated from the market exchange rate, sometimes even by a multiple of
the official figure, but transactions in foreign currency nonetheless took place at the
market exchange rate.
The negative economic and social effects of the informal economy first became
an issue in the 2000s. Starting in 2001, the Ministry of Finance undertook periodical
publicity campaigns to raise the profile of tax compliance, particularly that accom-
panying the introduction of VAT and fiscal receipts. A survey recently carried out
by the Employers’ Association and the Association of Independent Trade Unions
confirmed that business entities generally viewed the informal economy in a
negative light.
However, as with many other areas of the economy, government authorities and
economic policymakers are yet to systematically tackle this issue. There is no clear
commitment or strategy to the fight against the shadow economy. The past decade
again saw permitted exceptions that damaged equality of the participants in the
formal market: for instance, ‘linking’ workers’ years of service to compensate for
unpaid contributions, cancelling back taxes and other arrears, and tolerating the
non-payment of social security contributions by public businesses. Socially owned
companies in restructuring even enjoyed, for a long period of time, formal statutory
protection from actions that might have led to their insolvency (under the latest
amendments to the Law on Privatisation, this protection is set to expire in
mid-2014), and were thus able to run up huge debts in unpaid employee contribu-
tions to social security funds. There were several waves of what is termed “linking
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employees’ years of service”, where the government pays staff contributions at
troubled companies—thereby attempting to sway public opinion, but also acting as
accessory to the undermining of fiscal morals. This practice of socialising costs, of
course, has a negative demonstration effect on employers who comply with all of
their statutory obligations to their staff. In other cases, objectively marginal from
the point of view of public interest, the state was extraordinarily efficient, even
brutal, when collecting certain dues (e.g., performance rights charges).
Serbia’s experience over a lengthy period of time demonstrates the shadow
economy’s distorting and negative effect on balanced economic growth, particu-
larly in times of economic crisis. Displacement and substitution effects dominate
employment trends. To paraphrase Gresham’s law, no net new jobs are created—
bad jobs just drive out the good ones.
Although current economic conditions are much more favourable than those that
prevailed during the last decade of the twentieth century, and the shadow economy
shows no signs of overflowing its admittedly broad and comfortable basin, it poses
at least a threefold challenge to economic policymakers. Firstly, it directly hurts
public finances and often threatens public safety and health. Secondly, it is a
symptom of institutional weakness and an unfavourable business environment,
which jeopardises long-term growth. Thirdly, although it may at first sight seem
to serve as a refuge for vulnerable groups, the shadow economy is in reality a trap,
perpetuating instead of eliminating their poverty and exclusion.
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Chapter 3
The Concept of the Survey of Businesses
and Entrepreneurs Operating Informally
Gorana Krstić
3.1 Aim and Content of the Survey
The principal aim of the survey of businesses and entrepreneurs operating infor-
mally in Serbia is to assess the various forms of the shadow economy, as well as to
analyse the forms of the shadow economy according to the relevant characteristics
of business entities. In addition, the survey provides insight into the causes and
motives of businesses operating in the shadow economy, which is important when
drafting recommendations for shifting businesses from the shadow to the formal
economy. The sample consisted of 1,251 business entities (businesses and entre-
preneurs), and the survey was carried out from 16 to 22 October 2012 throughout
Serbia.
This survey has, for the very first time, made it possible to explore the shadow
economy in Serbia from the point of view of businesses, as all previous research has
been based on household surveys (Krstić et al. 1998, 2001).1 Research on employ-
ment in the shadow economy has recently been conducted in many countries
(EC 2007) in addition to standard and regular Labour Force Surveys, but similar
studies on the informal operation of businesses have been relatively rare, as will be
discussed in greater detail in Chap. 6. This is due to the substantial risk that business
owners/managers will refuse to take part in such a survey, or, when they do take
part, will provide misleading answers to questions regarding their involvement in
the various forms of the informal economy such as shadow employment (evasion of
wage tax and social security contributions); shadow trading (evasion of value added
tax); and evasion of other taxes, customs duties, and the like. This concern is also
present when surveying the general population, but seems to be less pronounced.
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Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: gkrstic@ekof.bg.ac.rs
1 The surveys were carried out in 1997 and 2002, respectively.
© The Author(s) 2015
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This is borne out by the results of this study, which show that activities in the
shadow economy are more acceptable where individuals rather than legal entities
engage in them: legal entities are thus less likely to report such activities in
interviews than individuals. Similar results were obtained in a Eurobarometer
survey covering 26,755 people aged 15 and over in 27 EU member states, where
undeclared work by individuals for private households is deemed more acceptable
than undeclared work by businesses (EC 2007).
Notwithstanding the risks inherent in such measurement, the survey of busi-
nesses and entrepreneurs operating in the shadow economy in Serbia was success-
fully carried out on the planned sample, with a large percentage of respondents
answering nearly all the questions posed in the questionnaire.
Most of the respondents were either owners of business entities or entrepreneurs.
The data were collected using face-to-face interviews.
To reduce the impact of the concealment of undeclared work on the results of the
survey, the content of the questions and their wording and order in the question-
naire, as well as the approach employed by the interviewers, were tested in a pilot
study2 and were subsequently adjusted so as to affect respondent bias as little as
possible. Various techniques were used that had in previous research shown their
effectiveness in eliciting answers that were as honest as possible (e.g., Gerxhani
2007; Kazemier and van Eck 1992; Hanousek and Palda 2004; Krstić et al. 1998).
This entails, among other things, gradually introducing respondents to the most
sensitive questions, which will usually be posed after the less sensitive ones. The
title of the survey (Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia) was
carefully worded so as not to be perceived negatively by the potential respondents
i.e., representatives of businesses.
In addition to questions relating to the participation of the surveyed businesses in
particular forms of the shadow economy, questions were also asked regarding the
subjective attitudes of business owners/managers to the participation of other
businesses from the same sector in these activities. This approach has been
described as a method that yields more honest responses (Gerxhani 2007) and
was used in the studies carried out by Hanousek and Palda (2004), Sauka (2008),
and Putninš and Sauka (2011). For the most significant forms of the shadow
economy, the same questions were posed to business owners/managers regarding
the participation of their own business in the shadow economy and their perception
of the participation of other businesses from the same sector in these activities.
Sauka (2008) found that, although the questions were posed indirectly, owner/
manager responses could be applicable to their own businesses. In this study we
assumed that data obtained on the basis of biased owner/manager responses regard-
ing the participation of their own businesses in informal operations could be
considered the lower limit of the extent of the shadow economy, while the data
obtained on the basis of their subjective perceptions on the participation of other
businesses from the same sector could be considered the upper limit.
2 The pilot study encompassed ten businesses and ten entrepreneurs.
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The questionnaire was made up of multiple modules. The first module was
devoted to general information about the business (type, size, ownership, year of
incorporation, sector of activity, turnover, etc.). The second module was designed
to capture data on the activities of each business, starting from less sensitive
questions and ending with those dealing with cash payments. The next set of
questions related to the position of the business in the market, relative to its
competitors. In this part of the questionnaire the business owner/manager was
expected to present his or her own subjective view of the participation of other
businesses from the same sector of economic activity in the shadow economy
(trading, employment, and the like) and the ‘justification’ of informal operation
(individuals vs. legal entities). The last part of this section contained questions that
the pilot survey revealed as the most sensitive and the least likely to be answered by
respondents. These questions dealt with informal employment (whether any
workers were employed in this manner, and, if so, what their number and wages
were). The third part of the questionnaire related to the causes of informal operation
and the motives of participants in the shadow economy, while the fourth part dealt
with the abilities of tax and inspection authorities. These were followed by a section
relating to remittances from abroad received through both formal and informal
channels by the households of the entrepreneurs interviewed. The final section of
the questionnaire covered proposals to develop policies leading to a reduction in
informal operations.
3.2 Research Methodology
3.2.1 Definition of ‘Shadow Economy’ Used in the Survey
Although the subject of this survey was the participation of businesses and entre-
preneurs in the shadow economy, the term ‘informal operation’ was used rather
than the expression ‘shadow economy’. Where respondents asked for clarification
of this term, they were shown a card containing the following definition: “Informal
operation is operation that is not fully in compliance with particular laws and
regulations governing the operation of businesses, or is not fully governed by
law.” This definition is rather broad and general in scope so as not to overly
discourage respondents from providing answers that are as honest as possible. It
corresponds to the definition used in the macro assessment of the shadow economy
in Serbia (see Chap. 5), which states that the shadow economy comprises all
market-based legal production activities that are deliberately concealed from public
authorities for one or more reasons: to evade payment of income, value added, or
other taxes; to evade payment of social security contributions; to evade certain legal
labour market standards, such as minimum wages, maximum working hours, safety
standards, etc.; and to evade certain administrative procedures, such as completing
statistical questionnaires or administrative forms (Schneider et al. 2010).
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We need to underline that the survey encompassed only formally registered
businesses and entrepreneurs, while unregistered companies and/or small privately
owned businesses not formally incorporated as legal entities were not covered. In
other words, the survey encompassed only a portion of businesses in the shadow
economy, the portion involving businesses operating in the formal sector (regis-
tered businesses). Shadow economy practices by businesses in the informal sector
(unregistered businesses and/or small privately owned businesses not formally
incorporated as legal entities) and in households were not examined. It should be
borne in mind that estimates of informal employment prepared by the ILO (2011)
for nearly all of the world’s countries show that employment in unregistered
businesses exceeds informal employment in registered businesses and households.
The definition of the shadow economy used in this study is based on the concept
of activities that may be declared or undeclared (with tax authorities and other
government bodies), rather than on the concept of declared or undeclared busi-
nesses or jobs. The first definition has become predominant in Europe and other
developed countries as it includes those forms of the shadow economy inherent to a
larger degree in developed economies, such as the under-reporting of income by
self-employed people and formal businesses, or the payment of a portion of wages
in cash (so-called ‘envelope wages’) that are not covered by the business-based or
job-based definition, since the worker is in a formal job and the work takes place in
a registered business (Williams et al. 2008).
The shadow economy can be divided into two parts. The first part involves
undeclared employment, where entrepreneurs or businesses do not report their
employees or declare only a portion of their wages in an attempt to evade or reduce
the tax burden (informal employment). These activities are at their most common in
the sectors of construction, agriculture, and services performed for households.
Another part of the shadow economy entails the underreporting of income, which is
most frequent in small shops owned by entrepreneurs that charge in cash and in
businesses trading in cash without paying taxes. Schneider (2011) estimated that in
Turkey, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Poland the first part accounted for on average
two-thirds of the total shadow economy and the second part for the other third.
Taking this concept as the starting point, both of these aspects of business
participation in the shadow economy were examined. Business owners/managers
were posed questions about the two most important forms of the shadow economy
present at their firm: informal employment and evasion of value-added tax i.e.,
transactions made in cash. The following groups of questions were designed to
capture this information:
• Is informal employment present at the company—the most important types of
such employment being employing workers without a formal contract, i.e.,
undeclared employees, and employing workers with a contract but declaring
only a portion of their wage? What is the number of such employees? How much
do they earn?
• Are payments made through bank accounts, or are payments made partly in
cash? What is the frequency of such payments? What is the estimated share of
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cash payments in the total? What are the other characteristics of payments made
in cash?
In addition to these questions (deemed to be the most important) other forms of
the shadow economy were examined by looking at the subjective views of the
respondents regarding participation in the shadow economy by other businesses in
the same sector of economic activity. The practices analysed included evading
property tax or customs duty, and infringement of individual laws and regulations
governing business operations.
The percentage of answers to questions posed in the survey was very high,
ranging from 92 to 98 %. An exception was the question regarding the number of
informally employed workers and their wages, with between 57 and 77 %
answering.
3.2.2 Sample
The survey was carried out on a single-stage stratified sample of business entities.
The entities were selected from a list of business and entrepreneurs registered with
the Business Registries Agency and classified by stratum. The stratification was
based on:
• Region: Šumadija and Western Serbia; Southern and Eastern Serbia; Vojvodina.
• Size of entity: up to 4 employees; between 5 and 19 employees; between 20 and
49 employees; between 50 and 249 employees; more than 250 employees.
• Sector of economic activity: agriculture; manufacturing; construction; trade;
transportation; catering; other services.
The total sample was allocated by stratum in proportion to the size of each
stratum in the initial sample. A simple random sample was used, without replace-
ment by stratum. The sample is representative at the level of Serbia and by stratum
(size of entity, sector of economic activity, and region).
3.3 Basic Information on the Business Entities Surveyed
A total of 606 businesses and 645 entrepreneurs were surveyed and the results were
presented after weighting by stratum to make the sample representative at the level
of Serbia and by stratum.
Most of the respondents were business owners (82 % of all businesses surveyed),
with far fewer managing directors (13 %) or chief financial officers (6 %). The
sample made it possible to survey business entities of varying sizes. The final
sample contained 83 % companies with a few workers (i.e., up to four employees),
13 % with slightly more employees (5–20), while larger companies were less
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represented (Table 3.1). Just as expected, entrepreneurs were to a greater extent
micro-enterprises with fewer than five workers (89 % of all entrepreneurs), since
they almost never employ more than 20 workers. According to ownership structure,
91 % of all businesses and nearly 100 % of all entrepreneurs were privately owned
(97 % of the total sample), while their equity was nearly always of domestic origin
(in 98 % of all cases).
The sample was constructed taking into account the sector of the business
entities’ economic activity. Most entities represented were engaged in wholesale
and retail trade or auto repair (30 %) or other services (26 %) such as: information
and communications; financial and insurance services; real estate; public adminis-
tration; scientific and technical activities; administration; education; healthcare and
social security; and other services. These were followed by manufacturing (17 %),
construction (9 %), transportation (10 %), catering (7 %) and agriculture (2 %).
Around half of all business entities (56 %) were VAT payers: 83 % of all
businesses and 45 % of all entrepreneurs.
Respondents estimated that only 24 % of all businesses and 46 % of entrepre-
neurs saw their sales increase in 2011 relative to 2010, while all other business
entities reported a decline in sales.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Chapter 4
Causes of the Shadow Economy
Milojko Arsić, Mihail Arandarenko, Branko Radulović, Saša Ranđelović,
and Irena Janković
4.1 Causes of the Shadow Economy Rooted in the Tax
System
Of all the factors related to the design of the tax system and the institutional
environment for its payment, collection, and administration, the following have
the most significant impact on the extent of the shadow economy: size and structure
of the tax burden; efficiency of the tax administration in collecting taxes; penalty
policy; complexity and fairness of the tax system; and compliance costs.
4.1.1 The Size of the Tax Burden
According to the standard (Allingham–Sandmo) model of tax evasion, the size of
the tax burden, along with the probability of detection of tax evasion and the
possible sanctions, is a fundamental determinant of tax evasion, as well as of the
shadow economy as a basis for tax evasion. According to this approach, increasing
the tax burden makes it more cost-effective to operate in the informal sector. The
total tax burden in Serbia is moderate (as measured by the ratio of tax revenue to
GDP) and close to the averages of other Central and Eastern European countries.
The situation is different, however, when individual forms of taxes are considered.
Thus the general VAT rate is among the lowest in the region (even after the increase
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to 20 %), while the reduced rate (at 8 %) is about average (Fiscal Council 2012).
The rate of excise duty on oil products is slightly higher than the regional average,
while the excise on tobacco products is at the level of the regional average (but
lower than in developed countries); excise duty on most alcoholic beverages is at
the level of the regional average or below. We can therefore conclude that the size
of the tax burden on consumption in Serbia is no greater, on average, than in other
Central and Eastern European countries, which leads us to conclude that the VAT
tax burden is not an important cause of the greater extent of the shadow economy in
Serbia in comparison to other countries in the region.
On the other hand, the fiscal burden on labour (as measured by the share of wage
tax and social security contributions in total labour costs) is relatively high in
Serbia, both in absolute terms and in relation to the country’s level of development.
This leads us to the conclusion that the size of the tax burden on income (partic-
ularly regarding social security contributions) is a major cause of the shadow
economy in the field of wages, as well as of the corresponding tax gap in Serbia.
Although the overall fiscal burden in Serbia is, realistically, moderate in relation to
that in other Central and Eastern European countries, it is perceived as high by most
businesses: many respondents in the survey carried out as part of this study
identified high taxes as the third most significant cause of the large extent of the
shadow economy. As legal entities mainly shift the VAT burden onto end-users, it
is realistic to assume that most of them refer to the fiscal burden on labour when
discussing fiscal burdens in general.
4.1.2 The Fiscal Burden on Labour
As for the fiscal burden on labour, it is particularly important to underline that, from
a comparative standpoint, the labour tax wedge (calculated as the quotient of total
wage tax and social contributions and total labour costs) is high at low wage levels
and relatively low at high wage levels, a consequence of a proportional income tax
system with a relatively small portion of non-taxable wage. At 33 % of the average
wage, the tax wedge in Serbia stands at 36.7 %. In Europe, recognised globally as
the region with the highest taxes, only Sweden, Hungary, Romania, and the
Federation of Bosnia–Herzegovina have greater tax wedges at those wage levels.
At the level of the average wage, Serbia’s tax wedge is around the European
average. The progressiveness of labour taxation is very low: between 33 and
100 % of the average wage, the tax wedge increases by just 2.6 percentage points,
while in many European countries the increase is over 10 percentage points (Koettl
2012). It should be noted that taxation was even regressive between 2001 and 2007,
with the tax wedge at the level of 33 % of the average wage standing at as much as
47.1 %, while amounting to 42.2 % at the level of the average wage (Arandarenko
and Stanić 2006): which could serve as an explanation of the otherwise counterin-
tuitive increase in informal employment seen between 2002 and 2007 (Krstić and
Sanfey 2011).
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The high tax wedge for low-paid work is a natural incentive to sustain and
increase informal employment. When informal businesses (including informal self-
proprietorships) are formalised by moving into the formal sector they typically
introduce salaries close to the minimum wage. If the tax burden is high at these
wage levels, it is a clear obstacle to formalisation on the labour demand side. On the
side of labour supply, the productivity of lower-qualified workers in lower-paid,
labour-intensive sectors is low; so for many of them their salary is borderline ‘cost-
effective’ when compared to the alternatives, such as social welfare or work in the
informal economy. In addition, the existence of a minimum social insurance
contribution base (currently standing at 35 % of the average wage) limits formal
part-time employment.
4.1.3 The Social Welfare System
The social welfare system in Serbia is conceived in the traditional manner. Most
importantly, welfare benefits are withdrawn at a ratio of 1:1 as reported income
from labour increases. There is no employee benefits programme. Once a person
loses the right to social welfare payments by virtue of finding employment, he or
she must go through the entire demanding procedure of collecting documents and
undergoing verification to become entitled to social welfare again. As a conse-
quence, many beneficiaries of social welfare opt for a survival strategy where they
combine these benefits with unreported, generally occasional, work. The rules of
the tax/benefit system as presented here act in synergy to foster informal employ-
ment, and consequently the shadow economy.
4.1.4 The Efficiency of the Tax Administration in Collecting
Taxes
The efficiency of the tax administration in collecting taxes is also an important
determinant of the shadow economy, in the sense that greater probability of
detecting tax evasion—all other considerations being equal—leads to a reduction
in the shadow economy. Although there are no consistent and comparable data on
the probability of detecting tax evasion in Serbia and other Central and Eastern
European countries, we estimate, from the results of the survey, that it is relatively
low in Serbia. A large number of taxpayers cite that the benefits of tax evasion are
greater than potential losses if detected as 8th of the 11 key causes of the shadow
economy. This does not mean that the Tax Administration is very effective in
uncovering tax evasion, but rather that other factors are seen as more important in
maintaining the shadow economy.
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The Shadow Economy and Use of State Services Free of Charge
The focus of most research on the shadow economy is on the environmental
factors that affect whether individuals decide to take part in the shadow
economy. However, it must be borne in mind that people have a propensity
to evade paying taxes but to continue using social security, health, education
and other services provided by the state. This propensity is borne out by both
day-to-day experience and a substantial body of econometric and experimen-
tal research. Due to people’s preference for free services, there would be tax
evasion even if state services were completely aligned with public prefer-
ences. To tackle tax evasion, therefore, the elimination of environmental
incentives must be accompanied by the establishment of an efficient evasion
detection system, and non-selective prosecution of evaders caught. The
propensity of the public to use services free of charge can to some degree
be reduced by changing the population’s values through outreach and the
education system.
4.1.5 The Penalties for Tax Evasion
The penalties for tax evasion correlate negatively with the extent of the shadow
economy and tax evasion: greater penalties, all other things being equal, bring
about a reduction in the volume of the shadow economy and tax evasion. Empirical
research shows that the impact of sanction policies on the extent of the shadow
economy is lower than that of the probability of discovery (Alm et al. 1992), which
leads to the conclusion that inadequate sanctions can be a cause, but not the key
cause, of the shadow economy. The system of sanctions for tax evasion in Serbia is
relatively well defined in statute, both as regards the penalties themselves and their
imposition. Penalties for non-payment of taxes are defined as a function of the tax
evaded (rather than of the undeclared tax base), which is an appropriate solution
from the point of view of the sanction’s desired aim. The sanctions for non-payment
of taxes in Serbia comprise the basic penalty (fine or imprisonment) and interest for
not having paid the taxes in due time. Although the statutory framework is not
structurally deficient, the inappropriate and inconsistent application of the available
penal mechanisms fosters the development of the shadow economy in Serbia. It has
become standard practice for the Government to write off interest for late payment
of taxes, provided that taxpayers continue paying tax regularly. This means that
those taxpayers that pay their taxes regularly are put at a disadvantage, increasing
moral hazard behaviour that negatively impacts their future readiness to comply
with tax rules.
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4.1.6 The Probability of Sanctions
The probability of sanctions where evasion is detected also substantially affects the
extent of the informal economy. Even with a well-designed statutory framework for
sanctioning tax evasion the penalty system can remain an inefficient tool for
tackling the shadow economy due to corruption, poor co-ordination between the
Tax Administration and other government bodies, and lack of readiness and
willingness on the part of the judiciary to process tax evasion cases, particularly
with more complex evasion schemes (‘VAT carousel’ etc.). According to the results
of the survey, this is also the case with Serbia, as more than two-thirds of all
respondents felt that the probability of being penalised for tax evasion as provided
for by law was very low, standing at the level of a random guess (50 %) or even
lower.
4.1.7 The Structure of the Tax System
The structure of the tax system is an important factor in the extent of the shadow
economy, in the sense that the level of informal activity is lower in countries where
the public revenue system is based more on taxing consumption than on taxation of
the factors of production. The reason for this lies in the fact that it is easier to evade
taxes on the factors of production (particularly personal income tax). The share of
taxes on consumption and those on the factors of production in total public revenues
is nearly equal in Serbia, but a reform of the tax system involving a reduction in tax
on labour and a revenue-neutral increase in consumption taxes could, among other
positive economic effects, bring about a partial reduction in the general extent of
the shadow economy.
4.1.8 The Complexity of the Tax System
In Serbia there is a large number of types of tax, and the system used to assess
individual taxes is very complex. The more different streams of public revenue
there are, and the more complex rules to assess and implement taxes, the lower the
ability of tax inspectors to audit all types of tax, resulting in a lower probability of
detecting tax evasion. In 2011 there were in excess of 370 various charges in Serbia,
both fiscal and quasi-fiscal; most were administered by the Tax Administration of
the Republic of Serbia and by local Public Revenue Administrations (NALED
2012a). In an environment dominated by such a large number of charges and
with few qualified people auditing taxes, the complexity of the tax system is a
major cause of the shadow economy. A large number of taxes, including many that
are difficult to assess, can also lead to tax evasion by omission, as taxpayers may
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fail to comply because they are not aware of the requirements or lack the technical
knowledge for tax self-assessment. The survey found that quasi-fiscal charges were
seen as 5th of the 11 causes of the shadow economy, being ranked after macroeco-
nomic and fiscal factors, lack of trust in the state, and corruption.
This system of quasi-fiscal charges has not been sufficiently transparent:
unpredictable changes to it have been made and the main parameters of the charges
(base, rate, taxpayer, etc.) have sometimes been arbitrarily defined according to the
needs of different public authorities (Arsić et al. 2012). Quasi-fiscal charges have
substantially distorted the operations of companies and entrepreneurs.1 The amount
of these charges has often been out of proportion to the financial strength of the
taxpayer, value of the service rendered to the taxpayer, amount of natural resources
used by the taxpayer, and damage caused to the environment. As the fees and
charges have, in some cases, been assessed at a much higher level than appropriate
for the purpose of these instruments, they have often been primarily—and some-
times predominantly—taxes in nature.2 Apart from issues regarding the amounts of
the charges, multiple quasi-fiscal fees have often been introduced that have similar
purposes (same base, same taxpayer). In addition to introducing distortion, the
quasi-fiscal charges have made a major contribution to the opaque tax system and
growing tax compliance costs. These charges have to a large extent negated the
positive effects of the low rates of basic taxes (corporate income tax, VAT). Some
of the fees that have been a major burden in the private sector have had a direct
bearing on the decision to start operating in the informal sector or to move a part or
all of an operation into the shadow economy. The reform of the system of quasi-
fiscal charges carried out in the second half of 2012 has been an important
precondition for improving the business environment in Serbia, while the abolish-
ment of some of these charges will certainly reduce start-up costs for small business
entities. Appropriate categorisation and naming of the various charges, use of better
parameters, and, above all, alignment of the charges with the financial strength of
the taxpayer, will all have a major impact on motivating entities not to operate in the
shadow economy. The statutory requirement for government bodies to set the
amount of fees and charges for the following year by the end of third quarter of
the current year could contribute to greater predictability of conditions for doing
business in Serbia. Moreover, the proposed requirement to obtain the consent of the
Ministry of Finance and Economy for any modification of fees and charges within
the remit of local authorities or extra-budgetary institutions could prevent the
uncontrolled growth of these burdens, which in the past has been a major incentive
for taxpayers to attempt to circumvent them.
1According to the NALED study, the Government collected in excess of 2 % of GDP through the
charges inventoried, but it is clear that the number of these charges and their significance to the
balance are greater.
2 For instance, some classical taxes were treated by statute as fees: the construction land usage fee,
which is a typical property tax, as well as the ‘signboard fee’, which is also a classical tax rather
than a fee.
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4.1.9 The Fairness of the Tax System
A fair tax system subjects entities at similar levels of financial strength to similar
tax burdens. In the Serbian tax system, and particularly in personal and corporate
income tax, such fairness is often notably absent. Personal income from various
sources is taxed differently, so that individuals with high income from capital are
taxed at a lower rate than those with high income from work. There are many tax
breaks available to business entities so that entities in different segments pay
different levels of tax on the same amount of profit. The real or perceived lack of
fairness in taxation is a major driver of resistance to paying taxes. Although the
latest changes to the Corporate Income Tax Law, adopted in December 2012,
removed a number of tax breaks, the most generous and most frequently used
(such as investment tax credit) have been retained. Given the relatively low
statutory tax rate, liberal tax breaks are an expensive (in terms of tax expenditure)
and inefficient instrument for incentivising investment, as well as one that distorts
business behaviour by continuing to treat entities of similar economic power
differently.
4.1.10 Tax Compliance Costs
Tax compliance costs are, along with high tax burden, one of the major elements of
expenses associated with tax compliance. When costs (time and money) associated
with assessing, declaring, and paying taxes are high due to complicated procedures,
lack of e-filing opportunities, etc., taxpayers are more incentivised to operate in the
informal sector. Serbia is ranked 149th (of 185 countries) for ease of paying taxes in
the World Bank’s Doing Business 2012 survey: a decline in relation to last year and
almost the worst result of all the countries in the region, as well as of all other areas
of doing business in Serbia. The high tax compliance costs in Serbia are caused by
the large number of payment procedures (as many as 66 times per year, compared to
the Eastern European average of 28 times per year) and the substantial time cost of
these activities (280 working hours per year, on average). Accordingly, it can be
concluded that high tax compliance costs are also a major reason for the increase in
the shadow economy in Serbia. According to estimates based on the standard cost
model, costs of administering taxes account for 47 % of all administrative costs
(Radulović 2011b).
The contribution made by these causes to the extent of the shadow economy in
Serbia is difficult to gauge, but can be approximately estimated on the basis of
taxpayers’ views and their perception of the importance of each of the above causes
(Fig. 4.1).
According to the results of the survey, legal taxpaying entities believe that the
economic crisis and fewer opportunities for employment, loss of confidence in
the government and public institutions, and high taxes are the principal causes of
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the shadow economy in Serbia. In addition, widespread corruption, numerous
quasi-fiscal charges, and poor corporate performance are among the main causes.
The problem of being unable to legally purchase certain goods is ranked least
significant.
The taxpayer’s decision whether or not to fully comply with their tax obligation
depends on the objective situation regarding the causes of the shadow economy
referred to above, and on their perception of that situation. The survey results on
taxpayer views of the importance of the causes of the shadow economy is therefore
also relevant in the context of designing measures aimed at tackling the shadow
economy in Serbia.
4.2 Labour Market Institutions as an Incentive
to the Shadow Economy
Recently it has often been claimed that rigid labour market regulation (particularly
hiring and firing rules or more generally, employment protection legislation) is one
of the major causes of the shadow economy. However, the regulatory framework
for the labour market comprises a large number of other features whose impact on
the shadow economy may be equally important. In this section we will briefly
consider the influence of some of these diverse factors that we believe could, in























Economic crisis and lower employment opportunities
Overall loss of trust in state and public institutions
High tax rates (or simply high taxes)
Widespread corruption
Numerous and high parafiscal dues
Bad company business results which make it impossible
to fully operate in the formal economy
High customs duties, dues and other payments due to the
state
Complicated administrative procedures
If that kind of business operation is discovered, material
gains are higher than fines
Low probability of discovery
Inability to legally buy certain goods
Doesn't contribute Contribute
Fig. 4.1 Respondents’ views on the contribution made by individual causes to the shadow
economy in Serbia. Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia,
FREN, 2012
28 M. Arsić et al.
4.2.1 Minimum Wage
In the simplest theoretical context, the minimum wage in the competitive labour
market can artificially constrain demand for labour. If an institutionally imposed
lower wage limit means that it is not cost-effective for businesses to pay workers
more than the wage that reflects their marginal productivity, such businesses will
simply refuse to hire them. Those workers will either remain unemployed or will
move to sectors without a minimum wage. If a uniform minimum wage applies
across the entire formal sector, as is the case in Serbia, then the informal sector is
the only way out for workers whose marginal productivity is lower than the
minimum wage.
The amount of the minimum wage is one of the key parameters that define how
many workers will be ‘squeezed out’ of the formal sector. The higher this wage (the
amount of which is usually viewed in relation to the average wage, which also
makes it comparable internationally), the greater the likelihood that more workers
enter the informal sector. Between 2001 and 2010 the minimum wage in Serbia
fluctuated in a relatively stable interval of between 35 and 40 % of the average wage
(Arandarenko and Avlijaš 2011), which, in international terms, is considered a
moderate amount. However, 2011, and particularly 2012, saw a major increase in
the minimum wage, which reached a level of approximately 50 % of the average
wage in 2012, making the minimum-to-average wage ratio in Serbia higher then the
Western Balkans average (Kovtun et al. 2014). This is considered very high and can
safely be said to be an incentive to informal employment.
4.2.2 Working Hours
The Labour Law stipulates rules governing working hours. This is a broad body of
regulations that includes rules on the length of full-time, part-time, and shortened
working hours, overtime and work on holidays, re-allocation of working hours,
annual leave, daily rest periods, maternity leave, etc. Generally speaking, the more
generous these provisions are to workers (shorter working hours, longer leave,
greater reimbursement for overtime, etc.), ceteris paribus, the greater the cost to
employers and the greater the incentive for them to partially or fully rely on
informal workers to whom they can deny statutory rights. Typically, employers
operating on the margins of formal sector will tend to extend the working hours of
their employees, both formal and informal, without reimbursement for overtime or
indeed any reimbursement at all; they are also prone to cutting workers’ annual
leave and ignoring statutory paid leave periods. It has also been observed that a
shorter working week (e.g., of 35 h, as in France) creates incentives for additional
informal work among those in formal employment.
OECD (2008) concluded that, when compared to other nations, Serbia had in
place balanced and neutral working hours regulations. The 40 h standard working
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week fits into the international average. The option of reducing the working week to
36 h is rarely used. From a comparative perspective, overtime is rather limited, with
8 h of overtime allowed per week. However, the law is more generous towards
employers in terms of re-allocating working hours, since it allows them to require
employees to work up to 60 h/week over a rather lengthy period of 6 months.
Thus working hours legislation in Serbia is comparable to the international
average for countries at a similar level of development. It is part of a tradition
spanning several decades that is rooted among both workers and employers and
thus probably does not represent a major primary incentive for exclusion from the
formal economy and/or participation in the informal economy.
4.2.3 Employment Protection Legislation
In a narrow sense, employment protection legislation (EPL) is made up of a set of
provisions and procedures that apply to the termination of employees. It imposes
statutory limitations on the termination of employees and governs compensation
payable by employers to employees in the case of both individual and collective
termination of open-ended employment contracts. Employment protection legisla-
tion has two main cost components: transfers, made up of severance payments and
the obligatory notice period, and taxes, which entail the procedural costs of
implementing EPL and the payments that need to be made to third parties, such
as the state, courts, and legal experts or other consultants. In a broader sense, EPL
also includes statutory regulation of hiring rules, including statutory limitations that
can be imposed through atypical employment contracts and that limit employee
rights in relation to those enjoyed by workers on open-ended employment contracts.
In general, the stricter the EPL the greater the incentive for businesses to employ
informal workers.
A composite EPL index, developed by the OECD, is used for international
comparison of the level of strictness of this framework. Although World Bank
and OECD (2008) research found that Serbia had an EPL index of 2.4 (on a scale
from 0 to 6, with 0 being the most liberal and 6 the most rigid level of regulation),
which is close to the average of OECD countries including comparable Central and
Eastern European nations, there are specific and important aspects of EPL that are
widely held to have a possible negative impact on formal employment.
Firstly, the amount of the statutory severance pay applicable in Serbia is linked
to the entire years of service of an employee, rather than on the years of service with
any one employer. This solution is nearly unique globally and must have a detri-
mental impact on the formal employment of elderly workers, although the intent of
the legislator was surely quite the opposite, as it makes it more expensive to fire
workers with more years of service.
Secondly, another harmful rule often cited is that under which the most a fixed-
term employment contract can be extended is up to 1 year, after which the employer
is required either to terminate the employee or to change their contract to an open-
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ended one. From a global perspective, most countries now allow fixed-term con-
tracts that last or can be extended for more than 1 year as a result of efforts to
increase labour market flexibility. However, in practice most companies in Serbia
have been known to break this rule with impunity by changing job titles and thus
circumventing the statutory provision.
It is interesting to note that the respondents in the Survey on Conditions for
Doing Business in Serbia stated that, among the most significant factors that
constrain doing business, labour legislation was only marginally restrictive: a
mere 3 % of total respondents included labour legislation among the largest
constraints. In addition, when respondents were asked what would improve the
employee registration process and increase their total wages, 38 % cited a cut in
wage taxes and 38 % a cut in contributions, while just 5 % mentioned changes to
labour legislation making it easier to terminate workers.
4.2.4 Unemployment Benefits
These benefits are a reserve source of income for workers who lose their jobs,
designed to help protect their standard of living and to enable them to devote all of
their time to looking for a new job. They therefore represent a natural extension of
employment protection legislation during the time that a worker is unemployed.
Yet, since entitlement to unemployment benefits is lost when a new formal job is
found, beneficiaries are incentivised to combine these benefits and income from
informal employment until their unemployment benefits expire.
The new 2009 Law on Employment and Unemployment Insurance reduced these
incentives in several aspects. Firstly, the extent of these benefits was reduced by
cutting the maximum period to 1 year (or, exceptionally, 2 years for people meeting
at least one condition for retirement at the time they lose their job), as well as by
establishing lower minimum and maximum benefit amounts ranging from 80 to
160 % of the minimum wage, respectively. Secondly, incentives were introduced
for finding formal employment before the expiry of the benefit period in the form of
30 % of the amount that would have been paid if the right to benefits had been
exercised to the fullest extent.
As current statutory provisions governing these benefits are comparable with
European and regional practice, in addition to which few countries have incentives
for early re-employment, the that current rules cannot be changed substantially
when it comes to statutorily guaranteed rights. There has, however, been criticism
of the National Employment Service, which is believed by some not to be suffi-
ciently efficient in supervising active job seeking by unemployment beneficiaries.
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4.2.5 Retirement Rules
The parameters governing Serbia’s pension system include a relatively low mini-
mum retirement age. In addition, there is no actuarial penalty for early retirement.
This creates incentives for people to continue working after retiring, primarily in
the informal sector, as formal work by pensioners is highly restricted. The standard
retirement age in Serbia is lower than in most other European countries (particu-
larly for women), while the difference between the standard and minimum age is
among the greatest, which indicates that this factor could substantially affect the
shadow economy among the Serbian population. The minimum retirement age in
Serbia is 55 years, or even lower in some sectors of activity (such as the military and
the police); thus people who retire relatively young continue working, mainly in the
informal sector.
4.3 Other Institutional and Economic Causes
of the Shadow Economy in Serbia
The following institutional and economic factors have been estimated to have the
greatest impact on the extent of the shadow economy in Serbia: low productivity,
the economic crisis and widespread lack of liquidity, inefficient market exit mech-
anism, high administrative burden, poor regulatory environment and legal insecu-
rity, construction permits for both existing buildings (‘legalisation’) and new
construction, low quality of public services, large number of small business entities,
structure of the population’s income, high levels of corruption, high tolerance for
the shadow economy by the state, high unemployment rate, and low tax morality.3
4.3.1 Low Productivity
According to the World Bank (2009), the productivity of Serbian businesses (value
added per worker) is much lower and their unit costs are much higher than in other
countries in the region.4 Low productivity, coupled with other factors, causes a
3 For an overview of the relevant causes of the shadow economy, see Schneider and Enste (2000),
and GIZ (2010).
4 Between 2007 and 2009 the added value per worker in Serbia was €12,837 per annum, or on
average less than half of the figure recorded in Slovakia (€25,043), or slightly less than half of the
amount for Hungary (€20,812). In addition, unlike the situation in EU countries—where medium-
sized and large businesses are much more productive than small ones—workers in Serbia’s
medium-sized businesses are less productive by as much as 20 % than employees in small
businesses, while large businesses are only slightly more productive (by a mere 5 %). The
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vicious circle in which low productivity makes business entities turn to the informal
sector, which, as a rule, decreases productivity further.5 In these circumstances, the
business model of many companies means they can be profitable (or, indeed, even
survive) only if they fail to comply with their tax obligations, either wholly or in
part.6
4.3.2 Economic Crisis and Widespread Lack of Liquidity
In an environment dominated by the economic crisis and a major decline in
demand, a number of business entities have been forced to adjust their operations
to the emerging circumstances. Some businesses that used to be profitable before
the crisis have now been forced to move at least part of their activities into the
shadow economy to be able to continue doing business. Other business entities are
faced with poor liquidity.7 Due to widespread liquidity problems, business entities
that pay taxes in Serbia often opt for partial compliance with tax legislation, either
not paying regularly or not paying the amounts required, giving preference instead
to meeting their obligations arising from commercial transactions. To be able to be
selective in their payments, business entities often shift part of their operations into
the shadow economy and pay their debts according to the significance of each
particular creditor to their business. According to the findings of the survey, the
economic crisis was identified as the single most important cause of the shadow
economy.
difference is even greater when particular sectors are observed (e.g., manufacturing) (World Bank
2011).
5Multiple reasons for the lower productivity of the informal sector are usually cited in literature.
The first one is the informal sector’s limited access to finance. Poorer access to formal finance (see
the last section of this chapter) forces these entities to seek finance from more expensive informal
sources, or to rely exclusively on their own sources of finance (including borrowing from family
and friends). Limited access to finance means that these companies employ less capital: this in turn
means that they cannot be more efficient due to division of labour, or achieve economies of scale
and size. Consequently, business entities operating in the informal sector tend to use labour-
intensive means of production and have lower productivity. The second reason is that the informal
sector, as a rule, retains a less productive workforce. The third factor is that these entities cannot
seek protection from the state (say, if informal contracts are not met), nor do they have access to
the various forms of assistance provided by the state. Finally, these business entities are often
unable to report corruption in government bodies, and are thus frequently forced to bribe corrupt
officials themselves.
6 As taxes account for less than 10 % of total expenditure, businesses must include all relevant
costs—including taxes—into their business models (Ranđelović and Ðorđević 2012).
7 One should bear in mind the fact that, in the minds of business people, the economic crisis can to
a large extent be equated with issues of poor liquidity (and insolvency) faced by the corporate
sector.
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4.3.3 Inefficient Market Exit
The already-mentioned issue of poor efficiency and substantial liquidity shortages
should lead to an orderly exit of businesses from the market, through either
insolvency (bankruptcy) or voluntary liquidation. Reforms of the insolvency pro-
cedure have resulted in some progress, both in terms of the duration and cost of the
proceedings and the number of insolvency cases (primarily owing to the application
of ‘automatic bankruptcy’), and have also brought about a major reduction in the
number of insolvent businesses (i.e., businesses whose bank accounts have been
frozen). Nevertheless, the late initiation of formal insolvency proceedings or the
lack of such proceedings has made it possible for a number of debtors whose bank
accounts have been frozen to continue operating, mainly in the informal sector. In
mid-2012 the Constitutional Court declared the ‘automatic bankruptcy’ provisions
of the Bankruptcy Law unconstitutional. This ruling will lead to a renewed increase
in the number of businesses with illiquidity problems, some of which will be forced
to continue operating in the informal sector.8
Another problem also present in Serbia is the so-called ‘phoenix company’
mechanism, where businesses keep their debts vested in the old business while
their assets are transferred to a new business (or they temporarily move the business
into the shadow economy) and then de facto wind the old business up. In practice
this often takes place with no sanctions for the owner. ‘Phoenix companies’ most
often do business with small and medium-sized businesses and cause them sub-
stantial liquidity problems. To be able to survive, the victims of ‘phoenix compa-
nies’ themselves rely on moving part of their operations into the shadow economy.
4.3.4 High Administrative Burden
A high administrative burden incentivises businesses and individuals to do business
in the informal sector. Empirical findings show a substantial positive correlation
between the regulatory burden imposed on the private sector and the extent of the
shadow economy.9 Some authors (e.g., Friedman et al. 2000) even believe that
8 Provisions on automatic insolvency (as governed by the Bankruptcy Law, Official Gazette of the
Republic of Serbia Nos. 104/2009, 99/2011—other law, and 71/2012—Constitutional Court
ruling) have been repealed. This has made it possible for debtors whose accounts have been
frozen due to non-payment for more than 1 year to continue operating.
9 Johnson et al. (1998) showed that changes to the regulatory environment (as measured using the
regulation index, which ranges between 1 and 5) have a major impact on the share of the shadow
economy. A one-point change in the index will lead to an increase of 8.1 % in the share of the
shadow economy. Enste (2010) used a comprehensive regulation index (comprising regulation of
the labour and goods market, and the quality of institutions) to also analyse the relationship
between the regulatory environment and the shadow economy. The findings, based on research
into 25 OECDmember countries, show that regulation is one of the main factors that determine the
extent of the shadow economy, in addition to the tax wedge and tax morality.
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entrepreneurs base their decision as to whether or not to enter the informal sector
more on their desire to avoid bureaucracy (and corruption) than to evade paying
taxes.10 The administrative burden is considered to be one of the major causes of the
shadow economy in Serbia. The administrative costs of doing business in Serbia—
estimated between 3.8 and 4.2 % (Radulović 2011b)—put it at the top of the list of
countries that have made similar measurements. Table 4.1 shows a comparison of
the share of administrative costs and the shadow economy in GDP in selected
countries.11
However, it is interesting that in the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in
Serbia, carried out for the purposes of this study, complex administrative pro-
cedures were ranked ‘only’ eighth in the list of causes of the shadow economy,
behind macroeconomic and tax factors, as well as behind corruption and lack of
trust in the state (Fig. 4.1). When analysing the findings of this study we should take
into account the fact that the respondents came from businesses that operate, as a
rule, mainly or even wholly in the formal economy. Hence, we cannot conclude that
complex administrative procedures have ceased to be a major factor for those still
remaining outside the formal market.
4.3.5 Poor Regulatory Environment and Legal Insecurity
In assessing the regulatory burden we should bear in mind the fact that it is not just
the burden that matters (in terms of money and time spent on compliance, etc.): it is
Table 4.1 Comparison of administrative costs and extent of shadow economy
Country Administrative costs (% of GDP) Shadow economy (% of GDP)
Serbia (2010) 4.0 30.1
Denmark (2006) 2.2 17.0
Netherlands (2003) 3.6 13.3
Czech Republic (2005) 3.0 17.8
Austria (2006) 2.8 9.6
Sources: For the share of administrative costs in GDP in Serbia, see Radulović (2011b); for the
Netherlands, see Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, CPB (2004), Reducing the
administrative burden in the European Union, CPB Memorandum; for Denmark, see SCM
Network (2006), Information about the Danish SCM measurements; for the Czech Republic, see
Office of the Government of the Czech Republic (2006), Regulatory Reform in the Czech
Republic. For the shadow economy, see Schneider et al. (2010), except for Serbia, for which see
Chap. 4 of this study
10 The findings of Friedman et al. (2000) indicate a substantial link between various indicators of
the regulatory burden and the extent of the shadow economy: more regulation means a larger
shadow economy.
11 One should exercise caution when comparing these data, due to the different methodologies
used to calculate administrative costs. The standard cost model is treated in greater detail and a
comparison of methodologies by country is given in Radulović (2011a).
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also the quality of the regulatory environment that is important.12 Where the
regulatory environment is poor, and the regulatory burden great, business entities
will tend to shift at least part of their activities into the shadow economy. In this
context, Enste (2010) cites the advantages of deregulation over other instruments
aimed at reducing the extent of the informal economy. On the one hand, tax policy
and the social security system are much more difficult to reform, due to the rigidity
of the need to finance public goods and services and the political sensitivity of such
reforms. On the other, deregulation does not bring about an increase in the budget
deficit, while at the same time removing constraints and creating greater freedom of
choice in how to do business, thereby directly contributing to the shadow economy
becoming a less attractive option.
The findings of the survey show that “frequent legislative changes and imposi-
tion of unnecessary costs by the state” were cited by business entities as the second
most important problem when doing business (a total of 41 %). As regulatory
expenses are mainly fixed, they theoretically affect small businesses the most.
There are multiple causes of the low quality of the regulatory environment and
legal insecurity in Serbia, the most important being lateness in adopting bylaws,
inadequate consultation with the private sector, and poor analysis and drafting
process. One of the main causes of legal insecurity is lateness in adopting bylaws,
which makes it impossible to implement the laws, while simultaneously old legis-
lation lapses.13 Faced with this legal vacuum, business entities are often forced to
operate not knowing whether they are operating in accordance with the law or if
their activities fall within the scope of the shadow economy. The second cause of
the poor regulatory environment is the frequent lack of publicity and consultations
with the private sector in designing new legislation. According to analyses carried
out by Transparency Serbia (2012), statutory provisions governing public comment
periods in Serbia are inadequate. Among other things, there is no pre-defined form
of public debate, nor are there sanctions in the event that a public body fails to
launch such a debate.14 Non-compliance with the law by public authorities is
compounded by the frequently passive stance of business entities. Businesses
often lack the time and resources needed to take part, or simply do not feel that
they can change anything. Besides, the frequent use of urgent law-making proce-
dure in adopting legislation makes any kind of public participation difficult. In 2012
as many as 45 of the 55 laws affecting the business environment were adopted
12 Loayza et al. (2006) state that “Countries with better institutions tend to create regulatory
environments genuinely aimed to improve business conditions rather than privilege a few interest
groups. They are also more likely to enforce regulation in a transparent and even-handed manner,
limiting the regulator’s margin for arbitrariness and corruption”. Unfortunately, this does not apply
to the Republic of Serbia.
13 According to analysis carried out by NALED in 2012 (NALED 2012b), only three bylaws were
adopted before the deadline, 33 were adopted after the deadline, and in 163 cases the deadline
expired before the bylaws were adopted. Some bylaws were more than 2 years late.
14 The last instance of a consultation process related to the package of tax laws adopted in
late 2012.
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under urgent procedure. The lack of transparency and abuse of urgent procedure
often result in inadequate statutory provisions (of which the administrative costs
mentioned above are just one part) that make it difficult or impossible for the
private sector to operate normally. Finally, the very manner of analysing and
drafting legislation is also often poor. Even when there are formal regulatory impact
analysis (RIA) reports that are part of the explanatory notes accompanying a
proposed piece of legislation, the quality of such analysis is often questionable, as
it is not carried out simultaneously with the law drafting and, as a rule, does not
contain any type of quantitative assessment of the impact (costs and benefits) on the
private sector. The current manner of drafting and adopting legislation does not
contain appropriate mechanisms to prevent the adoption of legislation containing
unnecessary regulatory requirements, while criteria guiding the authorities tasked
with appraising the adequacy of analyses and the regulatory impact on business are
excessively mild.15
4.3.6 Construction Permit Issues for Existing Buildings
(‘Legalisation’) and New Construction
According to a recent study entitled Assessment of Constraints on Construction
Permits in Serbia (USAID 2012b), investors often face difficulties in establishing
title to tracts of land due to complex and often unclear restitution, ‘legalisation’, and
conversion procedures. Unclear and complex ‘legalisation’ of buildings (i.e., issu-
ance of construction permits for buildings constructed without appropriate
approval) hinders access to the formal sector and commencement of legal opera-
tions, which means that some resources are placed completely beyond the scope of
legal transactions and use in the formal economy. This leads to the well-known
consequences described in de Soto (1989, 2000). According to data made available
by the Ministry of Construction and Urban Planning, there are more than 700,000
unpermitted buildings in Serbia. In addition to legalisation issues, market entry is
also hindered by the very complex construction permit system that entails filing for
approval with a large number of bodies.16 The construction permit procedure is
15 For instance, the Office of Regulatory Reform and Regulatory Impact Analysis received only
67 draft bills throughout 2012. Of these, the Office found that 24 contained impact analyses;
37 were provided with partial analyses; no analysis was required in three cases; while another three
cases did not contain such analysis. Even the three bills missing RIAs were able to enter
law-making procedure after the appropriate government committee so resolved. This means that
‘filtering’ legislation by quality does not function appropriately.
16 According to the construction permitting study carried out by the USAID Business Enabling
Project (BEP 2012b), 52 steps are typically needed to obtain a construction permit for an industrial
company. Public businesses and other public authorities are in charge of as many as 90 % of these
procedures; there are as many as 20 different bodies exercising public powers that take part in the
procedure.
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inefficient and lengthy; unable to obtain permits the proper way, a number of
business entities start construction on their own initiative, thereby assuming a
great deal of risk. In these circumstances they engage workers from the informal
sector and businesses and entrepreneurs who do not report their work. The results of
the survey carried out for the purposes of this study bear out the above conclusions.
In addition to the pronounced extent of the shadow economy in the construction
sector, this industry was also noted for a number of other responses (e.g., cost-
cutting due to unfair competition is more pronounced in construction, as is opera-
tion without appropriate permits, etc.).
4.3.7 Quality of Public Services
Quality of public services correlates negatively with the extent of the shadow
economy, with greater quality of public services implying greater readiness by
the public to pay taxes, as those taxes go towards financing goods and services that
meet their needs appropriately. Since relevant international studies show that the
quality of general public services (healthcare, education, efficiency of public
administration, efficiency of the justice system, etc.) is lower in Serbia than in
most other European countries (World Bank 2009), the readiness of taxpayers to
pay taxes in the manner and amounts set by law is also lower. The results of the
survey show that the lack of trust in the state and public institutions is the second
most important cause of the shadow economy in Serbia. Given that the degree of
trust in the state reflects the degree of taxpayer satisfaction with the way that the
state functions (and the quality of public goods it provides), it can be concluded that
this is one of the major causes of the shadow economy in Serbia.
4.3.8 High Levels of Corruption
High levels of corruption disincentivise taxpayers from paying taxes, since the
impression corruption creates is that those taxes will not be used to adequately
finance the public sector, but will rather result in private gain by certain categories
of people. Serbia has been ranked 86th (out of a total of 183 countries) in the global
corruption perceptions index, indicating a high level of perceived corruption in
society and, consequently, lower willingness of the public to pay their taxes. In
addition, our survey found that respondents ranked corruption as the fourth most
important cause of the shadow economy in Serbia.
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4.3.9 High Tolerance for the Shadow Economy
by the Government
Many forms of the shadow economy are visible and could be tackled with relative
ease. However, for a multitude of reasons, the Serbian Government has been
postponing measures aimed at doing so. Thus, for instance, new (unused) industrial
products are generally sold in flea and farmers’ markets where taxes are evaded
partially or wholly. The government tolerates these activities, as it views them as
social welfare of sorts, aimed at the unemployed. Non-taxation of property is
motivated more by political than by social reasons (e.g., local authorities avoid
realistically estimating market values of real estate for tax purposes or avoid taxing
all real estate in their areas in order to gain the political support of the electorate).
4.3.10 Large Number of Small Business Entities
The large number of small business entities has an adverse impact on the extent of
the shadow economy, as more taxpayers mean that the Tax Administration is less
likely to audit any one of them, which serves as an incentive for tax evasion.
Empirical research carried out worldwide, including in Serbia (see Chap. 6 of this
study) shows that the shadow economy is at its most widespread with entrepreneurs
and small and micro-businesses (Tedds 2010; Williams 2006). Although compar-
ative data indicate that the structure of Serbia’s economy, in terms of the number of
small, medium-sized, and large businesses, is similar to that of EU member states, it
has been estimated that the current ratio of Tax Administration staff effectively
engaged in tax audit to the number of taxpayers is relatively unfavourable. This
contributes to the relatively low perceived probability of the discovery of tax
evasion (issues faced by the Tax Administration will be covered in greater detail
in Chap. 8 of this study). The unfavourable ratio of tax inspectors to number of
taxpayers potentially subject to audit is primarily the consequence of the poor
staffing structure of the Tax Administration, where only slightly more than 10 %
of staff are tasked with performing audits. In view of this, reorganising the Tax
Administration to substantially increase the number of staff engaged in audits and
improve their skills, while at the same time reducing the number of employees
charged with administrative duties, would be an improvement of the current
situation.
4.3.11 The Structure of the Population’s Income
The structure of the population’s income affects the extent of the shadow economy
because of the differentiation in tax collection mechanisms by amount of income.
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The structure of the population’s income is closely linked to the relative signifi-
cance of individual forms of incorporation in the economy: companies, entrepre-
neurs, and agricultural estates. Thus the level of evasion of tax on income from
wage-employment is much lower in Serbia than that of the tax on income from self-
employment (paid by farmers, entrepreneurs, etc.), since income from wage-
employment is generally taxed at source by means of withholding a portion of
income, while tax on income from self-employment is generally either self-
assessed or payable when assessed by the Tax Authorities. In addition, states with
a greater share of agriculture in GDP have greater volumes of the shadow economy
on average, since the consumption of own products is not taxed.
4.3.12 A High Unemployment Rate
A high unemployment rate makes labour supply inelastic, meaning that the unem-
ployed, with few opportunities to find employment in the formal labour market,
consent to informal work that does not involve the payment of taxes and contribu-
tions on their wages (nor the rights arising from the payment of such dues). At
26.1 %, according to the Labour Force Survey, the unemployment rate in Serbia is
among the highest in Europe (similarly high unemployment rates are seen only in
Spain, Italy, Macedonia, and Greece). This factor has a major impact on the extent
of the informal economy in Serbia, particularly in the field of employment.
4.3.13 Tax Morality
Tax morality defined as the readiness of a taxpayer to pay taxes in full and on time
and thus pay in full for the public goods and services provided by the government,
also has a substantial effect on the extent of the shadow economy. Hence, in
countries with a low degree of trust in government institutions and their fairness
and efficiency (such as Serbia) tax morality is also low, which adversely impacts the
volume of the shadow economy. Low tax morality is also caused by the govern-
ment’s high tolerance for the shadow economy. However, the results of the survey
show that ‘just’ 9 % of all respondents believe that operating informally is justified
in full or to a large degree.
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4.4 Incentives from the Financial Sector
The major factors that indirectly support the shadow economy within the system
include the significant share of cash transactions in the total volume of payments,
informal finance, and unregistered remittance inflows sent by migrants from
abroad.
4.4.1 Cash Transactions
Cash represents a means that enables informal operations.17 Cash transactions
include off-account payments that often occur informally and in foreign currency
(in dollarized economies). As a rule, countries where the use of electronic money is
more widespread see substantially lower volumes of shadow economy. According
to the findings of Schneider (2011a), a 10 % increase in the share of electronic
payments will lead to a 5 % drop in the shadow economy. Payments in cash still
account for a large portion of total payments made in Serbia, although they have
been seeing a downward trend over the past 5 years. According to NBS data for Q3
2012, more than six million payment cards (debit, credit, and corporate cards) have
been issued in Serbia, with the number of active cards (with at least one payment
during the previous quarter) standing at 2.7 million. Between 2007 and 2011 an
increase of 56 % in the number of transactions at cashpoints and points-of-sale
involving cards issued in Serbia was recorded (a rise from 75 to 132 million
transactions). However, of the total turnover of RSD 534 billion, as much as RSD
372.5 billion, or some 70 %, is accounted for by cash withdrawals.
Seen in this context, Serbia is characterised by an extremely high degree of
euroisation (IMF 2011). According to the NBS report, in late March 2012 the
degree of dinarisation of the Serbian financial system, measured as the share of
dinar lending in total corporate and household lending, stood at 27.9 % (NBS
2012).18 As the formal sector is euroised, a large number of transactions in the
informal sector also take place in euros. It is quite common to pay for, say, more
valuable services provided by tradesmen, or minor construction work etc., in euros.
In addition to the fiscal motives discussed above, euroisation provides clear
(non-fiscal) incentives for transactions to take place in the informal sector. Pay-
ments in foreign currency, instead of in dinars, in the informal sector avoid
commission fees charged by banks and the differences in the exchange rates applied
17According to Schneider (2011b), “Countries with high levels of electronic payment usage, such
as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, have smaller shadow economies than those with
minimal levels of electronic payments, such as Bulgaria and Romania.”
18 In addition to the fact that the share of the dinar measured in this way is less than one-third, it
should be borne in mind that the bulk of dinar-denominated loans are actually those subsidised by
the state.
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by banks when buying and selling foreign currency (for instance, when a business
entity issues a foreign currency sales order to the bank where it keeps its foreign
currency assets, whereupon the bank pays the appropriate dinar amount to the
payee’s dinar-denominated account).19
4.4.2 Informal Finance
Informal finance is a phenomenon that accompanies the large extent of the shadow
economy in developing countries. The reasons for its existence are poor local
legislation and enforcement regulations, market entry barriers, expensive formal
financing sources, lack of finance products that meet beneficiaries’ needs, inappro-
priate tax legislation, and high tax rates (USAID 2005, 2012a). The consequences
of informal finance are reflected in greater information asymmetries between
market participants, lack of tax revenue derived from this area, and exclusion of
formal financial intermediaries from the funds transfer process. This has a negative
effect on the development of the financial sector and the efficient allocation of
financial resources to recipients. Low efficiency, lack of transparency, and greater
uncertainty reduce the trust of the participants in the system, which leads to less
readiness to embark on new projects and invest: this in turn has adverse repercus-
sions on the growth of the economy as a whole. Thus it is in the interest of economic
policymakers to disincentivise informal financing channels in parallel with efforts
aimed at tackling the informal economy, and to foster financing through existing
formal channels and the development of new ones. This would reduce uncertainty,
enhance the efficiency of allocation of funds received, boost employment, and
increase tax revenues generated by formal activity. A greater finance supply should
result in lower financing costs, which could increase the availability of these funds,
primarily to entrepreneurs and small and medium-sized businesses, which are
among the main drivers of new cycles of economic activity in developing countries.
A major role in this process, in addition to the private sector, should be played by
various forms of public-private partnership, as well as by special development
institutions.
According to one of the initiatives announced by the Serbian Ministry of Finance
and Economy, the state will acquire up to 25 % of the equity of a number of
primarily export-oriented SMEs that cannot secure appropriate financing. Busi-
nesses with the best investment programmes will be eligible to apply for this
support, while the Serbian Export Credit and Insurance Agency (AOFI) will be in
charge of the technical arrangements. The key issue in determining the success of
19 The Foreign Currency Operations Law (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 62/2006
and 31/2011) stipulates, among other things, that incoming and outgoing payments and transfers
between residents and non-residents in Serbia must be made in dinars, save for particular cases
listed in Article 34(2), in which foreign currency may be used.
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this programme will certainly be the need to reduce the moral hazard risk involved
in distributing the limited funds available in the budget.
Alternatively, Serbia could gradually shift to the globally accepted practice of
establishing institutions providing micro-finance to entrepreneurs and SMEs that
find traditional borrowing either inaccessible or too costly. Originally envisaged as
non-profit entities owned by the very people most at risk and in need of financing to
start their businesses, these institutions can take the form of either co-operatives or
credit unions. They can also formally be incorporated as non-governmental orga-
nisations or savings banks, or can even be owned by the government as sector-
oriented banks (e.g., agricultural development banks, rural banks, etc.). The key
issue and precondition for establishing these specialised entities essentially remains
similar to that for the proposal to establish a single Serbian Development Bank: it is
necessary to design appropriate laws and bylaws to prevent corruption in allocating
funds, and ensure professionalism and efficiency in managing the limited resources
available to such an entity.
As shown by the survey of businesses and entrepreneurs in Serbia, one of the
major constraints on doing business is access to formal financing, as well as weak
purchasing power, frequent changes to legislation, high tax rates, inflation, and
political instability. Most business entities are financed from net profits (92 %),
while slightly more than one-quarter borrow from banks (24 %). Business entities
tend to borrow either from banks or from their owners, while entrepreneurs rely on
funds borrowed from individuals, friends, or family members. Another initiative of
the Ministry of Finance and Economy current in 2013, which should facilitate
access to liquid financing, is a programme of subsidised liquidity loans, which
will be aimed at SMEs.
Slightly more than half of all business entities surveyed believe that financing in
their sector of activity came in part from informal sources on which no tax is paid;
the estimated share of informal investment was up to 50 % of the total investment.
On the other hand, such financing was rarely admitted when respondents spoke
about their own operations. Only one-fifth of all business entities stated that
investment in their companies came in part from informal financing (with up to
30 % of the sum total of investments), while 66 % claimed that no such financing
was invested in their company.
4.4.3 Unregistered Remittances Sent by Migrants from
Abroad
These represent a particularly important source of foreign capital in developing
countries, which in absolute amounts often exceeds other forms of capital inflow
from both private and public sources (Adams and Page 2005; Irving et al. 2010;
Abdih et al. 2009, 2012). As the greatest volume of remittances enters most
developing countries mainly through informal channels, better knowledge of the
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features of these transfers is necessary if they are to be formalised and directed into
productive activities in the recipient country.20
Remittances were undoubtedly the largest source of financial inflows into Serbia
during and after the global crisis. According to data for the period 2007–2011,
inflows of remittances reached €2.5–4 billion annually. The share of remittances in
GDP is significant (7.6 % between 2007 and 2011) and they cover nearly 40 % of
the trade deficit (the difference between the monetary value of imports and exports
of goods and services) (Janković and Gligorić 2012).
According to some estimates, only between 10 and 50 % of remittances are
actually transferred through formal channels (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009). In
some countries the actual volume of remittance flows not registered officially or
transferred through informal channels is often considered much greater than the
estimates made by the relevant institutions, which only serves to underline the
importance of remittances as a possible external source of financing consumption
and investment in developing countries (Chami et al. 2008, 2009). The inflow of
remittances into Serbia is at present estimated on the basis of formal inflows,
primarily through the banking sector, while informal inflows are approximated
primarily using the volume of activity of foreign currency exchange services.
In spite of the dearth of responses, the findings of the Survey on Conditions for
Doing Business in Serbia are significant, since this is one of the first studies to date
on the possible impact of remittances on Serbia’s economy.21 All entrepreneurs
whose households receive remittances from abroad claimed they did so via bank
accounts. As expected, no informal channels were mentioned. Entrepreneurs who
responded came predominantly from the trade and other services sectors, and
primarily represented small businesses with up to 4 or between 5 and 19 employees.
Although few entrepreneurs confirmed they did receive remittances from abroad,
they claimed that they used the money mainly to start or carry on operations (77 %
of all entrepreneurs’ households that received remittances). Interestingly enough,
only 34 % of the funds received had been used for consumption, while as much as
66 % had been employed in business. It is also important to note that funds from
remittances have been used in business for some time now. Entrepreneurs who had
employed such funds over the previous year made up 23 % of those who received
remittances. A total of 32 % of respondents stated that they had been using
20 The World Bank defines migrant remittances as the sum of workers’ remittances, employee
compensation, and migrants’ transfers. Under the IMF Balance of Payments Manual, 6th Edition
(IMF 2010), workers’ remittances are defined as personal transfers of migrant workers residing in
the country in which they work. Residence is assumed to be where a worker remains abroad for
1 year or more, while income earned during shorter stays abroad is categorised as employee
compensation. Migrant transfers represent the net value of the assets of migrants transferred from
one country to another during their migration for a period of at least 1 year. The recipients of these
assets reside in their country of origin.
21 An attempt was made by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia to study and analyse the
inflows of remittances into Serbia. This was an ad hoc survey into unregistered remittances carried
out as part of a regional project aimed at assessing a portion of the unreported economy.
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remittances in business for 6–10 years, while 15 % claimed that they had used
remittances in business for more than 10 years. Remittances are most often used to
purchase current assets, which is only logical in these activity sectors. These
findings are particularly relevant since it is certain that a substantial portion of
remittances is transferred through informal channels, which increases the amount of
funds potentially available for investment, notwithstanding the fact that the respon-
dents did not formally substantiate this assumption.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Arsić M, Ranđelović S, Pejić M (2012) Reform of the system of Quasi-Fiscal charges for the
improvement of business conditions in Serbia. Quarterly Monitor, vol 29, April–June 2012
Chami R, Barajas A, Cosimano T, Fullenkamp C, Gapen M, Montiel P (2008) Macroeconomic
consequences of remittances. IMF Occasional Paper No 259. International Monetary Fund,
Washington, DC
Chami R, Barajas A, Gapen M, Fullenkamp C, Montiel P (2009) Do workers’ remittances promote
economic growth? IMF Working Paper WP/09/153. International Monetary Fund,
Washington, DC
De Soto H (1989) The other path. Harper and Row, New York
De Soto H (2000) The mystery of capital: why capitalism triumphs in the west and fails
everywhere else. Basic Books, New York
Enste DH (2010) Regulation and shadow economy: empirical evidence for 25 OECD-countries.
Constit Polit Econ 21:231–248
Fiscal Council (2012) Predlog mera fiskalne konsolidacije 2012–2016
Friedman E, Johnson S, Kaufmann D, Zoido-Lobaton P (2000) Dodging the grabbing hand: the
determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries. J Public Econ 76:459–493
Giuliano P, Ruiz-Arranz M (2009) Remittances, financial development and growth. J Dev Econ 90
(1):144–152
GIZ (2010) Addressing tax evasion and tax avoidance in developing countries. Study prepared by
GIZ and the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development
IMF (2010) Balance of payments manual, 6th edn. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC
4 Causes of the Shadow Economy 45
IMF (2011) Republic of Serbia: request for stand-by arrangement, IMF Country Report 11/311.
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC
Irving J, Mohapatra S, Ratha D (2010) Migrant remittance flows: findings from a global survey of
central banks. Working Paper 94. The World Bank, Washington, DC
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Chapter 5
What Is the Extent of the Shadow Economy
in Serbia?
Friedrich Schneider, Gorana Krstić, Milojko Arsić, and Saša Ranđelović
5.1 Introduction
The last country study on the shadow economy in FR Yugoslavia/Serbia with
policy recommendations dates from 1998 (Krstić et al. 1998). The size of the
shadow economy is estimated at 34.5 % of registered GDP, using data from the
special individual survey on the informal economy and applying the modified
labour market supply approach suggested by Contini (1981, 1992).
Two multi-country studies that include estimates of the shadow economy for
transition economies including Serbia are Schneider (2004) and Christie and
Holzner (2004). Schneider’s paper provides estimates of the shadow economy for
countries from around the world using the MIMIC econometric approach. The size
of the shadow economy in Serbia and Montenegro (still one country at that time)
was estimated at 39.1 % of measured GDP in 2002/2003 and 41.4 % in 2006/2007
(Schneider 2007). Christie and Holzner (2004) analyze a range of South Eastern
Europe (SEE), Central Eastern Europe, and Baltic (CEB) countries. They take a
different approach from that of Schneider (2004) and focus instead on household
tax compliance (HTC). They found a wider range of estimates compared to
Schneider’s results, with Serbia, perhaps surprisingly, estimated at just 19 % of
GDP in 2001.
In this chapter, we will present estimates of the extent of the shadow economy
based on three methods: (1) the MIMIC method, (2) the household tax compliance
(HTC) method, and (3) the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia.
Estimates of the shadow economy for the period 2001–2010 using the MIMIC
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method were made for Serbia and ten other Central and Eastern European countries:
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Roma-
nia, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
The estimate of the shadow economy using the HTC method was based on
macroeconomic data on household consumption and income for 2010. The third
estimate was made using the findings of the Survey on Conditions for Doing
Business in Serbia. When comparing these assessments it is necessary to bear in
mind that their coverage of the shadow economy differs, both in terms of institu-
tional sectors (businesses, households, etc.) and informal activities (trade in goods,
undeclared work, unreported property, fees, charges, etc.). The MIMIC method has
the greatest coverage, since it comprises all institutional sectors and all forms of the
shadow economy. The HTC method covers informal activities that can be identified
in household income and consumption, but not those that are exclusively in the
businesses. The Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia was the basis
for estimating the extent of the shadow economy in the sector of businesses and
entrepreneurs for the two main types of informal activity, illicit trade in goods and
undeclared work. It is necessary to bear in mind that estimates of the shadow
economy in the households sector (the HTC method) and the business and entre-
preneur sector (the Survey) cannot be viewed as cumulative since they for the most
part cover the same forms of informal activity (undeclared work, trade in goods),
albeit with some minor differences in their coverage.
In addition to estimating the shadow economy, this chapter also provides
estimates of the VAT gap, the personal income tax gap, and the social security
contributions gap. Differences in coverage must be taken into account when
interpreting and comparing these assessments, as must be the fact that all estimates
of the shadow economy are only approximate.
Methodological differences between the methods and sources of data must also
be considered, since they can affect the findings to some degree. Whilst the first
method of estimating the shadow economy is based on modelling, the second is
indirect in its approach, since the estimates are based on macroeconomic data
obtained from national accounts. The third method is direct and is based on
microeconomic data from the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia.
5.2 Estimate of the Shadow Economy Using the MIMIC
Method
5.2.1 Introduction
The size and development of the Central and Eastern European shadow economies
have been measured since the late 1980s, starting with the work of Kaufmann and
Kaliberda (1996), Johnson et al. (1997), and Lacko (1996). All these authors use the
physical input (electricity) method and come up with quite large figures (from a
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macro perspective). In the work of Belev (2003) the above mentioned studies are
critically evaluated, arguing that the estimated size of the shadow economies are to
a large extent a historical phenomenon (due to the communist eras of all of these
countries) and partly determined by institutional factors.1
Definition of the Shadow Economy
The shadow economy is defined as the ensemble of all market-based legal
production activities that are deliberately concealed from public authorities
for one or more reasons: to evade payment of income, value added, or other
taxes; to evade payment of social security contributions; to evade certain
legal labour market standards, such as minimum wages, maximum working
hours, safety standards, etc.; and to evade certain administrative procedures,
such as completing statistical questionnaires or administrative forms
(Schneider et al. 2010). On average, the informal economy refers to legiti-
mate goods rather than illegal goods. The macro estimates include smuggling
of legitimate goods within the definition. Thus, smuggled goods/inputs that
make their way into legitimate production are implicitly included in the
definition of shadow economy.
In this section, we present the estimation procedure of the MIMIC method, and
estimation results and their interpretation for the following countries over the
period 2001–2010: Serbia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
Based on the MIMIC method, we estimated that the extent of the shadow
economy in Serbia declined from 33.2 % of GDP in 2001 to 30.1 % of GDP in
2010. When compared to other countries the shadow economy in Serbia was greater
than the averages for the selected 11 countries throughout the period observed.
Only Bulgaria recorded a more extensive shadow economy, in percentage of GDP,
than Serbia (by 2.2 percentage points in 2010).
5.2.2 The MIMIC Model Approach
Most methods for estimating the size of the shadow economy so far consider just
one indicator that captures all effects of the shadow economy. However, effects of
the shadow economy show up simultaneously in the production, labour, and money
markets. An even more important critique is that several causes that determine the
size of the shadow economy are only taken into account in some of the monetary
approach studies that usually consider one cause, the burden of taxation. The model
1 For a critical evaluation of the various estimations and calibration methods see Schneider (2005),
Feld and Schneider (2010), and Schneider (2010, 2011).
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approach explicitly considers multiple causes of the existence and growth of the
shadow economy, as well as the multiple effects of the shadow economy over time
in several indicator variables. The empirical method is based on the statistical
theory of unobserved variables, which considers multiple causes and multiple
indicators of the phenomenon to be measured. For the estimation, a factor-analytic
approach is used to measure the hidden economy as an unobserved variable over
time. The unknown coefficients are estimated in a set of structural equations within
which the ‘unobserved’ variable cannot be measured directly. The MIMIC
(multiple-indicators multiple-causes) model consists in general of two parts, with
the measurement model linking the unobserved variables to observed indicators.2
The structural equations model specifies causal relationships between the
unobserved variables. In this case there is one unobserved variable, the size of the
shadow economy: this is assumed to be influenced by a set of indicators for the
shadow economy’s size, thus capturing the structural dependence of the shadow
economy on variables that may be useful in predicting its movement and size in the
future. The interaction over time between the causes Zit (i¼ 1, 2, . . ., k), the size of
the shadow economy Xt, in time t, and the indicators Yjt (j¼ 1, 2, . . ., p) is shown in
Fig. 5.1.
There is a large body of literature3 on the possible causes and indicators of the
shadow economy, which distinguishes four types of cause:
(1) The burden of direct and indirect taxation, both actual and perceived—an
increasing tax burden is a strong incentive to work in the shadow economy.
(2) The burden of regulation as a proxy for all other state activities. It is assumed
that increases in the burden of regulation are a strong incentive to enter the
shadow economy.
(3) Tax morality (citizens’ attitudes toward the state), which describes the readi-
ness of individuals to leave their official occupations, at least partly, and enter
the shadow economy: it is assumed that a declining tax morality increases the
size of the shadow economy.4
(4) Institutional factors such as good governance or corruption and rule of law are
also important.5
2 Papers dealing extensively with the MIMIC approach, its development, and especially its
weaknesses are by Dell’Anno (2003) as well as the studies by Giles and Tedds (2002), Breusch
(2005a, b), Dell’Anno and Schneider (2009) and Schneider (2011).
3 Thomas (1992), Schneider (1994, 1997, 2003, 2005, 2010, 2011), Pozo (1996), Johnson
et al. (1998a, b), Giles (1997a, b, 1999a, b), Giles and Tedds (2002), Giles et al. (2002), Dell’Anno
(2003), Dell’Anno and Schneider (2004), and Feld and Schneider (2010).
4When applying this approach to European countries, Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984) had
difficulty in obtaining reliable data for the cause series, as well as for the direct and indirect tax
burdens. Hence, their study was criticized by Helberger and Knepel (1988), who argued that the
results were unstable with respect to changing variables in the model and over the years.
5 Compare here the survey of Feld and Schneider (2010).
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A change in the size of the shadow economy is reflected in the following
indicators:
(1) Development of monetary indicators. If activities in the shadow economy rise,
additional monetary transactions are required.
(2) Development of the labour market. Increased participation of workers in the
hidden sector results in a decrease in participation in the official economy.
Similarly, increased activities in the hidden sector may be reflected in shorter
working hours in the official economy.
(3) Development of the production market. An increase in the shadow economy
means that inputs (especially labour) move out of the official economy (at least
partly), and this displacement might have a depressing effect on the official
growth rate of the economy.
The approach has been used e.g., by Giles (1999a, b) and by Giles et al. (2002),
Giles and Tedds (2002) and Bajada and Schneider (2005), who obtain a time series
index of the hidden/measured output of New Zealand, Canada, India, and Australia,
and then estimate a separate ‘cash-demand model’ to obtain a benchmark for
converting this index into percentage units. Unlike earlier empirical studies of the
hidden economy, proper attention is directed at the non-stationary and possible
co-integration of time series data. Again, this MIMIC model treats hidden output as
a latent variable, and uses several (measurable) causal variables and indicator
variables. The former include measures of the average and marginal tax rates,
inflation, real income, and the degree of regulation in the economy. The latter
include changes in the (male) labour force participation rate and in the cash/money
supply ratio. In their cash-demand equation they allow for different velocities of
currency circulation in the hidden and recorded economies. Their cash-demand
equation is not used as an input to determine the variation in the hidden economy
over time, but only to obtain the long-run average value of hidden/measured output,
so that the index for this ratio predicted by the MIMIC model can be used to
calculate the level and the percentage units of the shadow economy. Overall, this
latest combination of the currency demand and MIMIC approach clearly shows that
some progress in the estimation technique of the shadow economy has been
achieved and a number of critical points have been overcome.
Xt-1
Causes Indicators
Development of the shadow 










Fig. 5.1 Development of
the shadow economy
over time
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However, there are also objections to this method, as follows:
(1) instability in the estimated coefficients with respect to sample size changes,
(2) instability in the estimated coefficients with respect to alternative
specifications,
(3) difficulty in obtaining reliable data on cause variables other than tax variables,
(4) the reliability of grouping the variables into “causes” and “indicators” in
explaining the variability of the shadow economy, and
(5) the calibration method used to transform the relative estimates into
absolute ones.
In spite of these objections, and knowing that all other methods also have severe
weaknesses, the MIMIC procedure is used to estimate the shadow economies of
11 Eastern and Central European countries.
5.2.3 Econometric Results and Their Interpretation
In Table 5.1 the econometric estimation results using the MIMIC approach (latent
estimation approach) is presented for the 11 Central and Eastern European coun-
tries over the period 2001–2010 (e.g. ten data points). As causal variables we can
chose from the following:
i. Indirect taxation revenues in percent of GDP,
ii. Direct taxation revenues in percent of GDP,
iii. Marginal income tax burden in percent,
iv. Effective average tax rate in percent,
v. Regulatory quality index (World Bank indicator), which ranges from 2.5
(weak) to +2.5 (strong) governance performance,
vi. Rule of law (World Bank indicator), which ranges from 2.5 (weak) to +2.5
(strong) governance performance,
vii. Corruption Index, World Bank (¼0 bad freedom from corruption and ¼100
most freedom from corruption),
viii. Self-employment in percent of total employment and
ix. Unemployment rate in percent.
As indicator variables we use:
i. Cash per capita growth,
ii. Employment rate in percent and
iii. GDP per capita.
If we interpret the econometric results shown in Table 5.16 we realize that
indirect taxation has the expected positive sign and is highly statistically significant.
6We present three plausible and ‘best’ results: the stability of the econometric results is somewhat
weak due to the dataset.
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Also, the variables measuring the direct income tax burden have the expected
sign and are statistically significant. The business freedom index of the World
Bank is not statistically significant, as opposed to the cause variable “rule of
law”. Self-employment has the expected positive sign but is not statistically sig-
nificant; the unemployment rate again has the expected positive sign and is highly
statistically significant. The corruption index has the expected negative sign and is
highly statistically significant. If we switch to the indicator variables, the variable
“cash per capita” has the expected positive sign but is not statistically significant.
GDP per capita has the expected negative sign and is highly statistically significant.
In order to calculate the size and development of the shadow economy in these
11 Central and Eastern European countries we have to overcome the disadvantage
of the MIMIC approach, which is that it gives only relative estimated sizes of the
shadow economy and it is necessary to use another approach to get absolute figures.
Table 5.1 MIMIC estimation of the shadow economies of 11 Central and Eastern Europe
Countries, 2001–2010
Cause variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3






Direct taxes in % of GDP – – –




Effective average tax rate in % 0.21**
(2.13)
– –




































Employment rate in % 1.00 1.00 1.00






RMSEA 0.29 0.22 0.19
Chi-squared 35.23 37.45 47.47
AGFI 0.82 0.81 0.91
N 64 64 64
D.F. 27 27 27
Source: Own calculations
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In order to calculate absolute figures for the size of the shadow economies of these
11 countries from this MIMIC estimation result, we use already available informa-
tion from the currency demand approach for Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, and
for the other countries from Schneider (2005) and Lacko (2000).
The results of the size and development of the shadow economies of these
11 Central and Eastern European countries are presented in Table 5.2 using
Model 1. Table 5.2 clearly shows that in principle we have a declining trend in
the size and development of these shadow economies in all 11 countries. As the
table is self-reading, only the values for Serbia will explicitly be mentioned here.
The size of the Serbian shadow economy was 33.2 % in 2001 and declined to
30.1 % in 2008, increased in 2009 to 30.6 % and decreased again in 2010 to 30.1 %.
A small increase in 2009 is observable for almost all of these 11 countries. The
results show that the shadow economy declined in Serbia over the period of
economic growth and then stayed almost unchanged after the beginning of the
economic crisis. We can also see that over the whole period considered the shadow
economy in Serbia is higher than the average values for the selected 11 countries.
Only Bulgaria has a higher shadow economy in percent of GDP than Serbia (by 2.2
percentage points in 2010).
Another important result is that the size and development of the Serbian shadow
economy between 2001 and 2010 show a strong (highly statistically significant)
negative relationship between the size and development of the shadow economy
and the size and development of official GDP. If the official GDP decreases by
1 percentage point the shadow economy increases between 0.60 and 0.70 percent-
age points, depending on the model used. Hence, if the official economy is in a
severe recession the shadow economy greatly increases. This is an obvious result,
which can be observed in a lot of other studies (compare e.g., Field and Schneider
2010 or Schneider 2011). If the official economy shrinks and if people have less
opportunity to earn money in the official economy they will increase their activities
in the shadow economy to compensate for the loss from the official economy or to
earn extra.
5.3 Estimate of the Shadow Economy Using the Household
Tax Compliance Approach7
The shadow economy can be estimated in other ways besides the MIMIC model. A
frequently utilised approach is the HTC (Household Tax Compliance) method,
based on data from macroeconomic accounts. This method estimates the extent of
the shadow economy generated by activities in the household sector, and as such is
narrower in its scope than the MIMIC model, which also includes other institutional
sectors. Any estimate of the shadow economy obtained using the HTC approach is
7 The methodology applied was described and used in Christie and Holzner (2004).
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expected to be lower than that using the MIMIC method, since some informal
activity takes place outside the household sector, i.e., in the corporate sector. So, for
instance, taxpaying businesses and entrepreneurs can conceal part of their profits,
under-report the value of taxable property, engage in trade without declaring VAT
and excise duty (e.g., by setting up ‘phantom companies’), etc.
The extent of the shadow economy in the household sector (SEHS), defined
as the share of undeclared household income (UHI) in GDP, was calculated as
the difference between the total taxable household income (THI) and the








¼ βH  βHλH ¼ βH 1 λHð Þ ð5:1Þ
where βH is the share of total household income in GDP, while λH is the ratio of
taxed to total i.e., taxable household income. Therefore, to estimate the shadow
economy in the household sector, total taxable household income and taxed house-
hold income must be estimated first.
The estimate of the amount of taxable household income (THI) was based on the
assumption that households can use their income for consumption (THC—total
household consumption), savings (SAV), and taxes (TAX). Starting from the fact
that data on total household savings are not known in advance for any given year,
the amount of savings was estimated by multiplying the net household savings rate
(σ) and total household income:
THI ¼ THCþ SAVþ TAX ¼ THCþ σTHIþ TAX
¼ 1
1 σ THCþ TAXð Þ ð5:2Þ
For the purposes of estimating the taxable income of Serbian households we used
data on total household consumption presented in national accounts, as published
by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia.
The savings rate was calculated as the ratio between total current household
savings and total household income. Total current household savings were esti-
mated as the difference between total gross disposable income and total final
household consumption,8 plus the increase in household financial savings, and
less net household liabilities with financial institutions (according to data published
by the National Bank of Serbia). Although savings should include other
non-financial types of savings, such as investment in durable consumer goods or
increase in inventories of non-durable consumer goods, etc., for the purposes of this
estimate we assumed, due to lack of data, that 2010 did not see any changes to
non-financial household savings. Net savings estimated thus amounted to some
8According to data obtained from the UN database.
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4.7 % of gross disposable household income.9 Starting from the estimated net
savings rate and official data of the Ministry of Finance and Economy on govern-
ment revenue in the form of personal income tax and social security contributions,
we estimated Serbia’s total taxable household income (THI).
The estimate of the amount of taxed income was based on the assumption that
total government revenue from taxes and contributions (TGR) is the product of total
(declared) taxed household income (DHI) and the statutory household tax rate
(SHTR), so that the relative extent of total taxed household income can be calcu-






Data on total government revenue from personal income tax and social security
contributions were taken from official publications of the Ministry of Finance and
Economy, while the statutory household tax rate needed to be estimated.
The statutory household tax rate depends on the average personal income tax
rate (PITR), the rate of social security contributions payable by employees (SSCR),
and the net household savings rate, as well as the average VAT rate (VATR), the
average rate of excise duty (EXCR), and the rate of consumption of excise goods
(RCEG). It is calculated in the following manner:
SHTR ¼ PITR þ SSCRþ 1 PITR SSCRð Þ
 1 σð Þ VATRþRCEGEXCRð Þ ð5:4Þ
The average rate of personal income tax was calculated as the weighted average of
tax rates applicable to all types of household income, including: wages; pension
income; social welfare payments; and income from agriculture, hunting, and
fishing, remittances, property, capital gains, gifts, and other income, as well as
income in kind and imputed housing rent. Of all these forms of income, tax is levied
on wages, income from property, and other income, while other forms of income
are non-taxable (i.e., neither income tax nor social security contributions are
payable). The weight applied in calculating the average statutory tax rate was the
share of particular forms of income in the total income of the population in Serbia.
The same approach was used to calculate the average rate of mandatory social
security contributions payable by employees.
The average VAT rate was calculated by taking into account the statutory
general and reduced VAT rates, the structure of consumption (share of goods and
services taxable at the general and reduced rate in total consumption, according to
data from the Household Budget Survey), and types of consumption de facto not
9 If net savings were estimated using data from the Household Consumption Survey, the net
savings rate would stand at about 8.4 %, which is close to the figure obtained by CLDS (2012).
However, due to the respondents’ propensity to underestimate income in these surveys, we felt that
more precise estimates could be obtained using macroeconomic accounts.
5 What Is the Extent of the Shadow Economy in Serbia? 57
subject to VAT, such as consumption from own production. The average rate of
excise duty was calculated by considering statutory excise rates and the structure of
household consumption, where particular excise duties were converted into ad
valorem rates, using typical excise goods as an example (e.g., starting from the
price of an average packet of cigarettes).
Taking formula (5.1) and the relevant variables for 2010 as our starting points,
we estimated the total extent of the shadow economy in Serbia at 23.6 % of GDP, or
RSD 680.3 billion (Table 5.3). The detailed calculation is provided in the Appendix
table. Since the official GDP figures for Serbia are underestimated for various
reasons (which will be described in greater detail below), an increase in the GDP
would cause a change in the absolute amount recorded in the shadow economy.
Thus a nominal increase in registered GDP of 15 % (considered a realistic figure)
would raise the shadow economy to RSD 782.5 billion, since the extent of the
shadow economy in unregistered GDP is assumed to be nearly identical to that in
registered GDP.
The estimated value of the shadow economy based on household consumption
and income data was lower by about one-fifth, or some six percentage points of
GDP, than that obtained by using the MIMIC method. This difference was primar-
ily caused by the fact that the HTC method does not cover informal activities not
reflected in household income and consumption, such as various types of informal
activity in the sector of businesses and entrepreneurs. Furthermore, some of the
divergence in the estimates can be accounted for by differences in methodology and
data sources.
5.4 Estimate of the Shadow Economy Based on the Survey
on Conditions for Doing
5.4.1 Business in Serbia
Microeconomic estimates of the shadow economy can be obtained by using data
collected from taxpayers themselves or from the Tax Administration on detected
evasion. Microeconomic methods are complementary with estimates of the shadow
economy obtained through the use of macroeconomic methods. These methods may
also provide additional information on which industries see the greatest extent of
tax evasion, differences in perceptions of tax evasion depending on the number of
employees in a business, type of business entity (enterprises/entrepreneurs), and the
Table 5.3 Estimate of the shadow economy based on macroeconomic data—HTC method
Shadow economy
As % of GDP 23.6
In RSD billion 680.3
Source: Own calculations
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like. Surveys can provide information about taxpayers’ views on the extent to which
tax evasion jeopardises the equality of market participants, their value judgments
and reasons for tax evasion, the efficiency of government bodies, the extent of
corruption, etc. This chapter estimates the total volume of the shadow economy in
trade in goods and employee wages in the business and entrepreneurial sectors,
while Chap. 6 takes a closer look at other aspects of the shadow economy.
Microeconomic methods do, however, have certain drawbacks. The main poten-
tial weakness of surveys is the near certainty of respondents being biased downward
and thus underestimating tax evasion in their own businesses. In addition, there is
the objective issue of the reliability of answers on tax evasion, as they are made
from memory and not based on any systematic records. Figures calculated using
data on tax evasion uncovered by the Tax Administration are systematically
underestimated, since it is clear that only a certain percentage of evasions are
discovered.
5.4.2 Estimated Extent of the Shadow Economy in the Trade
in Goods
Microeconomic estimates of the extent of the shadow economy in the trade in goods
presented in this study are based on the Survey of Conditions for Doing Business in
Serbia that covers businesses and entrepreneurs. The survey does not cover indi-
viduals, unregistered entrepreneurs, or businesses operating completely in the
shadow economy (see Chap. 3). However, it is estimated that this segment of the
shadow economy is indirectly included in the estimate of the total volume of
informal trading; i.e., trading without the payment of taxes. It is likely that respon-
dents from registered businesses and entrepreneurs included illicit trade with
unregistered businesses when estimating the total volume of illicit trade.
As expected, the businesses and entrepreneurs surveyed underestimated the
volume of informal trade engaged in by their own businesses. As little as 31 % of
businesses and entrepreneurs surveyed responded that they made some payments in
cash. The average volume of payments in cash estimated by the 31 % of respon-
dents stood at some 32.1 %. However, if we extrapolate this percentage onto the
total number of entities, we can see that cash payments account for about 11 % of all
payments—a consequence of the fact that as many as 66.6 % of all respondents
claimed that there were no cash payments at their businesses or shops. The next
chapter takes a more detailed look at ‘shadow trade’ for the set of VAT payers, by
features of business.
Obviously, regardless of the anonymity offered by the survey, the respondents
were less than honest when replying to the question designed to capture the extent
of cash transactions at their business/shop. An estimate of informal transactions can
thus be obtained on the basis of respondents estimates on the participation of other
businesses from the same sector and this estimate could be considered the upper
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limit of its likely extent (see Chap. 3). Based on the responses of the surveyed
businesses and entrepreneurs, cash payments accounted for about 21.6 % of total
payments in their sector of activity.10
The macroeconomic relevance of illicit trade in the business sector can be
gauged on the basis of the share of corporate GDP in total GDP. According to
2010 data, corporate GDP accounted for some 53 % of total GDP (Statistical Office
of the Republic of Serbia 2012). If we assume that the share of businesses in the
trade in goods is approximately equal to their share in GDP, it follows that illicit
trade of 21.6 % implies that the extent of the shadow economy in the trade in goods
amounts to 11.6 % of GDP. When interpreting these figures, it must be noted that it
reflects the amount of added value avoided, which serves as the VAT base, rather
than the value of gross turnover avoided. If the shadow economy were to be
estimated on the basis of gross turnover, rather than on added value, it would be
taken into account multiple times, which is incorrect from the standpoint of
methodology.11 Besides, calculating the extent of the shadow economy based on
gross turnover runs counter to the general idea of value added tax, which is
designed so that added value, rather than gross turnover, is taken as its base.
5.4.3 Estimated Extent of the Shadow Economy
in the Payment of Wages
One of the standard procedures for estimating the shadow economy in the field of
taxing personal income is also based on carrying out a survey on a representative
sample of taxpayers, although answers obtained in this manner have often been
known to underestimate the amount of overall and untaxed income.12 As employee
wages are the dominant form of taxable household income in Serbia, and the taxes
and contributions are paid by employers, the gap in personal income tax and
contributions was estimated using data obtained in the Survey on Conditions for
Doing Business in Serbia. Although this does not cover the portion of the household
income shadow economy that is generated through working outside of regular
working hours or outside of formal employment (e.g., private lessons given by
teachers), the findings can nonetheless serve as an approximate indicator of the
10 The average estimate of tax evasion was calculated using the weighted average, whereby
estimates within an interval were replaced by the median of that interval. In calculating the
average amount of tax evasion we excluded non-responses, i.e., respondents who claimed they
did not know how much was evaded and those who refused to answer.
11 Estimates of the shadow economy based on gross turnover are probably one of the most
significant reasons why the shadow economy is overestimated in public debates in Serbia.
12 The problem of bias inherent in answers to these questions has been partly resolved by posing
implicit questions that relate to the entire sector of activity the respondent engages in, rather than
on the respondent alone. However, this method also carries the risk of untruthful answers, or
misunderstanding of the concept of sector of activity.
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extent of the household income shadow economy, on condition that the extent of
non-declaration of other forms of income is similar to that seen with wages.
The extent of the shadow economy in the field of household income is defined as
the relative divergence between (total) taxable income and taxed (declared) income
in relation to the amount of taxable income. The difference between taxable and
taxed income has been defined in the survey as the wage paid to a worker in cash
(rather than via a bank account) in the sector of activity in which the particular
business entity operates. Thus, the extent of the shadow economy in the field of
household income is an indicator of the ratio of undeclared to declared household
income, and, as such, shows how widespread the shadow economy is in this field.
As respondents were able to choose between intervals of figures for this rate for the
sector of activity they operate in, the average weighted amount was calculated using
the median of the intervals, as well as a weight based on the frequency of respon-
dents selecting a particular interval.
As reported in the survey, the average extent of the shadow economy in wages
(the ratio between undeclared and total actual income from labour) stands at
26.2 %.13 On average, this is higher with entrepreneurs, i.e., wages paid by
entrepreneurs, than with businesses (Fig. 5.2). When viewed by sector of activity,
the extent of employee wages paid in the shadow economy is the highest in
construction, catering, and transportation, much lower in production, and lowest
in businesses engaging in trade. Moreover, the payment of wages in cash is the most
widespread in micro-businesses and by entrepreneurs, and, as businesses grew, the
extent of wages paid informally decreased. In addition, when the data are viewed by
region, the results show that ‘envelope wages’ were more common among
employers in Central Serbia than those based in Vojvodina or Belgrade. The Tax
Administration should take into account this structure of informal employment
when designing an audit system.
The share of gross wages in the sectors of businesses and entrepreneurs in GDP
can be used to estimate the share of avoided wages paid by the business sector in
GDP. Wages account for some 51 % of GDP, while wages paid by businesses make
up some 70 % of all wages. When the 26.2 % rate of informal wages paid by
businesses is applied to this figure, it can be estimated that the extent of the shadow
economy in the payment of wages by businesses stands at 9.4 % of GDP.14
13 According to data from the 2007 Living Standards Measurement Study, the rate of
underreporting of income (% of unreported income in relation to reported income) stood at
26.9 % in Serbia, which underlines the robustness of estimates of the extent of the shadow
economy in the field of household income (Ranđelović 2011).
14 If we take into account the percentage of workers without formal employment contracts whose
wages are paid wholly in cash (23.9 %), and assuming that the respondents did not include them in
their estimates, but rather referred only to workers with a portion of wages paid in cash, the
percentage of wages paid in cash rockets to 43.8 %. This means that the aggregate estimate of the
shadow economy in the payment of wages also increases, to 15.6 % of GDP. A more detailed
overview of the methodology used can be found in Putninš and Sauka (2011).
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5.4.4 Summary Estimate of the Shadow Economy
in the Sector of Businesses and Entrepreneurs
Based on the Survey of Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, it is estimated that
the extent of the shadow economy in the sector of businesses and entrepreneurs with
respect to the trade in goods and the payment of wages stands at some 21.2 % of
GDP (Table 5.4). This estimate covers the greatest portion of informal activity of
businesses and entrepreneurs, but not all types of such activity. The other types of
companies’ informal activity, including the evasion of corporate income tax,
property tax, and various fees and charges, probably collectively account for 10–
15 % of the volume of informal activity in the trade in goods and payment of wages.
As expected, the extent of the shadow economy in the sector of businesses and
entrepreneurs estimated using the findings of the survey was lower than that
estimated using the MIMIC and HTC methods. This is because the MIMIC
model takes into account all institutional sectors and all types of informal activity,
while the survey only looks at the shadow economy among businesses and entre-
preneurs (and not among households), and takes into account only the most
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Fig. 5.2 Extent of the shadow economy in wages, based on the Survey on Conditions for Doing
Business in Serbia. Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia,
FREN 2012
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5.5 Estimate of the Tax Evasion Gap
5.5.1 Introduction
The tax gap is the difference between hypothetical (theoretical) tax revenue and
taxes actually collected. Hypothetical tax revenues are sums that would be collected
over a particular period of time provided that all taxpayers pay their taxes in full
compliance with tax legislation. However, the tax gap is also made up of other
elements in addition to tax evasion, for example, taxes declared but unpaid and tax
revenue lost due to taxpayer insolvency, but their significance to the balance is
mostly low. In the case of Serbia, taxes declared but unpaid may have a relatively
large share due to widespread fiscal indiscipline, and also because of the tolerance
of non-payment by some groups of taxpayers (businesses undergoing restructuring,
poorer individuals, etc.). In this study we have focused on estimating the tax gap
without going into whether it is caused by evasion or non-payment of declared
taxes.
We have estimated the tax gap for the most important types of tax in Serbia:
value added tax (VAT), social security contributions, and personal income tax. The
share of these taxes in Serbia’s total tax revenue is about 80 %. The tax gap was not
estimated for another important tax, excise duty, which has a share of some 15 % in
total tax revenues. Estimating this tax gap would have required detailed assessment
by groups of excise product (oil products, cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, etc.),
which would have gone beyond the scope of this survey.
The application of various methods resulted in an estimate of 7.5 % of GDP for
the total VAT, personal income and social security contributions tax gap. Of this
amount, the income tax and contributions gap amounted to some 5 % of GDP, while
the VAT gap stood at about 2.5 % of GDP. Assuming that the extent of evasion was
slightly lower for other taxes (excise duty, customs duty, corporate income tax,
property tax, fees, charges, etc.), we estimate that the total tax gap stands at some
11 % of GDP, or, rather, that the sum total of taxes evaded and those declared but
not paid amounts to about €3 billion per year.
Table 5.4 Estimated extent of the shadow economy in the sector of businesses and entrepreneurs,
based on the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia
As % of GDP
Total extent of shadow economy 21.2
Shadow economy in trade in goods 11.6
Shadow economy in payment of wages 9.6
Source: Own calculations
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5.5.2 Estimate of the VAT Gap
The VAT gap is the difference between the hypothetical (theoretical) VAT assessed
and the amount actually collected. The VAT gap will be estimated using macro-
economic aggregates (with a top-to-bottom approach), as well as on the basis of
microeconomic data obtained from a survey of VAT payers.
5.5.2.1 Estimating the VAT Gap Based on Macroeconomic Aggregates
Methodology for Estimating the VAT Gap
The macroeconomic estimate of the VAT gap was made using methodology
applied to EU member states (Reckon 2009); other institutions use similar meth-
odologies (HM Revenue & Customs 2011). According to this methodology, the
starting point for estimating the VAT gap is the system of national accounts, as well
as disaggregated data on the consumption of various products by household. Thus
the reliability of such estimates is critically dependent on the quality of information
found in the national accounts and the Household Consumption Survey. One
advantage of estimating the VAT gap on the basis of macroeconomic accounts
rather than other methods of assessment is that it includes VAT contained in all
components of aggregate demand (household consumption, investment, other con-
sumption) and across all institutional sectors (households, businesses, government).
Under the macroeconomic approach the total hypothetical VAT is equal to the sum
of the hypothetical VAT contained in household consumption, fixed investments,
and other consumption. VAT figures obtained by these means are then adjusted for
several factors, such as small taxpayers exempted from VAT, purchase of business
car fleets and other goods not subject to a refund of input VAT, specific areas of
taxation in some countries, etc.
The most important macroeconomic basis for calculating VAT is household
consumption, which is financed from household income but also includes consump-
tion funded by non-governmental organisations (such as the Red Cross, religious
communities, and other NGOs). Hypothetical VAT contained in household con-
sumption accounts for by far the largest portion of total hypothetical VAT in EU
countries, averaging 64 %. The share of household consumption VAT in hypothet-
ical VAT has been stable, both by year and by country. The coefficient of variation
of the share of EU25 hypothetical VAT on household consumption in total EU25
VAT amounted to a mere 9.1 % between 2000 and 2006.15
Another significant macroeconomic base for VAT is made up of fixed invest-
ments. Although this is generally exempt from VAT, some of them contain
substantial VAT. Most VAT is accounted for by investments made by non-VAT
payer entities, such as private individuals, small-scale entrepreneurs, and the like.
15 Calculation based on Reckon (2009).
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The most important component within this group is investment in the construction
and purchase of housing. In addition, in many countries (Serbia included) VAT
payers are required to pay VAT on fixed assets that can be used for private
purposes, such as cars, furniture, etc. The share of VAT contained in fixed invest-
ments in EU member states stood at 14.7 % on average between 2000 and 2006, but
variations between individual countries were substantial, with the coefficient of
variation standing at 32 % on average. Such relatively high variation was caused by
both fluctuations in investment and the differing tax treatment of some investments,
such as the purchase of cars or furniture by taxpayers.
The third significant macroeconomic base for VAT is other consumption. Within
this factor the most significant areas are private household consumption provided
by the state through transfers in kind, collective consumption, and financial ser-
vices. Private consumption provided by the state in kind includes various types of
service provided by the state to private individuals, the most important being
healthcare, education, and social security, as well as sports and cultural needs,
which are less significant. All of these services have the features of private goods,
but the state provides them to the public for various reasons (goods egalitarianism,
exogenous effects and information asymmetries, etc.). Collective consumption
comprises public goods, such as defence, internal security, justice, etc. that the
state also provides to citizens. Added value in the financial sector is not yet subject
to VAT, but there have been calls to remove this exemption.
VAT is not charged on the added value of private goods provided by the state,
collective consumption, and financial services, but VAT contained in the inputs is
not deducted as input VAT. This means that VAT is not payable on education,
healthcare, internal and external security, justice, and financial services; however,
the costs of the delivery of these services include VAT payable on inputs such as
fuel, medications, utilities, office supplies, etc. Hypothetical VAT contained in
other consumption is a major component of overall hypothetical VAT, with an
average share of 19.6 % in the EU25 between 2000 and 2006. However, the
variation in the share of hypothetical VAT on other services in total hypothetical
VAT is relatively high—the coefficient of variation amounts to 25 %.
Hypothetical VAT contained in each macroeconomic base (household consump-
tion, fixed investment, and other consumption) is obtained by multiplying the tax
base and the average weighted statutory tax rate for each tax base. As VAT is
included in these bases in macroeconomic accounts and consumption data,
recalculated statutory tax rates must be used instead of the original ones.16
16 The general statutory rate in Serbia stood at 18 % at the time the analysis was carried out, while
the recalculated statutory rate amounted to 15.2 %¼ 18/(100 + 18) * 100. All estimates were made
using the statutory rates in force in 2011.
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Estimation of the VAT Gap in Serbia
In estimating the VAT gap in Serbia in accordance with methodology applied in EU
member states (Reckon 2009), particular attention was paid to estimating the
hypothetical VAT contained in household consumption. This approach was both
justified, since nearly two-thirds of total VAT is accounted for by household
consumption, and feasible, as data on the detailed structure of household consump-
tion are available, unlike those regarding the structure of investments and other
consumption.
The starting point for estimating hypothetical VAT was the set of data on
household consumption by product group (Radisavljević 2010) adjusted to house-
hold consumption data from national accounts, as well as the Law on VAT. This
piece of legislation stipulates which products attract the standard rate or the reduced
rate, and which activities are VAT exempted without credit (government services,
financial services, etc.). The average statutory VAT rate was estimated on the basis
of the Law on VAT and the structure of consumption for each product group. We
obtained the value of the hypothetical VAT for each product group by multiplying
the average statutory VAT rate for that product group (e.g., food and soft drinks)
with the value of consumption for that group. In the case of food and soft drinks, we
also took into account the fact that households obtain a portion of consumption
from their own production: this is termed in-kind consumption. No VAT is payable
on the added value of these products, but some VAT is contained in inputs (fuel,
seeds, crop protection, cattle feed, etc.) used to produce these mainly agricultural
products; we took this into account when estimating the average VAT rate appli-
cable to this group of products. We assumed that imputed rent, which has a share of
close to 11 % in personal consumption (Radisavljević 2010), did not contain any
VAT, i.e. that the tax rate was equal to zero.
Hypothetical VAT on fixed investment was estimated on the basis of the share of
fixed investment in Serbia’s GDP and the average share of VAT contained in
investment in new EU member states. This approach was used because there are
no data for Serbia on the structure of investment by type of investor (VAT payers
vs. others) or product (amounts of investment in products not exempt from VAT—
cars or furniture purchased by VAT payers, etc.) that could be used to estimate the
share of VAT in them.
Value added tax contained in other consumption (private and collective con-
sumption provided by the state, financial services) was estimated under the assump-
tion that the value of the inputs taxed amounted to 60 % of the added value in the
respective sectors of activity. In addition, we have assumed that these activities
used inputs taxed at an average VAT rate of 14 %.
Adding together the VAT contained in household consumption, fixed invest-
ment, and other consumption yields total hypothetical VAT. Total hypothetical
VAT is then adjusted with the aim of correcting for standard exemptions and
special tax regimes that are part of the VAT system. The most important adjustment
is the reduction in total hypothetical VAT for VAT contained in the added value of
entrepreneurs and businesses below the VAT entry threshold. These businesses and
66 F. Schneider et al.
entrepreneurs do not pay VAT on their own added value, but are also unable to
claim refunds of VAT paid on their inputs. The correction also takes into account
the fact that businesses that purchase cars are not able to claim VAT refunds. As
there are no data for Serbia that would make it possible to make these adjustments,
we applied an average adjustment rate of 3.5 % of the total hypothetical VAT,
which is slightly above the EU average.
The application of this procedure resulted in an estimate of the hypothetical
VAT of Serbia between 2008 and 2011. We calculated the VAT gap by subtracting
actually collected VAT from hypothetical VAT; this gap was made up mainly of
evaded VAT, as well as VAT declared but not paid. Based on official statistics of
macroeconomic aggregates and consumption and using the above methodology, the
VAT gap in Serbia between 2008 and 2011 was found to range between 7.3 and
9.4 % of the hypothetical VAT, with an average value of 8.6 % (Table 5.5). The
estimated VAT gap in Serbia amounted to just about 1 % of GDP.
The VAT gap calculated in this manner for Serbia was significantly lower than
the EU25 VAT gap seen between 2000 and 2006, which stood at 13.5 % of the
hypothetical VAT on average. The difference is even more marked in relation to the
eight new Central and Eastern European member states, where the average VAT
gap17 was 19.3 % in 2000–2006.
The VAT Gap and Registered GDP
The fact that the VAT gap is much smaller in Serbia than in EU member
states could be caused by an underestimated macroeconomic base (household
consumption and investment) in Serbia, or by exceptionally low tax evasion
and small amounts of tax declared but not paid. It is perfectly clear that the
low VAT gap estimated in Serbia was caused by an underestimate of the GDP
and its elements that are subject to VAT. Unlike EU member states, Serbia
does not include a portion of the shadow economy in the calculation of its
GDP. Yet another indication of the fact that underestimated GDP was the
primary cause of the low VAT gap in Serbia can be gleaned by comparing
the share of actually collected VAT in Serbia with that in EU member states.
The share in Serbia was among the highest in Europe, although Serbia’s VAT
rate was among the lowest.
The hypothetical VAT in investments and other consumption was calculated
using the appropriate parameters for EU member states.
The structure of the hypothetical VAT in Serbia differs from the EU average.
VAT contained in household consumption has a relatively high share in the
hypothetical VAT, while the share of VAT in investments and other consumption
is lower than the EU average (Table 5.6). This difference is the consequence of the
17 The average VAT gap for EU25 and the eight new CEE member states was calculated as the
unweighted average of data obtained by Reckon (2009).
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large share of personal consumption in Serbia’s GDP relative to the EU average. In
2009, household consumption in Serbia had a share of 77 % of GDP, while on
average this figure was 57 % in EU member states (Radisavljević 2010). The share
of household consumption in GDP was greater in Serbia than in any EU member
state, which was probably caused by specific factors; however, error cannot be ruled
out when estimating GDP or some of its components, such as investments. Key
factors affecting the high share of household consumption in GDP are the high
share of wages, pensions, and remittances in GDP.
To obtain a more realistic assessment of the amount of hypothetical VAT, and
thus of the VAT gap, while ensuring international comparability, official GDP data
for Serbia must be adjusted in line with ESA 95 methodology. This entails
increasing the official GDP by a portion of the shadow economy18 etc. included
in the GDP in countries that apply EU or United Nations methodology. According
to the latest estimate of the unobserved economy carried out in Serbia by the
Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia for 2003–2005, the GDP would be
greater than the official GDP by between 13.5 and 16.2 % if a portion of the
shadow and unregistered economy were included, as is done in other countries.19
Although the estimate of the unobserved economy relates to a period of nearly a
Table 5.5 Estimate of hypothetical VAT, in millions of RSD
2008 2009 2010 2011
Hypothetical VAT, total 325,370 328,832 347,515 377,597
VAT in household consumption 227,973 238,396 253,978 276,866
VAT in fixed investments 41,107 33,165 33,299 35,290
VAT in other consumption 44,892 45,351 47,603 52,048
Net adjustment 11,399 11,920 12,635 13,393
Actual VAT 301,700 296,900 319,400 342,000
VAT gap, in millions of RSD 23,670 31,932 28,115 35,597
VAT gap, in % of hypothetical VAT 7.3 9.7 8.1 9.4
Source: Own calculations. Calculated using macroeconomic data, household consumption data,
and Law on VAT
Table 5.6 Structure of hypothetical VAT, in %
2008 2009 2010 2011
Hypothetical VAT, total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
VAT in household consumption 70.1 72.5 73.1 73.3
VAT in fixed investments 12.6 10.1 9.6 9.3
VAT in other consumption 13.8 13.8 13.7 13.8
Net adjustment 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.5
Source: Own calculations
18 For a more detailed discussion, see the overview of activities not included in GDP in developing
countries in United Nations (2008).
19Website: http://www.stat.gov.rs/nacionalni_racuni.
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decade ago, adjustments made to Serbia’s official GDP will be based on it in the
absence of newer research. The official GDP of Serbia, therefore, rose by 15 %
between 2008 and 2011.
The increase in GDP by components of final use approach was differentiated:
investments increased by 20 %, household consumption by 16 %, and other
consumption by 5 %. The above-average adjustment in investments was caused
by the great extent of the excluded shadow economy in the construction industry,
encompassing businesses, entrepreneurs, and households equally. The adjustment
in household consumption was slightly greater than the average adjustment of GDP,
while other consumption saw a relatively modest adjustment, since it was domi-
nated by consumption provided by the state. Individual forms of consumption
recorded different levels of adjustment: above-average adjustment was seen in
the consumption of clothing and shoes20 and in the sectors of catering, personal
services, and food; below-average adjustment, on the other hand, was recorded in
the consumption of utilities, telecommunications services, etc. These differentiated
adjustments of particular forms of household consumption are important, since
various forms of consumption are taxed at different average weighted statutory tax
rates.
The hypothetical VAT was estimated on the basis of adjusted household con-
sumption, investments, and other consumption, using the methodology described
above. As expected, based on the adjusted macroeconomic bases, it was found that
the hypothetical VAT was greater by some 15% in relation to the hypothetical VAT
obtained on the basis of official VAT data. The estimated VAT gap between 2008
and 2011 amounted to 20.6 % on average (Table 5.7), which was much greater than
the EU25 average, which stood at 13.5 % between 2000 and 2006.21 However, it is
more relevant to compare Serbia with similar EU member states,22 where the VAT
gap amounted to 18.1 % between 2000 and 2006. It is also pertinent to note that the
VAT gap in these countries stood at 19.3 % in 2000–2003, before their accession to
the EU (Reckon 2009).
The macroeconomic relevance of the estimated VAT gap can be assessed by its
share in GDP. The use of adjusted GDP shows that the VAT gap in Serbia stood at,
on average, 2.5 % of adjusted GDP (or 2.9 % of official GDP) between 2008 and
2011. The VAT gap estimated using adjusted GDP is nearly three times as high as
that found using official GDP data.
According to the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, businesses
and entrepreneurs estimated that the extent of informal transactions in their respec-
tive sectors of activity stood at some 22 % of the total volume of transactions. This
20 These products are sold in large quantities at flea markets, or even in high-street shops, without
VAT being paid. However, the products—mainly imported from abroad—may contain some VAT
paid at the time of import, probably using an underestimated base.
21 Calculated as the unweighted average of data from Reckon (2009).
22 The Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. An even more relevant comparison would
involve Romania and Bulgaria, but data for these countries are not available.
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estimate supports the estimate of the tax gap made on the basis of adjusted
macroeconomic data, whereby the VAT gap in Serbia is seen to amount to some
21 % of hypothetical VAT.
5.5.3 Estimated Personal Income Tax and Social Security
Contributions Gap
As has already been mentioned, the term ‘tax gap’ is narrower than ‘shadow
economy’, since the shadow economy denotes income that is taxable by law but
is not declared or taxed, while the tax gap denotes the amount of tax evaded
expressed as a percentage of hypothetical tax revenue. The income tax and contri-
butions gap is defined as the difference between the hypothetical amount of income
tax and social security contributions that could be collected (if all income taxable
under law were actually taxed) and the amount of income tax and contributions
actually collected. The income tax and contributions gap can be estimated if we first
estimate the extent of the shadow economy in the payment of wages, using data
from the survey (the amount of income not taxed) and the statutory average rates of
tax and contributions payable on such income. Since the survey covered exclusively
income from labour, only such income was taken into account in calculating the
statutory tax rate.
Starting from the extent of the shadow economy in the payment of wages
estimated using the survey (26.2 %) and the total amount of gross wages earned
by employees stated in the national accounts, we were able to estimate the total
extent of the shadow economy in the area of income from labour (approximately
9.4 % of GDP, or some RSD 313 billion). By applying the average statutory tax rate
for taxable income from labour to this figure, we arrived at a figure of 4.1 % of GDP
(or RSD 135.7 billion) as an estimate of the personal income tax and social
Table 5.7 Estimate of hypothetical VAT using adjusted base, in millions of RSD
2008 2009 2010 2011
Hypothetical VAT, total 374,389 377,527 399,979 434,538
VAT in household consumption 268,771 280,458 295,507 322,137
VAT in fixed investments 49,328 39,798 39,958 42,349
VAT in other consumption 44,892 45,351 49,983 546,499
Net adjustment 11,399 11,920 14,530 15,402
Actual VAT 301,700 296,900 319,400 342,000
VAT gap, in millions of RSD 72,689 80,627 80,579 92,538
VAT gap, in % of hypothetical VAT 19.4 21.4 20.1 21.3
Source: Own calculations. Calculated using macroeconomic data, household consumption data,
and Law on VAT. Hypothetical VAT contained in investments and other consumption calculated
using appropriate parameters for EU member states
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contributions gap, or 22.7 % of the hypothetical revenue from personal income tax
and all social security contributions (Table 5.8).
The total amount of the income tax and contributions gap is probably slightly
higher than the estimated 4.1 % of GDP, since there are other types of informal
activity in the area of labour income that contribute to the income tax gap which are
not covered (e.g., self-employment after formal working hours such as private
tuition by schoolteachers, etc.). Moreover, evasion is also present in taxation of
income from capital (e.g., undeclared interest income from lending money infor-
mally, or dividends earned from unregistered corporate income, etc.) Since income
from wage employment and self-employment dominated total personal income, the
total personal income tax and social contributions gap is estimated to stand at about
5 % of GDP (or 27.7 % of the hypothetical amount of income tax and
contributions).
Shadow Economy, Tax Evasion, and the Tax Gap
‘Shadow economy’, ‘tax evasion’, and ‘tax gap’ are related but distinct
concepts, and as such are sometimes confused by the general public, which
can lead to misunderstandings. The shadow economy, from the taxation
standpoint, is the value of taxable activities (labour, trade, etc.) and rights
(ownership of property, etc.) on which tax is not paid, although they are
statutorily taxable. Tax evasion is the difference between the tax liabilities of
a taxpayer under current laws, and their reported tax liabilities; in the case of
total evasion, the tax liabilities reported equal zero. The tax gap is the
difference between the tax evaded and the amount of statutory tax liabilities
(‘hypothetical tax’).
We will present two hypothetical examples to clearly underline the dis-
tinction between shadow economy, tax evasion, and tax gap. If earned income
amounting to RSD 100 is fully evaded, given a fiscal burden on labour of
40 %, the shadow economy amounts to 100 dinars, while the tax gap stands at
RSD 40 (i.e. 100 % of the statutory tax liability). In the case of turnover of
RSD 100, of which half was made informally, given a VAT rate of 20 %, the
absolute amount of the shadow economy is RSD 50, the evaded tax amounts
to RSD 10, while the tax gap stands at 50 %. As can be seen from these
examples, the percentages of the shadow economy and the tax gap are
identical, and stand at 100 and 50 %, respectively, but their absolute values
differ greatly. The absolute value of the shadow economy is greater than the
(continued)
Table 5.8 Estimated personal income tax and social contributions gap, based on the Survey on
Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia
Income tax and contributions gap (as % of GDP) 4.1
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tax evaded by the amount of the reciprocal value of the tax rate, so that, for
instance, given a VAT rate of 20 %, the shadow economy is five times greater
than the tax evaded (1/0.2¼ 5).
In the case of Serbia, the MIMIC method resulted in an estimate of 30 % of
GDP for the shadow economy, or €10 billion, while the total tax gap in Serbia
was estimated to stand at about 10 % of GDP, or about €3 billion. It follows
from these estimates that the total implicit tax rate (the ratio of the tax gap to
the shadow economy) stands at 33 % in the shadow economy in Serbia,
slightly lower than the total tax rate in the formal sector, which amounts to
between 37 and 38 %.
Appendix
Estimation of the shadow economy in household income, based on macroeconomic
data (Household tax compliance method)
Description Designation
2010 (RSD million, at
current prices)
GDP at current prices GDPMP 2,881,891
Estimated total household income THI¼THC+Savings +Paid taxes¼THC
+σ*THI+Paid Taxes
Total household income, National accounts 2,703,013





Total household income, HBS 2,703,013
Total household consumption, HBS 2,686,493
Change in household deposits (12/2010-
12/2009)
165,141
Change in household liabilities
(12/2010-12/2009)
101,859
Net household savings 79,802
Net Household Savings Rate SVR 0.03





Total household income THI¼ (1 / (1 SVR)) *
(THC+Paid Taxes)
3,564,203
Estimated statutory household tax rate SHTR¼AIT+ESS + (1AITESS) * 1 SVR) *
(VAT+ECR*AET)
Estimated income tax rate AIT 0.046
(continued)
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Description Designation
2010 (RSD million, at
current prices)
Average rate of contributions payable by
employees
ESS 0.096
Average VAT rate VAT 0.11
Average excise rate AET 0.484
Rate of consumption of excise goods ECR 0.087
Statutory household tax rate SHTR 0.27
Statutory household tax rate (inc. employer SSC) 0.363
Total household tax revenues THTR¼ ITR+SSR
+VAR+ETR
772,483
Income tax ITR 139,376
Contributions SSR 161,507
VAT VAR 319,400
Excise duties ETR 152,200
Estimated shadow economy due to households
Percentage of declared household
income
λH¼DHI / THI¼THTR /
(THI * SHTR)
0.81
Total household income (as % of GDP) βH¼THI / GDP 1.24
Shadow economy in households sector
(as % of GDP)
SEIH¼ βH(1 λH) 23.6
Volume of shadow economy in house-
holds sector (RSD million)
782,443
Estimated total tax gap
Total tax gap (RSD million) 284,348
Total tax gap (% GDP) 11.3
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Chapter 6
Shadow Economy in the Business
and Entrepreneurial Sectors
Gorana Krstić and Branko Radulović
6.1 Assessment of Main Types of the Shadow Economy
and Their Characteristics
Research to date on the shadow economy in South Eastern Europe and beyond has
mainly focused on macro assessments of this phenomenon or on the socio-
economic characteristics of individuals involved in these activities. There have
been far fewer studies analysing the characteristics of businesses engaged in the
shadow economy and the factors that drive them to operating informally. Excep-
tions are research on the shadow economy in Bulgaria and the Baltic States
(Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia) based on data from the survey of businesses
operating informally, and a study on the impact of the shadow economy on the
operation and competitiveness of businesses in South Eastern Europe, based on data
from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Study (BEEPS) (Kyle
et al. 2001; Williams 2006; Tedds 2010; Putninš and Sauka 2011; Hudson
et al. 2012).
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Definition of the Shadow Economy and Informal Employment
in the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia
Business entities engaged in the shadow economy are those that employ
workers informally and/or make payments in cash as VAT payers. The term
‘informally employed’ refers to those workers who are either employed
without a formal contract, or who do have a contract but only a portion of
their wages is declared, meaning that they receive a portion of their pay
in cash.
The findings of the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia carried
out for the purposes of this study show that 28 % of all business entities in Serbia
engage in activities in the shadow economy (Table 6.1), while one-fifth of all
business entities employ workers informally.
If we include the other two categories—workers employed through the youth
employment agency and non-VAT payer entrepreneurs contracted to perform certain
activities for a company instead of its regular permanent employees with the aim of
cutting costs or securing cash (at a 10 % commission)—the percentage of businesses
engaging in shadow economy activities would be substantially greater, reaching
32.2 %. Although these two categories most often represent informal practices, they
are not included in our basic definition of the shadow economy, as the survey did not
include questions we could use to estimate how informal they actually are. Thus, for
the purposes of this analysis, we have used a narrower definition. Nonetheless,
regardless of the definition we use, the ratio of business entities in the shadow
economy to the total number of business entities is relatively high, particularly in
light of the fact that this figure presents the lower limit of the observed phenomenon,
due to respondents’ inclination to disguise their informal activities.
Table 6.1 shows the share of business entities in the shadow economy in the total
number of business entities by their basic characteristics. According to the findings
of the survey, the share of business entities evading VAT is slightly higher
(one-quarter of all VAT payers) than the share of those engaging in informal
employment (one-fifth of the total number of business entities).
When the results are viewed by type of business entity, it can be seen that
entrepreneurs are more involved in the shadow economy than businesses (30.7 % as
against 23 %, respectively), since informal employment and VAT evasion are more
frequent with entrepreneurs than with businesses. It is also evident that new
businesses and entrepreneurs, i.e., those registered after 2009, are more likely to
engage in the shadow economy than older businesses. This is primarily the result of
their inclination to employ workers without formal contracts, or with contracts but
without declaring their entire wages. On the other hand, no differences are visible
when it comes to informal transactions. This type of employment can be explained
by the fact that start-ups use it in an endeavour to cut their costs and improve
competitiveness.
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When businesses are disaggregated by sector of economic activity, most busi-
ness entities active in the shadow economy are seen to be operating in the con-
struction sector (42.9 %), followed by agriculture (33.8 %), catering (33.1 %) and
transportation (32.7 %). Similar results were obtained by Schneider (2011a), who
studied six European countries (Turkey, Spain, Italy, Germany, Poland, and
Romania and found that the shadow economy was at its most pronounced in the
construction sector (about 30 % of the total number of sector employees), the
wholesale and retail trade, catering, and transportation. A study of businesses in
the Baltic States (Putninš and Sauka 2011) also found that the shadow economy was
predominant in the construction sector, followed by services and retail trade,
sectors of activity traditionally favourable for shadow economy activities.


















Total 28.4 20.5 24.5 5.7
Type of business entity
Business 23.0 14.5 18.3 6.4




32.1 26.5 24.7 7.3
Others 27.9 19.6 24.8 5.5
Number of employees
Up to 4 27.7 20.2 25.7 5.2
5–19 32.8 23.6 22.0 9.1
20–49 28.0 11.4 24.8 6.5
50–249 24.5 16.9 15.8 7.7
250 and above 31.4 31.4 0.0 0.0
Sector of activity
Agriculture 33.8 20.0 25.3 3.4
Industry 27.5 20.2 24.8 7.3
Construction 42.9 32.7 42.3 11.6
Trade 24.9 15.0 20.8 6.3
Transportation 32.7 23.8 41.6 4.8
Catering 33.1 22.4 30.8 2.8
Other services 25.0 21.4 17.4 3.2
Region
Vojvodina 25.6 19.8 18.8 4.3
Belgrade 24.7 16.2 20.2 3.8
Serbia excl.
Belgrade
33.0 24.1 31.8 8.0
Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN, 2012
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Both components of the shadow economy—informal employment and trans-
actions—are at their most pronounced in the construction sector. Approximately
one-third of all business entities in the construction sector have informal workers,
while 42.3 % of VAT payers engage in shadow transactions. If we consider all types
of work, we can see that construction workers are most often engaged without a
formal employment contract, through the intermediation of an entrepreneur, with a
contract but with a portion of their wage undeclared, or under a temporary service
agreement. All of these forms of work are present in construction to an above-
average degree in relation to other sectors of activity. It is interesting to note that all
construction businesses employing between 5 and 19 people included in our sample
engaged in the shadow economy.
Underreporting of income is particularly noticeable in the construction sector,
mainly in the sub-contracting process and in activities that are directly related to the
population. In these activities, cash generated from the sale of a company’s products
can be used to pay suppliers, reducing both income derived from such sales and
costs. Although the reduction in costs is not particularly useful, goods and services
can be bought much more cheaply, as suppliers are able to evade paying VAT.
Many construction companies operate, on average, for very brief periods of
time, up to two or three years, obtain some government contracts through public
procurement procedures, and then vanish from the market. A significant number of
these firms are actually intermediaries between the client and the sub-contractors,
earning between 10 and 50 % of the contract price in commissions. These practices
could be avoided if public procurement tenders were open only to companies with
substantial references, an established number of permanent workers, and an annual
turnover not lower than the value of the public procurement contract (Socio-
Economic Council of the Republic of Serbia 2010).
After construction, the sectors with the highest proportion of activity in the
shadow economy are agriculture, catering, and transportation (33.8, 33.1, and
32.7 %, respectively). According to Schneider (2011b), in these sectors, with the
exception of agriculture, most income is under reported due to cash transactions.
The large percentage of business entities in the agriculture sector engaged in the
shadow economy—mainly entrepreneurs with few employees—makes it impossi-
ble for these businesses to obtain government subsidies or to borrow to finance
current operations or improve production. Most of them are smallholdings with low
production volumes, and this means that they cannot develop their businesses and
raise living standards.
Apart from catering, where a large shadow economy is expected, the shadow
economy is also extensive in the transportation sector. There are several explana-
tions for this. Transportation businesses are small compared to other sectors of
economic activity, and are more able to operate informally. However, although
transportation ranks second to construction in the share of businesses in the VAT
system that make cash payments (41.6 %), it needs to be underlined that the amount
of VAT actually evaded is minimal (Table 6.3), as the share of cash transactions in
the total volume of payments is the lowest of any sector (a mere 4.8 %). Similarly,
in catering the share of VAT payers engaged in cash transactions is above average
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(30.8 %), while the percent of VAT avoided is below average. Finally, based on the
results of the survey, it seems that transportation businesses are subject to less
inspection than other sectors. However, businesses in trade are frequently subject to
inspection, so part of the explanation for their lower share in the informal economy
is due to a higher probability of detection. There are other explanations for the
lower share of the shadow economy in trade: for example, the increasing share of
large chains in the retail sector.
The typical link between the shadow economy and the size of the business,
whereby businesses with fewer workers are more likely to engage in the shadow
economy (Rice 1992; Hanlon et al. 2007; Tedds 2010; Williams 2006), is not as
pronounced in Serbia. The shadow economy is mainly the domain of businesses
with between 5 and 19 employees and large businesses with 250 or more
employees. These businesses are over-represented as regards informal employ-
ment, while micro-businesses with up to five workers and medium-sized businesses
(50–249 workers) are over-represented among VAT payers as regards cash
payments.
Such substantial participation of business entities employing between 5 and
19 workers in the shadow economy can be explained by the large share of small
construction firms and entrepreneurs who take part in the shadow economy (70 % of
the total number of businesses in this group). Some 60 % of them employ workers
informally; 45 % of them engage in cash payments. On the other hand, nearly
one-third of all large businesses (with 250 or more staff) are involved in the shadow
economy: their participation is manifested through informal employment, with
above-average participation by state-owned businesses and below-average partic-
ipation by private businesses (36 % and compared to 27 %, respectively).
When the data are viewed by region, business entities based in Central Serbia
(excluding Belgrade) are the most likely to engage in the shadow economy, while
those in Belgrade are least likely (33 % vs. 24.7 %). A similar difference can be
observed when looking at type of shadow economy activity. Business entities from
Central Serbia dominate in informal employment and informal transactions (VAT
paying business entities making payments in cash) compared to businesses in
Belgrade where informal employment is the least pronounced or to Vojvodina
where informal payment is the least pronounced. We will see in next section,
where we analyze the determinants of shadow economy participation, if these
regional differences in shadow economy participation remain when the impact of
business size, sector of economic activity, etc. is controlled for.
The last column of Table 6.1 shows that only 5.7 % of business entities practise
both types of informal activities i.e., have informal workers and engage in informal
transactions. This subset of the basic set of business entities involved in the shadow
economy has similar features to the basic set. Businesses as opposed to entrepre-
neurs, business entities employing between 5 and 19 workers, start-ups, construc-
tion firms, and those based in Central Serbia are most likely to engage in both types
of shadow economy.
We will analyse two additional indicators of the shadow economy. These are the
share of informal workers in the total number of workers (both overall and by type),
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and the share of cash payments in total payments by basic characteristics of the
business (Table 6.2).
The share of informally employed workers in the total number of workers is
exceptionally low, amounting to 5.7 %, although one-fifth of all businesses claimed
they had employed workers informally. This was caused by the respondents’
twofold downward bias. Firstly, it can be assumed that a large number of respon-
dents did not wish to admit they employed workers informally; secondly,
one-quarter of those who did admit it did not wish to answer about the number of
such workers and their earnings. Caution is thus needed when interpreting data
about the share of informal employed in the total number of employed and their
wages.
The share of employees whose wages are paid in cash (3.8 %) in the total number
of those employed is greater than the share of those working without a formal
contract (1.9 %). The share of workers paid ‘envelope wages’ was much lower in
Serbia than in the five South Eastern European countries covered, along with other
nations, in the 2007 Eurobarometer survey (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Romania,
and Slovenia), where 16 % of all workers, on average, receive ‘envelope wages’
(EC 2007). Much of this difference can certainly be attributed to the fact that the
respondents in the Eurobarometer survey were aged 15 and over, with fewer
incentives to disguise the activities of their employers than the employers them-
selves who were surveyed in Serbia.
However, this picture becomes very different when respondents’ views on their
own shadow economy practice are compared to their views on the shadow economy
participation of other firms from the same sector. They considered all forms of the
shadow economy to be represented to a much greater degree at ‘other’ businesses in
the same sector than in their own businesses. Thus, as we have already underlined in
Chap. 3, we consider data obtained from biased answers made by owners/managers
on the participation of their own companies in informal operations as the lower
limit of the extent of the shadow economy, while taking data collected from their
subjective opinions on the participation of other businesses in the same sector as the
upper limit. We can therefore say that the share of workers employed without a
formal contract ranges from 1.9 % (lower limit) to 23.9 % (upper limit); the share of
Table 6.2 Comparison of respondents’ views on the participation of their own and other busi-




Respondents’ subjective views on the
participation of businesses from the
same sector in the shadow economy
% of workers without for-
mal contracts
1.9 23.9
% of workers with formal
contracts but without fully
declared wages
3.8 24.7
% of turnover in cash 11.3 21.6
Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN, 2012
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workers employed without their entire wages being declared ranges from 3.8 to
24.7 %; while the share of cash payments varies between 11.3 and 21.6 %.
According to the features of businesses (Table 6.3), the share of informal
employment is greatest among entrepreneurs, start-ups one to two years old or
less, companies employing between 5 and 19 workers, catering firms, other ser-
vices, agriculture, and those based in Central Serbia. If we look at type of informal
employment by sector of economic activity we see that agriculture, other services,
and construction have the greatest share of those working without a formal contract,
while the share of workers receiving ‘envelope wages’ is greatest in catering, other
Table 6.3 Share of informal workers in total number of workers; share of cash payments in total


















Total 5.7 1.9 3.8 27.8
Type of business entity
Business 3.5 1.0 2.5 22.6




10.8 4.8 6.0 27.7
Others 5.5 1.8 3.7 27.9
Number of employees
Up to 4 9.7 4.3 5.4 28.3
5–19 12.4 3.7 8.7 28.8
20–49 2.5 1.0 1.5 3.8
50–249 1.0 0.2 0.8 1.8
250 and above 2.7 0.5 2.2 –
Sector of activity
Agriculture 7.9 3.9 4.0 31.0
Industry 4.6 1.2 3.4 25.8
Construction 5.2 3.0 2.2 43.0
Trade 5.0 1.6 3.4 26.9
Transportation 4.9 0.6 4.3 4.5
Catering 8.4 1.5 6.9 13.8
Other services 8.0 3.3 4.7 21.7
Region
Vojvodina 5.3 2.8 2.5 30.2
Belgrade 4.5 1.2 3.3 37.0
Serbia excl.
Belgrade
6.6 2.0 4.6 22.0
Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN, 2012
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services, and transportation, which are also the sectors where it is easiest to sell
goods and services for cash.
The share of cash payments in total payments made by VAT payers (both
businesses and entrepreneurs) was 27.8 %. When disaggregated by business feature
it is greater with entrepreneurs than with businesses; it is also the most pronounced
in the smallest business entities, while no difference can be observed in terms of
business age (Table 6.3). Cash payments are the most common in construction
(43 %), where slightly less than half of all respondents (42.3 %) said they had made
such payments (Table 6.1). Agriculture came next (31 %), with one-quarter of
respondents reporting cash payments, followed by trade (26.9 %), where only six
percent of all respondents reported having made payments in cash. When the data
are viewed by region Belgrade is ahead of Vojvodina and Central Serbia with 37 %
of all payments made in cash, although the share of business entities making cash
payments was greatest in Central Serbia (excluding Belgrade). These results lead to
the conclusion that there is no major causal link between these two indicators of
informal transactions: the share of business entities making payments in cash and
the share of cash payments in total volume of payment transactions.
However, Table 6.4 shows a marked correlation between the various types of
informal activity as cited by the business entities surveyed: in other words, when a
business entity is involved in informal cash transactions it also has undeclared
workers and unreported wage payments.
Slightly over half of all respondents cited purchase of goods as the main reason
for paying in cash, nearly one-quarter reported paying cash for services, while the
remainder cited using cash to pay wages and rent (Table 6.5). Goods and services
are most often procured from entrepreneurs (37.1 %) and small or medium-sized
businesses (34.3 %), and less frequently from large businesses or friends/family
members (Table 6.6).
For some two-thirds of all respondents the principal reason for making cash
payments was that they cost less; far fewer respondents cited better quality and
inability to procure the required goods or services in the formal market (Table 6.7).
Nearly two-thirds of all respondents reported making payments in cash once a
month, slightly over one-quarter claimed they did so once a week, while far fewer
said they did so every day or once a year (Table 6.8). Daily cash payments were
most common in trade, transportation, and other services. On average cash pay-
ments accounted for 22.9 % of business entities’ total costs/expenditure.
In view of these results, it can be concluded that the usual relationship between
the shadow economy and the type, age, and sector of business exist in Serbia, with
entrepreneurs, start-ups, and those in construction more likely to engage in shadow
economy activity. However, the relationship between the shadow economy and
business entity size whereby smaller businesses are more likely to participate in the
shadow economy (Tedds 2010; Williams 2006) cannot be confirmed.
The wages of informal workers were lower than the wages of formal workers
(those whose entire wage is paid via bank accounts). The wages of workers without
formal contracts and workers who receive a portion of their wage in cash were
lower than formal workers’ wages by 51 and 28 % respectively (Table 6.9). When
84 G. Krstić and B. Radulović




% of workers with formal





% of workers with formal con-
tracts but without fully declared
wages
0.75
% of wage paid in cash 0.74 0.72
% of transactions carried out
informally (i.e., in cash)
0.73 0.67 0.70
Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN, 2012
Table 6.5 Most common reason for cash payments made by VAT payers
Total (%)
Purchase of goods 52.4
Payment for services 23.6
Payment of employee wages 14.4
Payment of rent for premises 0.1
Purchase of foreign currency intended for payment abroad 9.6
Total 100.0
Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN, 2012
Table 6.6 Who most often supplies the goods or services that you paid for in cash?
Total (%)
Friends/family members 9.0
Other companies owned by respondent 1.3
Entrepreneurs 37.1
Small or medium-sized businesses 34.3
Large businesses 18.4
Total 100.0
Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN, 2012





Helping vulnerable social groups 1.1
Doing favours to friends and family members 4.4
Goods and services unavailable in the regular/formal market 9.0
Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN, 2012
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the cost of taxes and contributions for those in formal employment are added to
wages, the difference in labour costs between formal and informal workers is
enormous. These findings are similar to those found by earlier research on the
informal economy based on the Living Standards Measurement Study (Krstić and
Sanfey 2011), which found that informal workers earned 44 % less than formal
workers, or 22 % less when other characteristics of the workers are controlled for.
Although the definition of informal employment was not the same in these two
studies, it is evident that workers in the informal sector remain at a major disad-
vantage compared to those working in the formal sector.
The distribution of wages by business characteristics differs significantly
between employees whose entire wage is paid through a bank account and the
two types of informal employment (Table 6.10). While formal workers’ wages are
higher when paid by entrepreneurs, start-ups (established one to two years ago),
businesses with over 20 employees, businesses in the industrial sector, and busi-
nesses in Central Serbia, the wages of workers without formal contracts are highest
when paid by businesses, entities established two or more years ago, businesses
employing between 5 and 19 workers, businesses engaged in trade, and businesses
based in Vojvodina.
Table 6.8 Frequency of cash payments made by VAT payers
Total (%)
Once every year 3.2
Once every month 62.4
Once every week 27.4
Every day 7.0
Total 100.0
Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN, 2012




Open-ended employment contract (entire wage paid via bank account) 38,061
Open-ended employment contract (some money paid in cash in addition to
portion of wage paid via bank account)
27,277
Employment pursuant to a temporary service agreement 25,752
Employment pursuant to a work for hire agreement 22,847
Employment through a ‘youth employment agency’ 16,160
Hiring an entrepreneur 23,401
Occasional/temporary work without a contract (trial work, training,
volunteering)
19,261
Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN, 2012
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6.2 Determinants of Participation in the Shadow Economy
In the previous section descriptive statistics were used to show how shadow
economy activities varied by key factors. In this section we use econometric
analysis to identify specific factors that are statistically significant in a company’s
decision to take part in the shadow economy.
Tax evasion literature usually identifies two groups of factors that affect a
business’s (or entrepreneur’s) decision to participate in the shadow economy.1
The first group of factors relates to the model of the rational choice to engage in
tax evasion. Entrepreneurs or businesses weigh the expected benefits and costs of
Table 6.10 Average wages by type of work and business characteristics
Permanent employees, entire
wage paid via bank account
Permanent employees,





Total 38,061 27,277 19,261
Type of business entity
Business 35,441 27,572 39,527





Others 35,937 25,539 18,185
No. of employees
Up to 4 37,879 26,759 16,118
5–19 33,787 28,830 21,542
20 and over 57,157 28,220 99,088
Sector of activity
Agriculture 46,197 6,000 –
Industry 55,128 23,923 20,525
Construction 29,027 30,238 18,178
Trade 37,243 24,904 29,390
Transportation 29,353 24,210 20,000
Catering 21,848 22,740 15,579
Other services 35,781 35,470 14,585
Region
Vojvodina 33,487 28,645 24,265




Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN, 2012
1 For a concise recent survey of the literature on the informal economy and tax evasion, see
Slemrod (2007).
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tax evasion and participation in the shadow economy, or, rather, compare the
savings they stand to achieve through tax evasion and the costs in case they are
caught. The expected costs depend on the likelihood of getting caught, the amount
and type of the penalty, the likelihood of that penalty actually being imposed, and
their propensity to risk. These factors differ by region, industry, and size and age of
the business entity, and other factors.
The reason why empirical studies usually find that the real level of tax evasion is
significantly lower than forecasts made using the rational choice model is the
existence of a second group of factors: attitudes and social norms. In tax evasion
literature these factors include the perception of the fairness of the tax system—the
attitudes on the equity of the tax burden and procedures. As our assessment deals
with attitudes regarding participation in the shadow economy, we examine how the
decision to participate in the shadow economy depends on social norms, or, rather,
moral values (as well as any feelings of guilt and stigma that may arise if the tax
evader is caught). Finally, participation in the shadow economy can be temporary
and the result of short-term operating difficulties, especially given the current
economic crisis, which must also be taken into consideration.
In both literature and empirical studies, sanction probability plays a very signif-
icant role in explaining the causes of tax evasion (shadow economy). According to
the results of the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia (Fig. 6.1), the
estimated probability of companies that operate informally being discovered is
generally low. As many as 67 % of the businesspeople surveyed believed that
this probability was very low (i.e. that 50 % or fewer companies operating infor-
mally would be caught). Just 17 % of those surveyed thought that one in every two
companies would be caught. Around 14 % of those surveyed believed that one in
three companies would be discovered; 13 % thought that one in five businesses
would be caught, while 14 % believed this would happen to one in every ten. Such
expectations support the decision to take part in the shadow economy because doing
so significantly reduces expected expenses.
Furthermore, business entities’ expectations of receiving fines for operating in
the shadow economy were even lower. The survey results show that they believed it
was very unlikely for the company manager or entrepreneur to be penalised if
caught operating informally. Two-thirds of all business entities surveyed thought
that there was a 50 % or less chance of an entity or person operating in the shadow
economy being penalised after getting caught, while 17 % thought that one in every
ten managers would face sanctions. The total probability of anyone who gets caught
facing any sanctions is even lower, since as many as two-thirds (67 %) of the
businesspeople surveyed thought that the fine imposed would be paid in fewer than
50 % of all cases, while 17 % felt that only one in every ten fines would be paid.
Thus the likelihood that those who get caught actually are fined and pay that fine is
believed to be very low. There are various ways in which business entities avoid
paying their dues. According to the results of the survey the most common means of
avoiding payment of a fine is corruption (40 %), followed by shifting the company’s
business to a newly established entity (17 %), or simply waiting for charges to lapse
due to the operation of the statute of limitations (18 %). However, in our
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econometric analysis we focused on the simplest concept of expectations (how
likely the respondents believed getting caught was if operating informally), mainly
because some respondents may have misunderstood the question, which could
mean that the calculation would result in unrealistically low expectations regarding
the consequences of engaging in these activities.
Approximately two-thirds of all respondents thought that companies continued
operating informally even after being fined for doing so. This result to some extent
implies that the majority of respondents felt that fines were relatively mild. The
majority of respondents (46 %) stated that fines for different types of informal
operation should be increased. The attitude towards the severity of sanctions is very
important for incentives, because if sanctions are perceived to be lax, business entities
are more incentivised to take part in the shadow economy, or rather to evade taxes.
Finally, our analysis also examined attitudes toward the shadow economy itself;
that is, whether the owners/managers considered informal operation to be justified.
This factor can correlate with insincere answers, but we believe that it is still a good
enough indicator of business entities’ readiness to become active (or not) in the
shadow economy in an environment where sanctions are less than likely. According
to the results of the survey, over two-thirds (71 %) of all business entities thought
that operating in this manner was unjustified. Just 17 % were neutral, while 9 %
believed it to be justified. It is obvious that some business entities operating within
the shadow economy were not being honest when they stated that informal oper-
ation was unjustified. The usual reasons cited when justifying informal operation
were poor legal framework (46 %), competition from the informal sector (27 %),
the great benefits of doing business in this manner (27 %), and the fact that almost
all business entities engage in these practices (21 %).
Fig. 6.1 Expectations of the likelihood of businesses not operating formally getting caught.
Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN, 2012
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We included certain other characteristics of business entities into our economet-
ric analysis in addition to the factors already referred to. As has already been
mentioned, nearly all recent start-ups are expected to be more involved in the
shadow economy as tax evasion makes them more competitive, which is very
important especially if they face obstacles when entering the market. Also, in
order to consider the possible influence of the economic crisis, we used a proxy
for the recent business results of the respondents based on their answers regarding
trends in their total turnover (question A6). Poor performance is expected to affect a
company’s motivation to become active (or increase their participation) in the
shadow economy.
Table 6.11 shows the results of econometric analysis of the determinants of
participation in the shadow economy. The results presented in the table show the
factors that affect the decision of a business entity to retain workers informally; that
is, not to declare or to partially declare its employees in order to evade or reduce its
tax burden (informal employment), and to make payments in cash even though it is
a VAT payer. In other words, these factors affect the decision of whether to take
part in the shadow economy (see Chap. 3).
Table 6.10 shows five logit models2 where the dependent variable represents
broadly defined participation in the shadow economy (dependent variable: entity
engages in activities in the shadow economy [¼1] or does not do so [¼0]).3 We
divided independent variables into five groups. The first group consisted of business
entities’ characteristics: business/entrepreneur, VAT payer, privately held or oth-
erwise, share of foreign equity (variables presented as dummy variables), company
age, and number of employees (a natural log transformed continuous variables).
The second group consists of regional dummy variables. The third group consists of
sector dummy variables. The fourth group is variables related to business entities’
expectations and attitudes: the likelihood of detection and attitudes regarding the
amount of fines and justification of the shadow economy. This group of variables
was obtained on the basis of the opinions voiced by the respondents. Finally, the
fifth group is made up of only one variable, turnover decline in 2010, and is used to
establish whether deterioration in the economic position of the business entity
influences the decision whether to take part in the shadow economy.
All models are statistically significant, and we will focus our attention, based on
selection criteria, on the last model (5). The total number of observations for that
model was 830, fewer than for other models due to missing values. In the first group
of independent variables, the binary variables of entrepreneur and VAT payer, as
well as the logarithm (ln) of the number of employees (i.e., approximation of
company size) are statistically significant. The other three variables—private
2Here we have shown the basic model only. The model does not contain interactions or other
analysed variables.
3 As the table shown contains different samples, we have not compared coefficients for the various
models here (any explanation of the change in coefficients must also take into account the
differences in sample size). For a detailed discussion, see Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) and
Long and Freese (2006).
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Table 6.11 Determinants of participation in the shadow economy
Model
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ownership, foreign equity, and logarithm (ln) of company age—are not statistically
significant, and for the sake of brevity will not be discussed further.4
We show results in terms of odds ratios. The odds ratio for entrepreneurs is
2.611.5 We interpret this as the odds of the entrepreneurs taking part in the shadow
economy vs. the odds of the business’s chance of doing so (while other independent
variables remain unchanged). These results are in accordance with the findings of
other studies, according to which entrepreneurs are more engaged in the shadow
economy than other types of business (Tedds 2010; Williams 2006). We can
interpret the VAT-payer coefficient in a similar manner. Finally, the significant
variable belonging to the first group (denoting company size as expressed by the
number of its staff) can be interpreted as follows: the odds ratio of an entity’s
participation in the shadow economy increases by 1.75 for each standard deviation
of the increase in the ln of total employment (with all other variables unchanged).6
This finding is in accordance with the results of the descriptive analysis, which do
not bear out the assumption that smaller companies are more prone to engaging in
shadow economy activities. The difference from the usual result, according to
Table 6.11 (continued)
Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pseudo R2 a 0.0592 0.0601 0.0781 0.145 0.148
N 1,051 1,051 1,051 843 830
AIC 1,141.8 1,144.7 1,135.1 876.0 866.0
BIC 1,176.5 1,189.3 1,209.5 961.3 955.7
Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN, 2012
Notes: f-reference variable. AIC is the Akaike information criterion for model selection; BIC is the
Bayesian information criterion, where the lower the value, the better the model. *p< 0.10;
**p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01
aPseudo R2 or McFadden’s likelihood ratio index compares the logarithm values of the likelihood
functions for the intercept-only model and the model with the predictors (excluding all explanatory
variables from the model). The value of this indicator ranges from 0 to 1; it resembles the linear
model determination coefficient, but cannot be used as directly in interpreting results
4 As expected, the value of the coefficient for the age of company is smaller than one (with younger
companies more likely to operate partially in the shadow economy). The same is true for the
coefficient of business entities that operate wholly or in part with foreign equity.
5We can here consider the ratio of the chance of a business owner taking part in the shadow
economy to the chance of a company doing so. To illustrate this, let us provide the example of the
model of N¼ 1,000 businesses and entrepreneurs, with 100 businesses taking part in shadow
economy and 300 not doing so, and with 300 entrepreneurs participating in the shadow economy
and 300 not doing so. The ratio calculated for businesses would amount to (100/300)/(300/300)¼
0.33. The ratio for entrepreneurs would amount to 3. It should be noted that a positive factor of
2 has the same effect size as a negative factor of 0.5. In other words, 2 is twice as great as 1, while
0.5 is twice as small as 1 (the effect size is 2 in both cases). Based on this, we can conclude that, for
instance, a coefficient of 0.1 is such that it has a greater effect than a coefficient of 2.
6 This result was obtained by using the listcoef command in Stata 11.1.
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which small businesses are more likely to participate in the shadow economy, can
be partially explained by the fact that the definition of the shadow economy was to a
large extent dependent on whether businesses employ workers outside the formal
sector. The second reason is the fact that other studies use the value of assets or
turnover to approximate company size.7
Interestingly, in all models regional characteristics are not statistically signifi-
cant. In the third group, consisting of seven sector dummy-variables, businesses in
the construction sector are nearly twice as likely to engage in shadow economy
activities compared to other service sectors (in line with our expectations), while
the trade sector, also statistically significant, was nearly twice as unlikely to take
part in the shadow economy than the other service sectors. We should note that the
remaining sectors also had the expected signs, but were not statistically significant.
In other words, major sectoral differences in the way businesses operate in the
shadow economy described in the preceding section are lost (except in construction,
and trade in model five) when the impact of other characteristics of the business—
such as size, type of entity, ownership structure, etc.—are included in the model.
This finding bears out the need for designing a strategy and specific measures to
formalise the shadow economy that are mainly sector-neutral, apart from for
construction.
As we have already presented the most important results in relation to activity
sector and other features of business entities, we will now devote more attention to
the fourth group: the perceptions and attitudes of business entities to taking part in
the shadow economy. Attitudes towards operating in the shadow economy being/
not being justified (a score ranging from 1, no justification, to 5, justified) are
statistically significant. The business entities that think that engagement in the
shadow economy is ‘more justified’ are more likely to be engaged in such activities.
This is a significant result, as it not only indicates the presence of the view that
operating in the shadow economy is perfectly normal for some business entities, but
also plays an important role in explaining why entities take part in the informal
economy when all other relevant factors are considered. Unlike the justification for
operating in the shadow economy, the likelihood of being caught is borderline
statistically significant (becoming significant only with a slight change in the
specification of model 5, if attitudes on penalties are excluded) (Andrews
et al. 2011). The one remaining variable in this group, the dummy variable
describing respondents’ attitudes to the severity of penalties, is not statistically
significant. It is not entirely clear how this variable should affect the results.
Companies that claimed penalties are mild do not operate in the shadow economy,
but may expect additional protection from unfair competition through stricter
sanctions. On the other hand a different interpretation is also possible: that it was
the business entities participating in the shadow economy that claimed penalties
were mild, which is certainly an incentive to do business in the shadow economy.
7 The use of the logarithm value of turnover in the model did not change the result substantially.
Many respondents refused to answer this question, which is why this variable was left out.
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Finally, the economic crisis that hit most business entities is not statistically
significant (while the values obtained were in line with expectations for the
likelihood of taking part in a particular type of activity in the shadow economy).
One possible explanation for its insignificance is the duration of the crisis. Another
reason could be the fact that it is not only companies with declining turnovers but
other businesses as well that turn to the shadow economy to either improve their
cash flows or to secure additional sources of financing.
6.3 Effects of Competition from the Informal Sector
Competition in the formal sector creates incentives for economic efficiency and is
the key driver of economic growth, since it motivates business entities to produce
higher quality products at as-low-as-possible cost. On the other hand, as a rule
competition between the formal and the informal sectors does not increase produc-
tivity and hurts progress in the economy (Perry et al. 2007). The relative cost
advantage of business enterprises operating in the informal sector through tax
evasion or non-compliance with regulatory requirements enables them to survive
even at low levels of productivity. An exception to the adverse impact of compe-
tition from the informal sector is a situation where there are substantial barriers to
entry, with the informal sector exerting competitive pressure without which the
formal sector would face X-inefficiency and waste resources (Loayza et al. 2010).
In Serbia, where small business entities are adversely affected by disproportionate
tax and regulatory requirements, this positive effect of competition from the
shadow economy should also be taken into account.
In this section we analyse the effects of competition from the informal sector due
to lower relative costs in relation to business entities operating in the formal
economy. In addition to the question of the extent to which informal operation by
competitors hurts businesses in the formal sector, another question must be posed:
who is hit the hardest, and why?
6.3.1 Competition from the Informal Sector
According to the results of the survey, competition from business entities that
engage in at least one type of informal activity is extremely widespread. As many
as 85.3 % of the business entities surveyed (of those who did respond) felt that there
was competition from shadow economy within their sectors (Table 6.12). In some
sectors such as transportation and construction nearly all of those surveyed said
they faced some form of competition from the shadow economy; these sectors were
also those where the majority of the surveyed admitted that they themselves took
part in informal activities. Larger business entities, as well as the ‘other services’
sector, cited slightly lower levels of exposure to this type of competition.
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Both entrepreneurs and businesses can be considered competition. The findings
of the survey show that entrepreneurs mainly compete with other entrepreneurs,
while businesses generally do not differentiate between competition from busi-
nesses and from entrepreneurs.
6.3.2 Effects of Competition from the Informal Sector
Informal activities of competitors are no obstacle to doing business for only 12 % of
business entities, while three times as many (34 %) respondents consider them a
major obstacle. There is a large difference between different sectors (see
Table 6.12), with informal activity particularly an issue in transportation,
Table 6.12 Informal sector as competition, obstacles to operation, and loss of revenue by the
formal sector (share in number of respondents who answered)
Loss of
revenue (%)
Large or very large
obstacle (%)
Presence of competition from
shadow economy (%)
Total 27.8 34.4 85.3
Type of entity
Entrepreneur 28.5 35.2 87.9
Business 26.2 32.1 79.1





Up to 4 28.7 35.3 85.6
5–19 24.8 30.6 85.4
20 and more 19.4 26.7 77.7
Participate in the shadow economy
No 27.0 34.7 85.3
Yes 29.6 33.7 85.3
Sector of economic activity
Agriculture 23.6 46.6 82.4
Industry 29.5 34.9 85.7
Construction 37.7 49.1 96.8
Trade 26.7 26.6 88.0
Transportation 36.0 53.8 94.2
Catering 24.7 24.0 86.8
Other services 22.5 31.2 73.8
Region
Vojvodina 28.3 37.7 80.9
Belgrade 26.7 36.7 81.9
Central Serbia 28.3 31.0 90.8
Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN, 2012
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agriculture, and construction. The results of an ordered logit model are presented in
Table 6.13. We used a question (To what extent are practices of competitors from
the informal sector an obstacle to the operation of your company?) as the dependent




































Likelihood of detection 0.408***
(2.75)
Prob> chi2 (degree of freedom) 48.19 (15)
Pseudo R2 0.0283
N (no. of observations) 825
Notes: f-reference variable; *p< 0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01
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variable. The possible answers ranged from 1 (no obstacle) to 5 (very large
obstacle).8
The importance accorded to competition from entities operating in the shadow
economy is lower for companies with foreign equity, while the type of entity
(entrepreneur and VAT payer), legal form, and ownership are not statistically
significant. Small businesses (by number of workers) are aware of the existence
and importance of informal activity to a greater degree. When viewed by sector of
activity, construction and transportation are particularly exposed to competition
from the shadow economy. The likelihood of detection is statistically significant:
the easier these entities believe it is for informal operations to be detected, the
smaller the extent of such competition.9 It should be noted that these results are
similar to those obtained for South Eastern Europe using the Business Environment
and Enterprise Performance Study (BEEPS) database by Hudson et al. (2012).
Some research has concluded that the greatest concerns about corruption from
the informal sector are voiced by those entities that most resemble the informal
sector. These are small businesses faced with financial constraints that are oriented
towards smaller clients, have under-utilised capacities, and operate in a market with
low entry costs.10 The only part of this conclusion that seems to be applicable in
Serbia is that which refers to small businesses, while the greatest problems are
present in activities with high entry costs and large participation of unskilled labour.
In other words, operating savings—and, consequently, the pressure of competition
from the informal sector—are greater in sectors where regulatory obstacles to
formalisation are more substantial and where it is more difficult to control workers.
Similarly to the small number of those who believed informal operation was not
an issue, a mere 17.8 % of all respondents claimed that unfair competition did not
bring about a decline in their annual revenue. On average, lost revenue amounted to
27.8 %, affecting particularly the sectors of construction and transportation. In most
cases lost revenue amounted to between 10 and 50 % (for about 70 % of all business
entities), while 11.6 % of entities estimated that their revenues had been reduced by
more than 50 % due to informal competition. It is interesting to note that the
estimated loss in revenue (27.8 %) does not deviate significantly from the estimated
share of the shadow economy in GDP as shown in Chap. 5.
In addition to the financial effects reflected in the estimated loss of revenue, we
can also cite other consequences of competition from the shadow economy.
Respondents primarily mentioned lower turnover and greater difficulty in selling
8 For a similar approach, see Hudson et al. (2012).
9We can obtain similar results when using a dummy variable with the value of 1 in cases where
business entities feel that competition from the informal economy is a large or very large obstacle.
The key difference lies in the fact that the variable describing whether or not the entity is a VAT
payer becomes statistically significant, while the presence of foreign equity and size (measured by
number of workers) cease being statistically significant variables.
10 The findings of the study on the impact of competition from the informal sector in Latin America
indicate that sectors with low entry costs cite informal competition as a substantial obstacle
(Gonzalez and Lamanna 2007).
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products (52 % of all respondents), lower product prices (41 %), and less invest-
ment into technological development due to lower revenue (14 %). When the data
are viewed by sector of activity, price cutting due to unfair competition is slightly
more common in construction (64 %), while lower turnover and greater difficulty in
selling products is at its most widespread in trade (60 %).
6.3.3 Types of Informal Operation
The relative cost advantage of business entities in the shadow economy stems from
various types of informal operation. Business entities estimate that these types of
operation (including not declaring workers, paying wages in cash, and making and
receiving informal payments) are represented in their respective sectors of activity
to a substantial degree. Thus, only one-quarter of all business entities felt that the
practice of not declaring employees is absent from their sector of activity; the same
percentage believed that no entities in their sector formally declared lower wages
than those actually paid. About half of all respondents felt that up to 50 % of all
workers in their sector of activity were either employed informally (without a
contract) or declared lower wages (although most respondents believed that the
portion of the wage paid in cash generally did not exceed 50 % of the total wage).
Finally, about two-thirds of business entities felt that some transactions—up to
50 % of the total—in their sector of activity were made informally (i.e., without
paying tax).
In addition to informal operation by registered businesses and entrepreneurs,
competition also comes from entities that are not officially registered. The findings
of the survey show that about half (46 %) of all respondents knew of unregistered
entities operating in their sector of activity. This view was slightly more common
among entrepreneurs than businesses (55 % relative to 37 %, respectively) and in
the transportation (78 %) and construction (67 %) sectors.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Chapter 7
Effects of Formalisation of the Shadow
Economy
Milojko Arsić and Gorana Krstić
7.1 Fiscal Implications of Formalisation of Shadow
Economy
7.1.1 Estimate of Possible Fiscal Effects with Respect to VAT
As tax evasion is by far the largest component of the VAT gap, the question that
needs to be asked is to what extent VAT revenue could be increased by ensuring
better tax collection over the medium and the long term, all other considerations
being equal.1 Over the medium term a realistic aim for Serbia would be to reduce
the VAT gap to the average level seen in the five new Central European EUmember
states before their EU accession. This means that in the next several years a realistic
aim would be to cut the VAT gap from its current level of 21 % to 18–19 %, as
experienced by Central European EU member states. Cutting the VAT gap by 2–3
percentage points would result in an increase in the Serbian budget revenues of
between 0.2 and 0.5 % of GDP. In the long run, say within 10 years, Serbia could
aim to reduce the VAT gap to the EU average of 13.5 %. Cutting the VAT gap to
this level, all other conditions being equal, would increase budget revenue by 1 % of
GDP. Hypothetically, if Serbia’s VAT gap were reduced to the level seen by the
M. Arsić (*) • G. Krstić
Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia
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1 It is important to bear in mind that other factors, such as a re-orientation of the economy towards
exports (not subject to VAT) and greater investment (subject to lower VAT rates), will have an
impact on the reduction of both hypothetical and actual VAT revenue. In this context any estimate
of additional revenues due to a reduction in the VAT gap should be treated as a hypothetical
estimate, all other conditions being equal, rather than as a realistic one. Closing the VAT gap is
therefore a necessary precondition for preventing, or at least reducing, any future decline in the
ratio of VAT revenue to GDP.
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five most efficient EU members (Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Luxembourg, and
France), where it stands at a mere 5 %, the additional revenue would be 2 %
of GDP.
All of the above estimates were made using current VAT rates as of 2011; we
therefore ought to determine the effect on these estimates of the increase in the
general VAT rate from 18 to 20 % that took effect in late 2012. The rise in the
general tax rate by 2 percentage points, as well as other changes to the VAT system,
will result in an increase in the potential VAT revenues of some RSD 33 billion at
current prices, which equals about 1 % of GDP. However, given the existing tax gap
(i.e. if the shadow economy remains unchanged), actual VAT revenues will
increase by about RSD 25 billion, or about 0.8 % of GDP (Fiscal Council 2012).2
7.1.2 Estimate of Possible Fiscal Effects with Respect
to Personal Income Tax and Social Contributions
Although the overall personal income tax and social contributions gap is relatively
significant, as we have seen in Chap. 5, potential additional public revenues that
could be generated through the efficient implementation of measures for reducing
the shadow economy are far lower. Even with the efficient use of well-designed
measures to combat the shadow economy, and given an effective institutional
framework, the shadow economy cannot be reduced to zero—as is borne out by
the fact that it is not insignificant even in the most developed countries. According
to 2011 estimates the total extent of the shadow economy in EU countries is 19.7 %
of GDP (Schneider 2011). Although separate estimates of the shadow economy in
household income and consumption are not provided, theoretical and empirical
studies have shown that the extent of the shadow economy is greater in income than
in consumption. We can accordingly assume that the shadow economy in house-
hold income is more widespread than the EU average. Starting from the assumption
that the estimated level of the shadow economy in household income in Serbia is
24.4 % of GDP, measures aimed at tackling the shadow economy could reduce this
level by some 10–15 %, with a similar reduction in the relevant tax gap. The
government would then see an increase of at most 0.6–0.9 % of GDP in income
tax and social contributions revenue (0.6 % of GDP in the medium term and slightly
more in the long run, assuming systemic measures are implemented consistently).
Taking into account VAT, income tax, and social contributions, reducing the
shadow economy to the level present in other Central and Eastern European
countries—an outcome that can be achieved in a relatively short span of time
(1–3 years), assuming the adoption and consistent implementation of systemic
2 These estimates differ from those made by the Fiscal Council because the impact on liquidity of
the shift to VAT payment upon collection of accounts receivable for small and medium-sized
businesses has been ignored, as this is a short-term effect.
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measures—could result in an increase in public revenue of between 0.8 and 1.1 %
of GDP (Table 7.1). Reducing the shadow economy to the EU average would take
longer (between 7 and 10 years) and require not only institutional measures, but
also other structural changes to the Serbian economic system. It could, however,
ensure additional public revenue of up to 1.9 % of GDP.
In interpreting the above estimates we must bear in mind that they reflect only
the isolated impact of the formalisation of the shadow economy, and not the impact
of other factors on the collection of tax revenue. In this sense the estimates
presented in Table 7.1 are not a forecast of changes in tax revenue in relation to
GDP. Other factors that will affect tax collection include long-term macroeconomic
trends such as movements in domestic demand and GDP and changes to the
employment rate. Thus, when estimating actual tax revenues, other factors need
to be taken into account in addition to the possible formalisation of the shadow
economy. The reduction in the difference between domestic demand and GDP,
which is necessary to avoid a balance of payments crisis, will cause a substantial
drop in VAT revenue in relation to GDP. A 5 percentage point drop in the ratio of
domestic demand to GDP would cause a corresponding fall in VAT revenue of
about 1 % of GDP. In this context, tackling the shadow economy can be interpreted
as a necessary activity to prevent a drop in VAT revenue in relation to GDP, rather
than as a possible source of additional tax revenue. In other words, if the shadow
economy is not formalised VAT revenue will decline by about 1 percentage point in
relation to GDP over the coming several years. Similarly, movements in the actual
levels of tax and social contribution revenues in relation to GDP will be affected by
changes in the employment rate. The number of employed might decline in 2013,
which could, all other things being equal, bring a drop in social contributions and
income tax revenue. However, employment in Serbia could increase in the medium
and the long term, which would generate additional income tax and social contri-
butions revenue.
7.2 Effects of Formalising the Shadow Economy
on Economic Growth
The preceding section estimated the possible fiscal effects given certain assump-
tions of a possible reduction in the shadow economy. This section will attempt to
consider how formalising the shadow economy can affect economic growth. This
Table 7.1 Estimate of the fiscal effects of formalising the informal economy in Serbia (in % of
GDP)
Short and medium term (1–3 years) Long term (7–10 years)
VAT 0.2–0.5 1.0
Income tax and contributions 0.6 0.9
Total 0.8–1.1 1.9
Source: Own calculations
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question is far more difficult to answer, as although there is a large body of
empirical research on the impact of the shadow economy on economic growth,
there are still no unequivocal empirical and theoretical findings (Schneider and
Enste 2000). The basic question is this: Is the shadow economy, from an economic
point of view, a positive phenomenon; in other words, does it make a positive
contribution to economic growth? The answer to this question will result in two
possible avenues of approach for government policy on the shadow economy:
tolerance or active suppression.
We can generally distinguish between three situations:
• Shadow and formal economies are substitutes for one another: any increase in
the shadow economy leads to a reduction in the volume of the formal economy;
• The volume of the formal economy is a given (i.e., fixed): the shadow economy
increases the total economic activity of a country; and
• The shadow economy contributes to the growth of the formal sector: its effect is
multiplicative.
The first view is the conventional one, based on a simple neoclassical model, that
the total volume of economic activity in a country is a given, based on the
assumption of full factor employment, so that the shadow economy may grow
only at the expense of economic activity in the formal sector. According to this
position, an entity chooses whether to take part in the shadow or the formal
economy; not doing business (being unemployed) is not an option. In this case
total GDP will even decrease, as operating efficiency is lower in the shadow than in
the formal economy (less capital-intensive technologies, greater uncertainty, poorer
protection of owners’ rights, etc.). Loayza (1996) showed how, under certain
conditions and using the example of Latin American countries, excessive tax
burden and over-regulation encourage the growth of the informal sector, which
has a negative impact on the pace of overall economic growth.
In the second case, given an unfavourable institutional environment, the volume
of activity in the formal economy may be a given; i.e., adverse circumstances may
preclude full-factor employment in this sector. For example, prohibitive laws, poor
economic policies, sanctions, or wars may constrain growth, as was the case with
Serbia in the 1990s. In this situation growth in the shadow economy does not affect
the formal sector but rather leads to an increase in the total economic activity.
Finally, in the third case, the shadow economy can have a positive impact on
economic activity in the formal sector through the interaction of the two sectors.
According to empirical research carried out by Schneider (1999), two-thirds of
income earned in the shadow economy in Germany and Austria is spent on
consumption in the formal economy (where value-added tax is payable), thus
boosting formal sector growth. The UK also saw a similar stimulating effect of
the informal economy on consumption in the formal sector (Bhattacharyya 1999).
An answer to the question of whether the shadow economy is useful or not and
how it affects economic growth can be found by using econometric models which
will be presented below. However, in real life various models and factors can act
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together, usually in opposing directions, and have different impacts on the final
result.
It can be posited that any major reduction in the shadow economy leads to a
major increase in tax revenue, which leads to more and better public goods and
services, which in turn boosts economic growth. This hypothesis was empirically
confirmed by, among others, Loayza (1996), whose research covered Latin
America. He established that any growth in the relative volume of the shadow
economy (in percent of GDP) contributes to a reduction in the growth of official
GDP in countries where (a) the statutory tax burden is greater than the optimum and
where (b) enforcement of compliance is too weak. This negative impact on GDP
can be explained by (a) reduced availability of public services in the formal sector
and (b) lower efficiency of the use of existing public services. The foundations of
this model have been criticised (Asea 1996), while the assumption that the shadow
economy hurts economic growth has failed to find widespread acceptance.
In the case of transition countries, Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) estimated
that the shadow economy has cushioned the drop in registered GDP, particularly in
countries that faced major declines in their GDP levels. Over half of the decline in
registered GDP carried over into the drop in overall economic activity, while the
other half was absorbed by the growing shadow economy. Using Ordinary Least
Squares regression, they concluded that the share of the shadow economy in overall
GDP increased by nearly 4 % for each 10 % of cumulative decline in
registered GDP.
Eilat and Zinnes (2000) came to a very important conclusion applicable to
transition economies, showing that there is an inertia effect in the creation of the
shadow economy, as well as a hysteresis effect in its destruction. If overall
economic activity is on the decline, a drop in GDP of one dollar is linked to an
increase in the shadow economy by 31 cents, meaning that the shadow economy
cushions the fall of registered GDP. On the other hand, if overall economic activity
is on the increase, a one-dollar rise in GDP leads to a reduction of just 25 cents in
the shadow economy. These findings indicate that caution is necessary when
estimating the effects of formalising the shadow economy on economic growth.
According to Schneider (2004), the shadow economy hurts economic growth in
developing countries while having a positive effect on economic growth in devel-
oped countries. The results of this econometric analysis, which covered 21 OECD
member states and 89 developing and transition countries, show that in developed
economies an increase in the shadow economy of 1 percentage point of GDP leads
to an increase in registered GDP of 7.7 %. On the other hand, in developing
countries 1-percentage-point growth in the shadow economy leads to a 4.9 %
drop in registered GDP, all other model variables being equal (openness of the
economy, inflation, government spending, capital accumulation rate, population).
One explanation for these results is that growth in the shadow economy in devel-
oped countries may stimulate the formal economy by generating additional income
that boosts formal-sector consumption. On the other hand, in developing countries a
greater volume of the shadow economy leads to a substantial erosion of the tax
base, which results in lower availability of public infrastructure and basic public
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services (such as an efficient legal system), in turn causing lower economic growth.
We believe that both of these explanations can be relevant to developing and
developed countries, but their final effect on economic growth depends on which
group of factors dominates.
However, a study carried out by USAID (2005) shows that there is no correlation
between the GDP growth rate and the shadow economy, and concludes that no
empirical confirmation can be found of the hypothesis that a reduction in the
shadow economy automatically leads to economic growth, and vice versa.
Although countries with higher GDP per capita have smaller shadow economies,
it cannot be determined whether formalisation is the cause or consequence of the
higher level of development. The authors also state that the available series of data
on changes to the shadow economy are not long enough to confirm or deny the
assumption that countries with high rates of economic growth are able to reduce
their shadow economy levels faster than those with lower growth rates. When
viewed from a theoretical standpoint the shadow economy limits business growth,
as it denies companies access to critical services and the opportunity to separate
their business and personal assets, which increases risk and constrains growth.
Serbia’s experience over a lengthy period of time shows the predominance of
distorting and negative effects of the shadow economy on balanced economic
growth, particularly in times of economic crisis. In the crisis conditions that Serbia
has faced since 2008 the shadow economy has become part of a vicious circle,
where one consequence of recession is flight from the formal to the shadow
economy, thus reducing tax revenue and thereby the availability of public services
and increasing the fiscal deficit. The growing deficit must then be compensated for
by greater tax rates, which drive companies and workers into the shadow economy
or out of the economy altogether. This downward spiral keeps repeating itself,
always at a lower level of GDP and employment. The state receives ever-lower
amounts of money to pursue appropriate development policies and finance public
services, leading to poorer public services and the continuation of the vicious circle
where companies are increasingly less ready to pay taxes. Government bodies are
thus faced with the task of adjusting how institutions operate and calibrating
economic policies so that the reduction in the shadow economy is accomplished
by shifting business from the informal to the formal sector, and so that there is
neither a decline in activity nor a drop in GDP.
Results of the study conducted using the MIMIC method in Serbia and the other
10 Central and Eastern European countries shown in Chap. 5 indicate that the
impact of the shadow economy on official GDP is statistically highly significant,
and has the expected negative sign. Depending on the model used, the value of the
GDP per capita coefficient varies between 0.60 and 0.70, meaning that if GDP
per capita declines by 1 percentage point, the shadow economy will grow by
between 0.6 and 0.7 percentage points. In other words, if GDP declines in the
future the shadow economy will grow as business entities attempt to off-set the
limited opportunities for doing business in the formal sector by becoming active in
the shadow economy.
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Chapter 8
Analysis of the Administrative Capacity
of the Institutions in Charge of Overseeing
the Operations of Business Entities
Mihail Arandarenko
8.1 Introduction
According to the results of the survey, the respondents’ negative views of
inspection bodies were caused predominantly by corruption (32 %), inconsistency
in implementing regulations (20 %), strictness in implementing regulations (12 %)
and lack of regulation implementation (9 %). Nearly one-half of all respondents
(46 %) felt that bribery of inspectors was common or very common; 30 % believed
it took place sporadically, and only 6 % believed it never happened. The lack of a
consistent, predictable relationship with taxpayers is a common feature of these
findings.
About two-thirds of all business entities visited by oversight bodies stated that
visits had happened only once, while about another one-fifth stated that they had
received two visits. Visits generally took one day (in about 70 % of all cases).
Figure 8.1 shows the frequency of inspection visits tasked with oversight of
corporate operations by sector of activity. Half or less of all respondents stated that
they had been visited by these inspectors: 53 % cited Labour Inspection, 43 %
mentioned Market Inspection, while 38 cited the Tax Authority. Audits by govern-
ment bodies were much more rare for business entities in sectors most affected by
the shadow economy such as construction, agriculture, and transportation. The only
exception to this rule was catering, where inspection audits were more frequent than
the average.
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8.2 Tax Administration
According to 2011 data the Republic of Serbia Tax Administration employed 6,165
staff, which is less than optimal given the number of taxpayers and international
standards. This problem is compounded by the inadequate structure of current staff
by age, education, and organisation. Thus, of the total number, only 55 % have
university degrees and the average age of employees is 49. In addition, many staff
are tasked with receiving and technically processing tax filings, while the number of
people effectively carrying out tax audits is lower than necessary.
The relatively low degree of efficiency in uncovering tax evasion is the conse-
quence of the lack of human and financial resources available to the Tax Admin-
istration, the inadequate structure of Tax Administration staff, the lack of systemic
exchange of information with other government bodies that could be used to
discover tax evasion, etc. The total budget of the Tax Administration is lower
than is required; as a result, employee salaries are rather low, which incentivises
younger staff to leave after gaining experience in tax audits, which in turn has an
adverse impact on the quality of audits and the overall efficiency of the Tax
Administration. In addition, rigid public sector remuneration rules mean that the
Tax Administration is unable to adequately pay professionals that are most in
demand (e.g., IT experts or auditors). Many of its current employees are not
sufficiently trained to do their jobs as those jobs are defined at present.
Lack of automation of business processes, lack of an organised cross-checking
system to compare data from other government bodies (e.g., Real Estate Cadastre,
Pension and Disability Insurance Fund, local Public Revenue Administrations, the
police, etc.), and sub-optimal mechanisms used to select taxpayers for audit,




































ity Did the Labor Inspectorate visit your 
company over the past year (2011)
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Did the tax administration visit your 
company over the past year (2011)
Fig. 8.1 Frequency of audit by sector of activity. Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions
for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN, 2012
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likelihood of uncovering tax evasion, which has served as an incentive for operating
in the informal sector. The current IT platform used by the Tax Administration does
not satisfy the needs of a modern public revenue authority. It needs replacing, and
transitional solutions must be found in the meantime. Too many tax administration
processes, including debt collection, rely on manual intervention. This substantially
decreases the efficiency of the Tax Administration. There is a major gap between
hardware and software: although multiple independent applications have been
developed to solve various issues they do not function as a whole, with some
posing their own problems. There are no business analysts in the Tax Administra-
tion who can appropriately define its business needs. An entire new system is
necessary, which requires a great deal of financial resources and time.
Changes to the Law on Tax Procedure and Tax Administration have meant that
the Tax Administration has become responsible for auditing entities engaged in
unregistered activity. Placing these powers within the remit of the Tax Adminis-
tration is justified, but, to achieve an appropriate level of efficiency, this broadening
of authority should be accompanied by major reforms to how the Tax Administra-
tion operates. Given the current number of tax inspectors (some 600 covering all of
Serbia), any new powers can be exercised only formally, since capacities to do so
are constrained. To resolve this issue the structure of Tax Administration staff must
be substantially changed: the number of employees tasked with administrative work
(receipt, certification, and registration of tax returns) should be reduced and the staff
effectively engaged in oversight increased. A switch to mandatory e-filing of tax
returns would reduce the need for the several hundred Tax Administration staff
estimated to be employed in administrative jobs, which would in turn enable part of
them (particularly the younger, better-educated staff) to be shifted to oversight tasks
after undergoing intensive training. Since many of these employees will neverthe-
less prove to be under-qualified for oversight tasks, the option of hiring well-
educated employees to deal exclusively with oversight should be considered.
Continuing improvements to the Tax Administration’s remuneration system is a
necessary precondition for retaining staff that already have the appropriate skills
and knowledge of tax audit procedures and for attracting young high-quality
employees.
Statutory, Institutional, and Organisational Framework The current framework
imposed by tax legislation poses numerous obstacles to efficient revenue adminis-
tration. The Tax Administration has no influence on how penalties are defined in
statute, nor can it get involved with actual sanctions practice, as this is the domain
of the courts. In addition, the threshold amount for tax fraud is much lower than in
most other countries, which shifts the focus away from major tax offenders and
means that tackling larger forms of evasion is less efficient.
The Tax Administration is formally a division of the Ministry of Finance, but
communication between the two does not flow both ways. The Tax Administration
is not sufficiently involved in providing support to the Ministry in its efforts to
design taxation policy, which is partly due to the weakness of the Tax Administra-
tion. Interpreting legislation and decision-making are currently within the remit of
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the Ministry of Finance rather than the Tax Administration, while in international
practice the reverse is often true. The current system in Serbia leads to substantial
delays in advice on the treatment of taxpayers, even by the Tax Administration,
which increases uncertainty among taxpayers.
The current organisational structure of the Serbian Tax Administration does not
reflect current organisational approaches in modern public revenue administration.
A strong central core is needed to design business processes, oversee their imple-
mentation, set operational goals, and oversee their realisation. At present the High
Taxpayer Unit does not have sufficient resources at its disposal to manage its client
base. The Education and Communication Division is in charge of training, rather
than the Human Resources Division, which would be more appropriate. Human
resources are under-utilised. For instance, more staff than necessary deal with desk
review and processing of tax filings while other more important tasks are neglected.
The number of branch offices is too large for an organisation the size of the Serbian
Tax Authority.
Since findings of empirical research (Alm et al. 1992) show that an increase in
the likelihood of tax evasion detection is a more efficient deterrent than other
mechanisms (such as reducing the tax burden or increasing penalties), there is
much room for tackling the shadow economy in Serbia by improving the efficiency
of the Tax Administration.
The Tax Administration should strive to ensure that its activities are aimed at
areas most at risk, that taxpayers who wish to comply with the law are able to do so
quickly and easily, and that enforcement is directed at repeated non-compliers. To
improve compliance the Tax Administration should particularly improve the vali-
dation of taxpayers and maintenance of taxpayer records by developing strategies
and programmes for a taxpayer service and increasing the standards of services
provided. In order to maintain compliance levels a greater focus on self-assessment
is needed and an overhaul of basic business procedures: development of a collection
strategy and a filing strategy (with various requirements for different types of filing,
and an emphasis on electronic filing and the removal of unnecessary forms);
improvement of oversight and collection of mandatory social security contributions
and payroll taxes; review of rules on handling requests for refunds/exemptions;
improvement of tax accounting; and review of penalties and their administration.
The relatively low efficiency of the Serbian Tax Administration in collecting
taxes has been borne out by the views of taxpayers voiced in the Survey on
Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, where equal portion of respondents
(46 % each) believed that the Tax Administration was either mainly unsuccessful




Tackling informal employment (colloquially known as ‘working in the shadow’) is
the primary task of the Labour Inspectorate, a separate division of the Ministry of
Labour, Employment, and Social Policy. The Labour Inspectorate is also charged
with carrying out other activities related to the implementation of the Labour Law,
the Health and Safety Law, and other labour legislation. The strategic aims of the
Labour Inspectorate are to minimise risks employees face at work, tackle
undeclared work, and combat breaches of rights arising from employment or
collective agreements. The Inspectorate is entitled to audit registered companies:
where it detects breaches of law—including work without a written employment
contract—it can require any deficiencies to be eliminated within a short period of
time. The Inspectorate employs some 260 inspectors, mainly lawyers, with a
number of engineers specialising in various fields, and operates in each of the
25 administrative districts and in Belgrade.
Labour inspectors are authorised to inspect a business’s internal bylaws and
individual contracts, as well as any and all other documents. They may take
statements from corporate officers and other interested parties, and may also inspect
offices, production plants, and other premises. The inspectors are also entitled to
launch audits based on reports made by members of the public, workers, or any
other interested parties. An integrated inspection oversight concept has been in
place in Serbia since early 2010, meaning that all labour inspectors undertake
comprehensive inspection actions: employment issues are not kept separate from
those related to health and safety.
A priority task of the Inspectorate has always been to verify whether workers
have formal employment contracts. People in informal employment are not
protected by workers’ rights, face greater risk of injury, are not entitled to
healthcare, and are denied unemployment benefits and old age pensions due to
the fact they are not registered for mandatory social security when in work. From
the point of view of safeguarding public interest, non-declaration of employees
entails tax evasion and a number of safety hazards, as well as other issues. Due to all
of the above, labour inspectors’ main task is to oversee the implementation of
statutory provisions governing “entering into labour relations”: i.e., uncovering
informally employed workers and formalising their status.
When workers without employment contracts are discovered at a business the
employer is given a deadline for either signing contracts with those employees or
letting them go. The employer must notify the Inspectorate of the steps taken within
8 days; inspectors will then visit the employer again to verify that the issue has been
resolved. Although this procedure is clearly aimed at protecting workers without
contracts its preventive role can be disputed, since there is no credible threat of
sanctions to prevent future non-compliance (Arandarenko 2012).
The effective power of labour inspectors is further constrained by two factors.
Firstly, although the law stipulates harsh fines, only courts can impose them. To
impose mass penalties in order to discourage the widespread non-compliance the
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Labour Inspectorate would have to become involved in a large number of individual
court cases, which is unrealistic as the procedure for proving allegations of this type
is demanding.
In performing oversight, labour inspectors establish whether people found on the
premises of a business entity have employment contracts. Inspectors can base their
official accounts of inspection visits on workers’ statements and conclude those
workers are employed informally (i.e., without a written employment contract, or
not declared for social insurance purposes), but employers can circumvent sanc-
tions by subsequently presenting employment contracts antedated to seem as if they
were entered into a day or two previous to the audit, and claim that the workers will
be declared for social insurance purposes by the statutory deadline—which, as a
rule, does take place.
In cases where an audit establishes that an employer is not paying taxes,
mandatory pension and disability insurance contributions, healthcare contributions,
and unemployment insurance contributions (payable for every month by the 30th
day of the next month, as required under Article 51 of the Law on Contributions for
Mandatory Social Insurance), labour inspectors cannot act independently but have
to report to the Tax Administration, the body in charge of implementing this
particular law. This procedure illustrates the shortcomings of the current
fragmented inspection system compared to the integrated inspection approach
used by most European countries.
Secondly, wholly unregistered ‘phantom firms’, typically located in private
homes and with all workers employed informally, are allowed by law to deny
labour inspectors access to their premises, since the Labour Inspectorate does not
have jurisdiction over them (unlike Market and Tourism Inspectorates). Audits
have detected many cases where employers have organised production in base-
ments, garages, and private homes, even though this is not easy to detect. The
buildings are unmarked and entrances are guarded by dogs and secured by cameras
and intercoms. Inspectors have found that these premises are most often venues for
sewing, shoemaking, carpentry, or other small-scale production, and the workers
are employed informally. Services, such as hairdressers or beauty parlours, may
also operate in this way. In these cases inspectors are expected to call in the police,
who generally lack enthusiasm for assisting since breaches of the Labour Law are,
from their perspective, relatively minor offences. Thus the worst infringements of
labour legislation remain almost completely beyond the reach of statutory sanction.
Articles 273 and 274 of the Labour Law envisage fines of RSD 1 million (about
€9,000 at the current exchange rate) for businesses employing workers without
appropriate contracts, not paying social security contributions, not paying wages,
paying wages below the statutory minimum, or paying wages partly ‘cash in hand’.
Fines for entrepreneurs are also high and amount to half the amount applicable to
businesses. Yet, in order for these fines actually to be imposed, inspectors must
bring and argue each case in court, which happens only rarely—until recently, in
only some 2 % of all cases. Of late there has been an increased number of
employment contracts entered into and workers registered for social insurance
after inspection visits. In addition to a stricter penal policy the way inspectors
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operate has changed, with visits now also being made outside of regular working
hours.
Misdemeanour judges often claim that the amounts of fines for infringement of
labour laws and health and safety regulations are unrealistic, given the current state
of the Serbian economy, which is why they have trouble handing down fines.
Nonetheless, penal policy applied by misdemeanour courts has become much
stricter over the past several years, with judges now, as a rule, handing down
fines that lie within the statutory range, rather than below the statutory minimum.
The Labour Inspectorate has contributed to this trend: inspectors have been appeal-
ing judgments that only impose reprimands instead of fines or hand down fines
below the statutory minimum; they have also been contesting rulings suspending
proceedings for lack of evidence. In addition, court cases are still liable to lapse due
to statutes of limitation. Labour inspectors have also been complaining that they
must testify in nearly every misdemeanour proceeding and face defendants on
multiple occasions, which is a large burden on their time.
Labour inspectors generally find that employers justify informal employment by
citing ‘trial employment periods’, claiming they need to assess the performance of
prospective employees before entering into employment contracts and registering
workers for social insurance. They also attempt to justify shadow employment by
claiming employees are reluctant to enter into formal contracts and wish to receive
higher wages resulting from employers not paying taxes.
Inspectors also cite instances where informally employed workers refuse to enter
into formal employment after inspectors intervene, instead leaving the employer in
order to be able to retain other statutory rights or benefits. This particularly
important consideration points to an often-overlooked cause of informal employ-
ment: the interests of the workers themselves, who might, when formally employed,
lose the right to social benefits, child support, unemployment benefits, or other
payments that are either de jure or de facto conditioned by the lack of any registered
income.
The Labour Inspectorate (Annual Report 2011) has found that informal employ-
ment is most common in trade, construction, industry, tourism and catering, crafts
and home repair, and personal services. Some activities record an increase in
informal workers over the same periods of each year, which is a particular hallmark
of catering and construction. Catering sees this trend in the summer, while in
construction it is evident towards the end of the building season as employers strive
to meet deadlines. However, enhanced inspection oversight is employed in the
construction sector throughout the year due to the possible health and safety risk.
Shadow employment in the construction sector is fostered by high employee
turnover, frequent shifts from one construction site to another, and brief periods
of employment, as workers remain on site only until a particular job is finished.
Inspectors have also discovered that unregistered employers in the shadow
economy mainly hire young unskilled labourers, with at most secondary school
diplomas; they also employ workers without permanent incomes, the unemployed
over 40 years of age, beneficiaries of various types of assistance or social security,
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etc. In most cases there is agreement between these employees and their employers
and no direct coercion.
The status of workers found on the premises of a business is also controlled
through integrated inspection oversight. There were a total of 40,757 Labour
Inspectorate audits in 2011 (including integrated audits), which found a total of
171,264 people at places of work, among them 6,230 people without employment
contracts (that is, in shadow employment). After inspectors intervened, employers
entered into contracts with a total of 4,622 people (or 74.2 %). The sectors of
activity with the most frequent incidence of undeclared work were wholesale and
retail trade, catering, construction, and food production. Of the total number of
people found not to have employment contracts, 23 % were engaged in trade, 16 %
in catering, 15.5 % in construction, and 8.7 % in food production.
Table 8.1 provides an overview of the overall results of inspection oversight of
shadow employment in Serbia between 2007 and 2011.
As can be seen from Table 8.1, the Inspectorate carried out some 40,000 audits
per year; this figure followed a downward trend, with 2011 seeing one-third fewer
audits than 2007. At the same time, however, the total number of employees
covered by these audits nearly doubled, which means that the focus of oversight
shifted onto larger businesses with more employees: the average number of workers
at a business or with an entrepreneur increased from six to more than 15 over the
observed period. At the same time the number of people found to be working in the
shadow economy nearly halved (from 10,448 to 5,744), as did the number of those
employed following audits (from 7,517 to 4,314). Nonetheless, the efficiency of
oversight remained high or even increased, given that nearly three-quarters of all
workers found to be employed informally were admitted into formal employment
following an audit.
The fact that far more undeclared workers were found in the ‘boom years’ of
2007 and 2008, and that the number continually declined from 2009 to 2011 after
the crisis, is consistent with the findings of the successive Labour Force Surveys
from 2008 to the present. It is, however, part of a longer-term trend that can be
followed back in time to 2005. Starting in that year the number of workers without a
valid employment contract discovered by inspectors has constantly been on the
decline, while the degree of their subjective formalisation has remained relatively
stable.1
Therefore, judging by the data collected by the Labour Inspectorate since 2005,
we could conclude that tackling undeclared work at registered businesses has been
very successful, and that the number of cases of such work uncovered has been
reduced to one-quarter of the initial figure in just seven years. This would also
match to a large extent the declining rate of informal employment, especially
outside the agriculture sector, found by household surveys (admittedly from
1A total of 28,735 people were identified as illicit workers in 2005, while 21,563 of them went on
to gain formal contracts. In 2006 the number of undeclared workers was 16,205, of which 11,324
were subsequently employed formally.
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different sources: the Living Standards Measurement Study for 2002, 2003, and
2007, and the Labour Force Survey conducted using indirect methodology in 2005
and direct methodology since 2008). Estimates made by respondents in the Survey
on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia of the extent, types, features, and
desirability of shadow employment can neither definitely confirm nor deny data
found in Labour Inspectorate reports.
The number of instances of oversight (audits) reported by respondents generally
bears out the assumption that the focus of oversight was businesses and entrepre-
neurs employing five or more workers, with audits taking place at two-thirds of
such entities; conversely, one in every two entities with four or less workers was
audited (Table 8.2). When data are viewed by sector of activity, most audits were of
catering businesses (80 %), followed by industry and trade (64 and 62 %, respec-
tively); while far fewer audits were made of construction businesses where informal
employment is most common—only one in three construction firms from the
sample were audited by the Inspectorate in 2011. The greatest number of audits,
proportionally, took place in Central Serbia (65 %), followed by Belgrade (50 %),
while Vojvodina saw the fewest audits (39 %).
While companies taking part in the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in
Serbia believed that the extent of informal employment and undeclared wages was
relatively high, a fairly low score was awarded to the Labour Inspectorate’s efforts
at uncovering workers without contracts and other types of informal employment
(Fig. 8.2). A generally positive score was given by 42 % of respondents, while 51 %
viewed the Inspectorate’s work in a generally negative light.
8.4 Market Inspection
The Market Inspectorate is a separate division of the Ministry of Foreign and
Internal Trade and Telecommunications. The division is made up of two sections:
the Section for Co-Ordination Oversight of Trade in Goods and the Section for
Co-Ordination of Oversight of Services, Prevention of Unfair Competition, and
Oversight Support. The Market Inspectorate’s headquarters are at the Ministry and













2007 48,255 268,682 10,448 7,517
2008 42,595 306,416 9,054 6,394
2009 40,222 357,498 5,734 4,178
2010 37,747 558,536 5,228 3,925
2011 33,920 503,613 5,744 4,314
Source: Labour Inspectorate, Annual Report 2011
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it has 24 territorial units and 4 specialised branches in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Niš, and
Kragujevac.
The Market Inspectorate’s remit is very broad and is governed by a myriad of
laws and bylaws, which clearly impedes its efficiency and often leads to
Table 8.2 Labour and
Market Inspectorates audits
by features of business
entities






Up to 4 50.0 41.0
5–19 68.0 54.0
20 and more 64.0 44.0











Central Serbia 65.0 52.0
Source: Own calculations. Survey on Conditions for Doing Busi-
ness in Serbia, FREN 2012
Fig. 8.2 How successful is the Labour Inspectorate in uncovering workers without employment
contracts or in other types of informal employment? Source: Own calculations. Survey on
Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia, FREN 2012
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overlapping with other inspection services. However, it can be said that the primary
task of this service is to ensure the application of the Law on Trade and, as part of
that effort, prevent various types of informal trade. The principal legislative frame-
work for the operation of the Market Inspectorate is the 2010 Law on Trade, a piece
of legislation that provided a unified structure for issues hitherto regulated by three
separate laws—the old Law on Trade, the Law on Conditions for Trading in Goods
and Providing Services Related to Trade in Goods and on Inspection Oversight, and
the Law on Prices. However, the remit of the Market Inspectorate goes beyond the
scope of the Law on Trade and covers a total of 27 laws, including those governing
consumer protection, prevention of money laundering, wholesale and retail trade in
tobacco products, product safety, advertising, copyright protection, anti-smoking
measures, etc.
The Market Inspectorate engages in various forms of oversight that differ in
scope, methods, areas audited, and aims. Oversight may be pursued ex officio,
pursuant to an official order, or pursuant to a report of an infringement. Any
interested legal entity or individual may contact the Inspectorate; reports of
infringements may also be filed online.
In the course of an audit a market inspector is authorised to inspect the premises
of a business entity or the premises where its business is conducted; inspect ledgers,
records, official documents, and any and all other documents both in paper form and
stored by electronic means that relate to the trading engaged in; inspect personal
identity papers of persons engaging in trade; extract oral and written statements on
issues of importance for the audit; photograph or film premises where trading is
engaged in, or the goods or other items being audited; inspect vehicles used in the
course of trading; sample goods and other items; seek court warrants for searching
homes or ancillary buildings in the event of suspecting them to be used for illicit
trading; and seek assistance by the police or municipal police. In performing
oversight the Market Inspection Division adheres to principles of administrative
proceedings as governed by the Law on General Administrative Proceedings, which
include the right of parties to lodge complaints against rulings issued by market
inspectors.
In the event that the Market Inspectorate establishes that an infringement has
taken place, it cannot impose a fine directly, but can only file criminal charges,
charges for economic crime, or misdemeanour charges. It may also report the
offender to a professional tribunal (the Court of Honour). However, if a law has
been infringed, a market inspector is authorised to issue a ruling requiring the
infringement be remedied, temporarily ban trading in particular goods or provision
of particular services, temporarily close down a retail or wholesale outlet, or call for
goods to be confiscated.
Article 54 of the Law on Trade has conferred some powers previously held by
the Market Inspectorate onto the Municipal Inspectorate, particularly those relating
to trade outside of formal shops and ensuring adherence to working hours. It is
important to note that the Municipal Inspectorate has the same powers in exercising
these functions as the Market Inspectorate.
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The manifestations of the informal economy faced by market inspectors are
many and varied. Firstly, market participants such as illicit traders or entrepreneurs
and people who engage in illegal activity may be completely invisible to public
registries. Secondly, business entities may be registered with a public registry but
may pursue part of their activities in an illicit manner, without registration or the
required permits. In trade sector, legal traders may sell smuggled or illicit goods; in
catering, a legal café may quickly turn into an illegal nightclub, etc. A survey
carried out by the Serbian Association of Employers (Socio-Economic Council of
the Republic of Serbia 2010) showed that in the informal sector goods are most
often sold through personal advertisements, in markets, in undeclared stores or
craftsmen’s shops held by self-employed persons, from improvised roadside stalls,
at illegal distribution centres, through illegal door-to-door sales, through illicit sales
in otherwise legal outlets, and through illegal commission sales at legal entities’
premises.
In 2011 the Market Inspectorate employed 487 staff, nearly all of them with
university degrees. The majority of staff had backgrounds in economics (44 %) and
law (24 %). The standard of equipment is good, with all employees provided with
laptop computers, portable 3G modems for accessing the Inspectorate’s intranet,
and mobile telephones. On average, there is one official vehicle for every two
inspectors. The Inspectorate has developed software applications to improve the
records of inspection activities, provide information on unsafe products
(‘NEPRO’), record actions taken to protect copyright, and to record goods confis-
cated during audits.
The Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia found that the Market
Inspectorate had visited 43 % of all respondents (Table 8.2), of which one-third
were audited more than once a year. Audits did not take more than one day in 73 %
of cases and took more than 3 days in 9 % of cases. As expected, most audits were in
the catering and trade sectors (68 % of all catering establishments and 63 % of all
trading businesses and shops were audited). Above-average numbers of audit were
also seen in production (55 % of entities visited), while other sectors recorded
below-average levels of oversight. Greater incidence of oversight was seen by
entrepreneurs than by businesses (45 % vs. 38 %, respectively); similarly, busi-
nesses with between 5 and 19 workers were audited more than those with less than
five employees or those with more than 20 workers (54, 41, and 44 %, respectively).
Most audits were made in Central Serbia, with oversight in Vojvodina being at the
level of the national average, and Belgrade seeing a below-average incidence of
oversight.
Respondents mainly viewed the Market Inspectorate in a positive light: 52 %
gave it a score of 4 or 5 on a scale of one to five, while 13 % of respondents assessed
its performance negatively (1 or 2 on the same scale). These scores were slightly
lower than those awarded to the two other public services, the Labour Inspectorate
and the Tax Administration. This is borne out by the average scores: 3.5 for the
Market Inspectorate and 3.6 for both the Labour Inspectorate and the Tax
Administration.
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Chapter 9
Main Findings and Recommendations
Gorana Krstić, Friedrich Schneider, Mihail Arandarenko, Milojko Arsić,
Branko Radulović, Saša Ranđelović, and Irena Janković
9.1 Main Findings
In this section we will summarise the findings presented in the previous chapters on
the key causes of the shadow economy in Serbia and the mechanisms that contrib-
ute to its development. We will also present the results of an estimate of the extent
of the shadow economy in relation to GDP, estimates of various forms of the
shadow economy in the sectors of businesses and entrepreneurs and their charac-
teristics, and an estimate of the effects that formalising the shadow economy can
have on the government budget and economic growth. Finally, we will summarise
findings that relate to the administrative and institutional capacity of government
institutions tasked with overseeing the operation of business entities.
9.1.1 Causes of the Shadow Economy
Some of the fiscal causes of the shadow economy are the relatively high fiscal
burden on labour, complex and expensive tax procedures, a complex and opaque
tax system, the lack of organisation, training, and equipment at the Tax
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Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: gkrstic@ekof.bg.ac.rs; arandarenko@ekof.bg.ac.rs; arsicm@ekof.bg.ac.rs;
randjelovic@ekof.bg.ac.rs; irenaj@ekof.bg.ac.rs
F. Schneider
Department of Economics, University of Linz, Linz, Austria
e-mail: Friedrich.schneider@jku.at
B. Radulović
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Administration, the low quality of public-sector services, and high tolerance of the
shadow economy.
We have singled out the following features of the labour market that have a
bearing on the growth of the shadow economy: taxation of labour; minimum wage;
social benefits system; employment protection legislation; minimum wage regula-
tion; unemployment benefits; and retirement rules. The most significant of these are
the rules for taxing labour, primarily the high tax burden on lower-paid work caused
by the low tax-exempt allowance, high contribution rates, and minimum contribu-
tion base. Since the natural zone for formalising the informal economy is around the
amount of the minimum wage, a high burden on minimum wages implies high costs
of formalisation, and thereby discourages it. This effect is compounded by the high
minimum wage, which currently stands at around 50 % of the average wage,
exceeding the recommended level by some 10 percentage points. The minimum
contribution base makes part-time employment contracts unpopular, and also
effectively prevents the introduction of special contractual arrangements at more
favourable tax rates such as the ‘mini jobs’ and ‘midi jobs’ that have successfully
contributed to the flexibility of the labour market in some European countries.
Apart from causes in the tax system and features of the labour market, other
factors of particular importance in Serbia have to do with the unfavourable eco-
nomic and regulatory environment. Of the economic conditions we can single out
low productivity and widespread liquidity issues, especially pronounced in times of
crisis. While low productivity forces business entities to shift at least part of their
operations into the informal sector to be viable in the market, the lack of liquidity
affects the taxpayer’s decision to evade taxes and so preserve funds needed to pay
suppliers. Regulatory constraints particularly include high administrative costs and
legal insecurity. In addition there are many other factors that are the consequences
of weak institutions and a chaotic system, such as issues with construction permits,
inefficient market exit, and frequent abuses using ‘phoenix companies’. The poor
institutional framework is also reflected in a high degree of tolerance for the shadow
economy on the part of the state and the high level of corruption. These two factors,
coupled with the low quality of public services, further disincentivise taxpayers
from paying their taxes.
Some of the major factors favourable to the shadow economy that are found in
the financial sector are the major share of cash transactions in the total volume of
payments, informal financing, and unregistered remittances sent by migrants resid-
ing abroad. Cash payments continue to account for a major portion of total
payments in Serbia, although they have seen a downward trend of late. These
circumstances have been further complicated by the fact that the high level of
euroisation has stimulated moral hazard behaviour by transactors, while transac-
tions have been made primarily in foreign currency and outside legal channels.
Moreover, the volume of informal finance has grown with the shadow economy.
The causes behind the use of informal sources of finance are poor local regulations
and contract enforcement mechanisms, barriers to market entry, expensive formal
finance, lack of financial products appropriate to consumer needs, inadequate tax
regulations, and high tax burdens. Informal financing causes greater information
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asymmetries between market participants, lack of tax revenues from these activi-
ties, and exclusion of formal financial intermediaries from the transfer of funds.
This adversely impacts the development of the financial sector and the efficient
allocation of finance. Finally, remittances from migrants abroad are a particularly
significant source of foreign capital in Serbia, as their post-crisis amounts in
absolute terms exceed all other categories of capital inflows from private and public
sources. The vast majority of remittances enter the country through informal
channels and are often not invested in productive activity; this has negative effects
on economic growth and development.
9.1.2 Estimates of the Extent of the Shadow Economy
and Tax Gap
The extent of the shadow economy in Serbia was estimated using three methods:
MIMIC, Household Tax Compliance (HTC), and the Survey on Conditions for
Doing Business in Serbia. The application of the MIMIC method found that across
all sectors in Serbia the shadow economy stood at some 30 % of official GDP in
2010. Data for the same year resulted in an estimate of 23.6 % of GDP for the
shadow economy, identified on the basis of household income and consumption
(the HTC method). According to the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in
Serbia, the shadow economy in the business sector stood at some 21 % of GDP for
the two major types of informal activity (illicit trade and undeclared work). Based
on these results we can conclude that the total extent of the shadow economy in
Serbia was 30 % of GDP, and that this was for the most part accounted for by trade
in goods and undeclared work.
The study also estimated the tax gap in the collection of VAT, personal income
tax, and social security contributions. The VAT gap was estimated at 2.5 % of GDP,
while the gap in personal income tax and social security contributions was put at
about 5 % of GDP. We believe that the estimates of tax gaps for the key forms of
taxation are relatively reliable. By extrapolating these estimates we arrived at an
approximate estimate of the total tax gap in Serbia, which we put at about 10 % of
GDP. A similar figure was also obtained using the HTC method, which indirectly
supports the above estimate.
9.1.3 The Shadow Economy in the Business
and Entrepreneur Sector
We analysed the shadow economy in the business and entrepreneur sector by using
data from the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia based on three
indicators. These were: (1) the share of business entities engaged in the shadow
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economy in the total number of business entities; (2) the share of informal workers
in the total number of workers, both overall and by type; and (3) the share of cash
payments in the total volume of payments.
The Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia asked respondents
whether their own business was engaged in the shadow economy, and found that
28 % of all business entities in Serbia did so. These businesses and entrepreneurs
employed workers informally and/or made payments in cash even though they were
VAT payers. The term ‘informal worker’ is used to describe workers employed
without a contract, or those who do have contracts but only part of whose wage is
officially declared, with the remainder paid in cash. The findings showed that there
was a link between the shadow economy and the type and age of the business entity:
entrepreneurs and new start-ups were more likely to engage in the shadow econ-
omy, while the common relationship between the shadow economy and the size of
business entities, whereby smaller businesses are more likely to work in the shadow
economy, could not be confirmed. Most business entities operating informally were
in construction (42.9 %), as is also evidenced by most empirical research; this
sector was followed by agriculture (33.8 %), catering (33.1 %) and transportation
(32.7 %). According to region, business entities located in Central Serbia (exclud-
ing Belgrade) were the most prone to operate in the shadow economy, while those
in Belgrade were least likely to do so (33 % versus 24.7 %).
A further two indicators of the shadow economy were based on respondents’
views on the participation of their own businesses compared to their opinions on
how active other businesses from the same sector were. All types of shadow
economy were represented to a much greater extent in ‘other’ businesses in the
same sector than in the respondents’ own businesses. We therefore considered data
obtained from owners/managers’ biased responses regarding their own business
activity in the shadow economy as the lower limit of the shadow economy, while
figures obtained on the basis of their subjective views on the participation of other
businesses from the same sector were deemed to denote the upper limit. Hence, the
share of employees working without formal contracts ranged from 1.9 % (lower
limit) to 23.9 % (upper limit) of the total number of employees; the share of workers
whose total wages were not declared varied between 3.8 and 24.7 %; while the
share of turnover in cash ranged between 11.3 and 21.6 % of the total volume of
turnover.
The results of econometric analysis based on the survey data show that several
variables are statistically significant and represent important determinants for
making decisions on whether or not to join the shadow economy. They confirm
the findings of similar studies that entrepreneurs are more likely to operate infor-
mally. In addition, we found that size (as measured by the number of employees)
and the VAT status of entity are significant. Doing business in particular sectors of
economic activity, (construction) is statistically significant, while according to
some specifications the transportation sector increases and the trade sector
decreases the probability of participation in the shadow economy. Regional vari-
ables are not statistically significant. Finally, the business attitude towards justifi-
cation of the shadow economy is also statistically significant, which leads to the
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conclusion that measures aimed at changing opinions about the shadow economy
should play a more pronounced role.
There is widespread competition from business entities operating in the informal
sector. On average, entities claimed they lost nearly 28 % of their income from this
competition, while almost 35 % stated that the shadow economy was a large or very
large obstacle to doing business. This is particularly evident in the sectors of
transportation and construction, where nearly all respondents said they were
exposed to some type of competition from the shadow economy. Our analysis
also found that competition from the informal sector was felt less by companies
with foreign equity, as well as when informal activities are more likely to be
detected. We found significant correlation between the various types of informal
activity, so that making and receiving cash payments was often accompanied by
employing undeclared workers and paying wages in cash.
9.1.4 Estimated Impact of Formalising the Shadow Economy
Based on our assessment of the tax gap, we estimate that a decrease in the extent of
the shadow economy could, over a period of up to 3 years, result in additional
revenues of between 0.8 and 1.1 % of GDP, while over a decade additional revenues
of close to 2 % of GDP could be expected. When viewed in a broader fiscal context,
additional revenues resulting from less informal activity will not make it possible to
reduce tax rates, nor will they allow discretionary increases in public spending. The
shadow economy must be addressed to compensate for the drop in revenues
collected from consumption taxes that will occur due to the necessary reduction
in the absorption gap. The current absorption gap, characterised by a balance of
payments deficit of some 10 % of GDP, is unsustainable in the long run since it
leads to continual growth of foreign debt and net foreign assets. A reduction of the
absorption gap by some 5 percentage points of GDP is estimated to have an
autonomous impact on the decline in VAT revenues of about 1 % of GDP.
Moreover, autonomous growth of public expenditure can be expected in the long
run as the population ages; it would thus be more favourable to ensure that
additional expenditures can be met through better collection of existing taxes,
rather than by increasing tax rates. If addressing the shadow economy generates
additional revenue it should be used to reduce the fiscal deficit rather than to reduce
tax rates or increase taxes in a discretionary manner.
Even though there has been a lot of empirical research on the effects of
formalising the informal economy on economic growth, there are still no clear
and unambiguous empirical or theoretical findings that indicate whether the shadow
economy has a positive or a negative impact or what the direction of causality is
(Schneider and Enste 2000). According to the findings of the survey carried out in
Serbia and ten other Central and Eastern European countries for the period 2001–
2010 using the MIMIC method, the effect of the shadow economy on official GDP
is statistically highly significant and has the expected negative sign. The GDP per
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capita coefficient indicates that if GDP per capita declines by 1 percentage point,
the shadow economy will grow by between 0.6 and 0.7 percentage points,
depending on the model used. In other words, if GDP declines in the future the
shadow economy will increase as business entities seek to compensate for fewer
opportunities in the formal sector. This result is evidence of the importance of
maintaining macroeconomic stability and creating conditions for future economic
growth, as these are major components of successful strategies designed to formal-
ise the informal economy.
9.1.5 The Administrative Capacity of Institutions Tasked
with Overseeing Business: Labour Inspectorate,
Market Inspectorate, and Tax Administration
The Labour Inspectorate is charged with tackling informal employment, or ‘work-
ing in the shadow’. When workers without employment contracts are discovered at
a business the employer is given a deadline for either signing contracts with those
employees or letting them go. The employer has a brief window to notify the
Inspectorate of the steps taken. Although this procedure is clearly aimed at
protecting workers without contracts, its preventive role can be disputed since
there is no credible threat of sanctions to prevent future non-compliance. Even
though the law provides for substantial fines for these offences they can only be
handed down by the courts, and the procedure for proving breaches of the law is
very demanding. The Inspectorate is even more constrained in its oversight of
completely unregistered businesses or ‘phantom firms’, since access to their pre-
mises needs police assistance. Respondents’ estimates of the extent of informal
employment made in the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia are
relatively high, especially in the sectors of construction, catering, trade, and indus-
try. Similarly, estimates of the extent of the practice of paying a portion of wages
while evading taxes and contributions for formally declared workers were also
high. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that respondents had mixed views regarding
the efficiency of the Labour Inspectorate. Nonetheless, this service was ranked
slightly higher than both the Tax Administration and the Market Inspectorate,
which corresponds to the finding that the principal issue does not lie with the
capacities of the staff and the organisation of the Labour Inspectorate: rather it is
prevented from being more effective in tackling informal employment and
undeclared earnings by lack of resources and an inadequate statutory framework.
The primary task of the Market Inspectorate is to ensure the implementation of
the Law on Trade and, in doing so, prevent various forms of illicit trade. Goods are
most often sold in the informal sector through personal advertisements, in markets,
in undeclared stores or self-employed craftsmen’s shops, from improvised roadside
stalls, and at illegal distribution centres. When the Market Inspectorate establishes
that an infringement has taken place it cannot impose a fine but must bring
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proceedings in court. Market inspectors may issue rulings that require the infringe-
ment to be remedied, temporarily ban trading in particular goods or provision of
particular services and temporarily close down a retail or wholesale outlet, or call
for goods to be confiscated. The Market Inspectorate’s remit is very broad and is
governed by myriad laws and bylaws, which clearly impedes its efficiency and
often leads to overlapping with other sectoral inspection services, including the
Municipal Inspectorate. As regards its organisation, the Inspectorate is very
fragmented, both horizontally and vertically, which hinders its effectiveness.
Even though respondents in the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia
generally viewed it in a positive light, the Market Inspectorate scored slightly lower
than both the Labour Inspectorate and the Tax Administration.
The Tax Administration was also less than efficient when uncovering tax
evasion, which is the consequence of its lack of human and financial resources,
inadequate staff structure, and systemic exchange of data with other government
bodies aimed at discovering tax evasion. According to 2011 data the Republic of
Serbia Tax Administration employed 6,165 staff, which is less than optimal given
the number of taxpayers and international standards. Of the total number only 55 %
have university degrees and the average age of employees is 49. In addition, many
staff are tasked with receiving and technically processing tax filings, while the
number of people carrying out tax audits is inadequate. The total budget of the Tax
Administration is lower than necessary, and as a result salaries are low, which
incentivises younger staff to leave after gaining experience in tax audit, which in
turn has an adverse impact on audit quality and overall Tax Administration effi-
ciency. The fact that business processes are not automated, that there is no cross-
checking system to access and compare data from other government bodies (e.g.,
Real Estate Cadastre, Pension and Disability Insurance Fund, local Public Revenue
Administrations, the police, etc.), that the mechanisms used to select taxpayers for
audit are sub-optimal, and that the staff structure is inadequate, all result in a low
likelihood of uncovering tax evasion, which serves as an incentive to operate in the
informal sector.
9.2 Recommendations for Formalising the Shadow
Economy
9.2.1 Strategy for Formalising the Shadow Economy
A successful policy to formalise the shadow economy must reduce the entry of new
participants and foster the formalisation of existing participants by moving their
activities from the shadow to the formal economy. This requires a strategy that
addresses the root causes and mechanisms that contribute to its development:
excessive tax burden, over-regulation of economic activity, and weak and ineffec-
tive government bodies. The causes of the shadow economy are many and varied
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and multiple methods are needed to reintegrate it with formal channels. Policies
designed to reduce the shadow economy can be divided into general reforms that
address the shadow economy by building a favourable environment for doing
business in the formal sector, incentives directly aimed at the shadow economy,
and building the administrative capacity of the state.
Business entities decide how to operate on the basis of their assessment of the
costs and benefits associated with doing business in either the formal or the shadow
economy. Therefore any policy aimed at formalising the shadow economy should
change the cost-benefit ratio for both the shadow and the formal economies.
There have been frequent attempts to change this cost-benefit ratio in the shadow
economy by increasing administrative repression (i.e., through better detection and
greater penalties). The policy for reducing the extent of the shadow economy
pursued by most European countries up until 2000 was founded on exactly these
repressive measures (Williams et al. 2008). However, the experiences of these
countries, as well as of Serbia and Yugoslavia since the 1990s, show that this is
neither the only nor the best avenue of approach, since relying solely on repressive
methods without tackling the underlying causes of the shadow economy decreases
economic activity by reducing the shadow economy without a corresponding
increase in the formal economy (Krstić et al. 1998; Williams 2005). The use of
repressive measures does, however, yield good results when the aim is to prevent
entities joining the informal economy or to close down businesses already operating
in the shadow economy, rather than to move business entities from the shadow to
the formal economy.
Another means of changing the cost-benefit ratio in the shadow economy is to
use various measures to reduce the benefits enjoyed by entities operating in it. This
can be accomplished primarily by cutting costs (reducing the burden of taxes and
business regulations) and increasing the benefits in the formal economy (e.g. by
providing access to incentives and loans) in order to make operating in this sector
more attractive. This can be achieved through preventive measures and incentives.
Preventive measures can prevent the emergence of the shadow economy by reduc-
ing the tax burden and allowing new types of formal work. Preventive measures are
directly aimed at participants in the shadow economy and are intended to induce
them to formalise their operation. They include amnesties at the individual or
general level for those wishing to join the formal sector, business advisory and
support services, and targeted direct and indirect tax breaks for employing declared
workers.
The practical task and key challenge for economic policy in Serbia is to develop
a well-balanced combination of incentives and sanctions that will maximise the
formalisation of participants in the shadow economy—businesses, entrepreneurs,
and workers—and result in the loss of as little GDP or overall employment as
possible. Ideally, the admixture of these incentives and penalties should comprise
incentives aimed at incorporating those population groups that are excluded from
the formal economy and re-integrating businesses and entrepreneurs that have left
the formal economy due to high taxes, rigid regulations, or the economic crisis; and
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sanctions designed to discourage voluntary, opportunistic use of the shadow econ-
omy to generate excessive profits through illegal cost-cutting.
The key prerequisite for a successful strategy to formalise the shadow economy
is to complete transition and stabilise the legal and institutional structures of
society, and then achieve and maintain macroeconomic stability and create pre-
conditions for economic growth. The impact of these factors on the shadow
economy is just one of their many desirable effects. The econometric findings
presented in Chap. 6 indicate that an increase in registered GDP leads to a drop
in the extent of the shadow economy. In other words, if GDP were to decline in the
future the shadow economy would increase, since business entities would endeav-
our to compensate for fewer business opportunities in the formal sector by working
in the shadow economy. In these circumstances the measures proposed will not be
fully effective.
The econometric analysis shows that there are no statistically significant differ-
ences in the involvement of individual sectors in the shadow economy, except for in
construction and trade. Thus the proposed measures for formalising the shadow
economy are mainly sector-neutral; i.e., address all sectors equally. An exception to
this is measures aimed at the construction sector and some services.
We propose a set of preventive measures and incentives aimed at formalising the
shadow economy that cover tax policy and regulation, labour market institutions,
and the financial sector. The recommendations that entail building the administra-
tive capacity of government bodies relate primarily to the institutions that oversee
businesses with informal employees and/or that make and receive cash payments:
the Tax Authority, the Labour Inspectorate, and the Market Inspectorate. These
recommendations are based on the analysis of the operation of these institutions
presented in the preceding chapter. Table 9.1 at the end of this chapter shows the
key recommendations for formalising the shadow economy for each of these areas,
their sectoral coverage, the institutions responsible for conducting such measures,
and the expected outcomes of their implementation.
9.2.2 Fiscal Policy Measures
Fiscal policy includes tax policy, public expenditures policy, and public debt
management. The main factors affecting the formalization of the shadow economy
are the characteristics of the tax and public expenditures system, while public debt
policy does not have a substantial bearing on the informal sector.
The key measures that can be applied to combat the shadow economy within the
framework of tax policy are:
• Reducing distortions introduced by taxes;
• Reducing tax compliance costs;
• Reducing the return to tax evasion, and
• Reducing tolerance of the shadow economy.
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Table 9.1 Recommendations for formalising the shadow economy
Fiscal policy
Measure Sectoral coverage Institutions Expected outcome
Reduce fiscal burden
on labour (see section
on features of the
labour market)






increase in rate of
registered
employment
Remove tax breaks for
corporate income tax
and harmonise taxation
of property of both
individuals and legal
entities
All sectors Ministry of Finance
and Economy
Less distortion gener-






All sectors Ministry of Finance
and Economy/Tax
Administration
Lower cost of admin-
istering taxes and
greater readiness of
taxpayers to pay taxes






selecting entities to be
audited
All sectors Ministry of Finance
and Economy/Tax
Administration





utory penalties for tax
evasion
All sectors Ministry of Finance
and Economy/Tax
Administration/courts
Greater cost of tax
evasion and, conse-
quently, less evasion
Ban sale of new indus-
trial products in flea
markets, farmers’ mar-
kets, and roadside stalls
All sectors Municipal Police Reduction in volume
of shadow economy
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Fiscal policy
Measure Sectoral coverage Institutions Expected outcome
Improve co-ordination
between Tax Adminis-








ticularly in exchange of
information


















by state to abandoning
practice of writing off
interest on back taxes
All sectors Ministry of Finance
and Economy
Greater readiness of




and value of services
provided by the gov-
ernment and the draw-
backs of the shadow
economy through the
public education sys-
tem and the media






Invest effort in system-
atically improving the




Public services Government of Serbia/
all Ministries
Greater readiness of
taxpayers to pay taxes
Features of the labour market
Measure Sectoral coverage Institutions Expected outcome




to level of minimum
wage








base for social insur-
ance contributions
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Fiscal policy
Measure Sectoral coverage Institutions Expected outcome
Introduce more
favourable tax treat-
ment for ‘mini’ and
‘midi’ jobs























tion rates by sector or
progressive social
security contributions




level of 50 % of aver-
age wage to around or
under 40 %







hourly rates for over-
time work







ments to years of ser-
vice with last employer
rather than total years
of service








contracts to 3 years










expected use of retire-
ment payments
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Fiscal policy
Measure Sectoral coverage Institutions Expected outcome
Introduce micro-
lending facilities






































































Reduce extent of infor-
mal finance
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Fiscal policy
Measure Sectoral coverage Institutions Expected outcome
Business environment





bans imposed on busi-
ness owners and man-
agers in criminal or
other proceedings)
































to take part in the con-
sultation process
All sectors Government of Serbia Private sector partici-
pates in consultation





Adopt bylaws in a
timely fashion




All sectors Ministry of Foreign













Multiple sectors Multiple regulatory
bodies
Lower start-up costs









Construction Ministry of Construc-
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Reducing Distortions Introduced by Taxes
The extent of distortions introduced by taxes stands in proportion to the square of
the tax rate, meaning that higher tax rates also introduce higher distortions. Tax
rates in Serbia are generally relatively low, and so the distortions are not substantial.
An exception to this rule is the total fiscal burden on labour, which stands at some
39 % in Serbia, slightly lower than in developed EU member states but greater than
in countries at similar levels of development (Arsić et al. 2010). Therefore total
taxes on labour in Serbia are high and create incentives for tax evasion. The high tax
burden is a particular constraint on labour-intensive sectors of activity such as the
textile industry and services. A major reduction in the fiscal burden on labour would
have a positive impact on the readiness of taxpayers to actually pay their taxes.
Detailed recommendations on the taxation of labour are presented in the following
section, which deals with measures aimed at the labour market.
In addition to the high fiscal burden on labour, the highest marginal rate1 of the
regular annual property tax, standing at 2 %, is considered to be relatively high and
serves to foster various forms of tax evasion. Any reform of property tax, assuming
this type of taxation remains progressive, should therefore limit the top marginal tax
rate to 1 %. This change would not have much significance for the budget, but
would be justified from the point of view of both reducing the shadow economy and
enhancing efficiency and equity.
Distortions introduced by taxes also depend on the number of tax rates, breaks,
and exemptions for each type of tax, special tax regimes, etc. The more rates there
are for each personal income tax, the greater the opportunities for tax evasion. In
general, the Serbian tax system is well designed in this respect and does not offer
much incentive for tax evasion. It would, however, be desirable for future reforms
of the VAT framework to gradually introduce a single tax rate, as this would reduce
the scope for tax evasion. The most tax breaks and exemptions apply to corporate
Table 9.1 (continued)
Fiscal policy
Measure Sectoral coverage Institutions Expected outcome
‘Legalise’ buildings
without permits







Outreach All sectors Government of Serbia Less tax evasion; or
more incentive to shift
from shadow to for-
mal economy
1 The marginal tax rate is calculated by dividing the increase in tax by the increase in the tax base.
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income tax. Although these breaks for the most part do not contribute to the shadow
economy, they nonetheless facilitate tax avoidance and tax fraud, and as such
should be gradually abolished.
Reduce Tax Compliance Costs
Greater costs associated with administering taxes encourage taxpayers to evade
them. The tax compliance costs grow larger as the number of taxes in the system
increase, become more complicated, as the number of payments per year increases,
and as e-filing opportunities become more limited. The tax compliance costs are
particularly relevant for small taxpayers (e.g., small and micro-businesses, entre-
preneurs) whose incomes are low. One of the main measures to reduce tax com-
pliance costs is continual re-examination of the justification for numerous fiscal and
quasi-fiscal charges. Complicated and unclear tax regulations increase tax compli-
ance costs and facilitate accidental or deliberate tax evasion. However, the assess-
ment of some taxes—such as the corporate income tax—is not aligned with
international accounting standards, which increases compliance costs, particularly
for foreign companies doing business in Serbia. Although the divergence of
accounting standards from international practice is probably not a major cause of
the shadow economy, bringing them into line with global standards is important in
improving general conditions for doing business in Serbia.
Simplifying tax procedures to cut the number of tax payments each year would
increase e-payment options, reduce tax compliance costs, and increase the readiness
of taxpayers to pay their taxes voluntarily.
Reforming the system of quasi-fiscal charges is an important precondition for
improving the business environment and reducing the costs of doing business. The
reform process begun in 2012 with the removal of 138 individual dues is an
important step towards improving the business environment; it has resulted in the
abolishment of many unjustified charges and the definition of statutory procedures
for the introduction of new dues; moreover, all charges are now paid into the
national budget. Besides removing the remaining unjustified charges, future efforts
should focus on combining similar fees and appropriately naming and categorising
them. It is particularly important to improve the parameters used in defining the
charges that are justified: these include adjusting the tax burden to the financial
strength of each taxpayer, aligning fees with the expenses associated with the
provision of a service by the government, and bringing the amounts of charges
into line with the benefits enjoyed or damage caused by the payer. Systemic
limitations need to be introduced to avoid a return to an economically distorting
and unfair system of quasi-fiscal charges. With this in mind, it is important to again
apply the gross budget principle consistently, as well as to introduce any fiscal and
quasi-fiscal dues exclusively by law.
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Reduce the Return to Tax Evasion
Tax evasion can be viewed as a rational choice on the part of taxpayers that depends
on the cost-benefit ratio of evading taxes. Hence, to reduce tax evasion its benefits
must be reduced and its costs increased. An increase in the costs of tax evasion can
be brought about by increasing the probability of detection, as well as by increasing
penalties in the case of evasion. Empirical research shows that increasing the
probability of detection is a greater deterrent to evasion than imposing harsher
penalties. Reforming the Tax Administration is the one decisive precondition for
increasing the probability of detecting tax evasion: this means carrying out more
frequent audits, while the probability of a taxpayer being audited should be based
on the risk of that taxpayer actually committing tax evasion.
In addition, the probability of prosecuting tax evasion needs to be increased. For
this to happen, systematic measures must be taken to tackle corruption at the Tax
Administration, as well as to improve co-operation between the Tax Administration
and other government bodies. Efficient prosecution of tax evasion cases also
depends on changes to criminal legislation, training of judiciary bodies, and
combating corruption within the judiciary.
Increase Tax Morals
The readiness of taxpayers to engage in evasion does not depend only on the cost-
benefit ration, but also on their moral views of tax evasion. Moral views of how
justified tax evasion is depend on numerous factors, such as tradition, how other
taxpayers behave, the existence of privileged taxpayers, government tolerance of
tax evasion, the quality of public services, etc. There are many ways in which
governments can encourage taxpayers to regard evasion as immoral, such as
incorporating anti-evasion messages into the education system and media cam-
paigns. The readiness of individuals to pay taxes depends on the behaviour of other
individuals and their estimated readiness to pay their taxes. If the government is
consistent and unselective in tackling tax evasion, taxpayers will be more certain
that others will pay and will be more willing to pay themselves.
Reduce Tolerance for the Shadow Economy
Tax evasion is more or less tolerated in most democratic societies, and the shadow
economy is often treated as an activity that contributes to the social security of the
less well-off. However, the high tolerance of the shadow economy in Serbia does
not extend only to vulnerable groups. Reducing tolerance for the shadow economy
in Serbia is necessary to reduce the extent of informal operations. This primarily
entails consistently and unselectively banning activities that result in visible and
noticeable tax evasion. Specifically, in the case of Serbia, this would entail:
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• Introducing a ban on the sale of new industrial products in flea markets, farmers’
markets, and roadside stalls.
• The fact that there are many untaxed buildings sends a clear message that the
government tolerates the shadow economy.2 A major increase in the reach of
taxation of real property would clearly indicate that the government is becoming
less tolerant of the shadow economy. To this end, national authorities could
provide technical support to local bodies and introduce a system of incentives
and penalties for local authorities dependant on their degree of success in
increasing the reach of taxation and property tax collection.
• Many forms of shadow activity are openly engaged in via the Internet, classified
ads in newspapers, etc. These could be prevented relatively easily, but this is not
done due to the passive stance of the Tax Administration, which does not
monitor new channels of tax evasion. Particularly significant in this respect is
the widespread practice of catering establishments (restaurants, coffee bars, etc.)
not issuing fiscal receipts or not assessing and paying VAT, although added
value is high in this sector. This type of tax evasion can be uncovered without a
great deal of additional training for tax inspectors, since evasion is obvious and
easy to discover. Therefore, since the introduction of e-filing will release many
Tax Administration staff from their current technical and administrative duties
(receiving and certifying tax filings, entering data into the database, etc.), it is
recommended that they be reassigned to audits of sectors where tax evasion is
obviously taking place.
• Over the past several decades there have been clear discrepancies between the
amount of property owned by many Serbian nationals and income reported to the
Tax Administration. The absence of any reaction from the Tax Administration is
a form of tolerance for tax evasion—and for tax evasion that has nothing to do
with social security. Regulations on cross-checking property and income must
be implemented without delay, and those individuals whose assets far exceed
their declared income must be subject to ex-post income tax. The government’s
decision to finally implement statutory provisions allowing the cross-checking
of property and reported income is a major step forward in tackling the shadow
economy. That said, it is crucial to ensure that the Tax Administration continues
to cross-check property and income rather than for this effort to be a one-off
exercise. For these measures to succeed fully, the Tax Administration needs
to co-operate with other government bodies in order to increase its capacity
for uncovering the real owners of property in Serbia. Establishing sound
co-operation with foreign tax authorities is also necessary to identify and
appraise the assets that Serbian nationals hold abroad.
2According to Tax Administration estimates, some 15 % of flats in residential buildings, as well as
office buildings, are untaxed; for individual houses, the figure stands at over 20 % (Arsić and
Ranđelović 2012).
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Encourage Taxpayers to Settle Reported Tax Liabilities Fully
and on Time
The practice of companies making tax filings and then failing to pay is widespread
in Serbia. The reason for this is in the poor liquidity of companies, which is often
actually insolvency in disguise. The Tax Administration often tolerates this behav-
iour to avoid forcing taxpayers into formal insolvency, which generally ends in
many workers losing their jobs. This indicates that non-payment of taxes in Serbia,
even when not formally the result of the shadow economy, is a significant type of
financial indiscipline that results in both lower fiscal revenues and less equality for
business entities. Statutory limitations on payment deadlines in commercial trans-
actions are a major step forward in establishing financial discipline. An advantage
of the proposed measure is that the deadlines are the shortest in cases where the
government owes money. Yet the reach of this measure is relatively constrained by
the fact that financial indiscipline is primarily caused by the presence of insolvent
businesses in the market. The decisive factor in establishing financial discipline,
therefore, would be the efficient and non-selective implementation of bankruptcy
procedures, which would remove insolvent entities from the market. In that context,
the suspension of automatic insolvency by the Constitutional Court is a step
backward. To establish financial discipline it is also important to raise prices
charged by infrastructure operators so that they cover costs.
Abandon the Practice of Writing off Interest for Late Payment
of Taxes
In addition to being the consequence of tolerating a large number of insolvent
companies active in the market, fiscal indiscipline is also partly caused by the
periodical reductions in and write-offs of back taxes. Over the past two decades
Serbia has, from time to time (generally just before or after a general elections),
written off interest on corporate back taxes. Given the high inflation rate in Serbia,
when interest is written off, so is part of the principal that has decreased in value due
to inflation. When inflation is taken into account, a zero interest rate on tax
liabilities actually becomes a negative interest rate. So, for instance, if interest on
3-year-old back taxes is written off, assuming inflation stands at 10 % per year, the
principal of the tax debt will lose 27 % of its value. By writing off interest on back
taxes the government systematically rewards non-conscientious taxpayers and
directly encourages moral hazard. This means that some taxpayers who are emi-
nently able to pay their taxes choose to wait for interest to be written off and their
tax debt reduced. Writing off interest on tax debts hurts the level playing field for all
participants in the market and fosters negative selection, whereby undisciplined
taxpayers are rewarded and disciplined ones are not.
The adoption of a new Law on the Write-Off of Interest for Late Payment of
Taxes will temporarily improve liquidity in the economy, as well as the inflow of
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funds to the budget. However, the long-term effects of this law on financial
discipline will be markedly negative, since it represents the continuation of the
practice of periodically rewarding undisciplined taxpayers by writing off a portion
of the real value of their principal debt along with nominal interest. Thus the
practice of writing off interest on back taxes should be discontinued, since it
rewards non-compliance and enables insolvent companies to remain in the market.
Improve the Quality of Services Provided by the Government
Taxes are the price that the public pays for services provided by the government.
Thus the readiness of the public to pay taxes depends on the actual volume and
quality of public services, and on individual perceptions of the provided services.
Low quality of public services, unproductive expenditure, and corruption affect the
readiness of the public to pay their taxes. Improving the efficiency of the govern-
ment by enhancing the quality and availability of its services (from security and
justice to education and healthcare) is important for tackling the shadow economy.
Educate the Public About the Importance and Value of Services
Provided by the Government
In addition to improving the quality of government services it is necessary for the
government to work on the perception of the public regarding the value of those
services. The public often underestimate the value of the services provided by the
government: a year of elementary school, certain forms of healthcare, social
security, agricultural subsidies, etc. This bias creates a widespread conviction
among the public that the taxes they pay are much greater than the value of the
services provided by the government. This belief, which is partly true, increases the
willingness of people to not pay their taxes. It would be beneficial, therefore, for
brochures to be periodically mailed to all households (modelled after the ‘citizen’s
budget’ prepared in many developed EU member states) explaining in clear and
easily understandable language how much the government spends for what purpose
and why it is important for individuals and businesses to pay their taxes regularly.
9.2.3 Measures Relating to Features of the Labour Market
Taxation of Labour
The most important recommendation in the field of labour taxation pertains to the
need to substantially reduce labour costs for lower-paying jobs. Any kind of reform
of labour taxation (or, in a broader sense, of the taxation of income derived from
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work) should ideally entail an increase in the tax-exempt personal allowance to the
level of the minimum wage. Most European countries employ this practice.
Tax allowances for family dependents in Serbia are available only to annual
income tax payers, i.e., the richest 1 % of the population. Introducing a tax-exempt
allowance for dependents would reduce the tax burden of employees with an
unemployed spouse and children, and thereby reduce their incentives for joining
the shadow economy.
Another means of reducing the tax burden on lower wages would be the removal
of the minimum social security base, which now stands at 35 % of the average
wage. While its impact on people working full-time jobs is negligible since the
minimum wage is far above this level, it increases labour costs for part-time
workers with standard open-ended employment contracts.
In addition to removing the minimum base for social insurance, an important
incentive to formalising informal employees working part-time jobs would be the
introduction of less restrictive tax treatment of so-called ‘mini jobs’ and ‘midi jobs’,
based on the positive experiences of Germany (Eurofound 2008) where healthcare
and social security contributions for mini jobs (defined by the wages earned rather
than by hours worked) are much lower than standard, while the rate of income tax
can even equal zero. Midi jobs (where wages lie between those of mini jobs and
standard employment) attract contributions that are greater than those for mini jobs
but are still lower than standard. These rules ensure that workers in mini jobs avoid
the trap of wage poverty and ease their transition into standard employment.
Seasonal workers in agriculture, tourism, and other seasonal activities may find
the Montenegrin solution beneficial: employers there are required to pay a fixed
amount per day for each seasonal employee.
Some countries have also introduced progressive contributions for social secu-
rity or contribution rates that differ by sector, with labour-intensive, lower-paying
sectors of activity (where the shadow economy is generally more widespread)
paying contributions at lower-than-standard rates. Empirical, theoretical, and leg-
islative arguments for and against the introduction of such differentiated rates in
Serbia deserve careful consideration.
Minimum Wage Regulation
To avoid driving down the demand for formal work, the minimum wage should be
reduced from the current level of 50 % to some 35 %–40 % of the average wage, as
was the case in Serbia until several years ago and as recommended by the World
Bank for middle-developed countries. Moreover, the introduction of a slightly
lower minimum wage for youth under 25 years of age should be considered, to
stimulate their open-ended employment. Similarly, the minimum wage could vary
slightly by region so as to partly reflect regional differences in the cost of living
(which is slightly higher in Belgrade than in the rest of Serbia).
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Working Hours Regulation
The body of regulations governing working hours should be carefully analysed to
see which of the current standards are more costly for employers or do not benefit
workers, and an effort should be made to change them. The suggestions made below
are based on comparative data on prevailing practices in OECD countries and on
employers’ most common complaints.
– Slightly reduce increased hourly rates for overtime and work on weekends and
holidays.
– Allow more flexible re-allocation of working hours, both within the working
week and for longer periods of time, subject to the consent of both employee and
employer.
– Allow annual leave to be used as agreed between employee and employer.
Employment Protection Legislation
The most urgent requirement in this respect is the removal of the statutory provision
obliging employers to pay employees severance in proportion to each employee’s
total years of service rather than only years of service spent with that employer.
This would foster formal employment, primarily of elderly workers with work
experience.
In addition, the maximum length of employment under individual fixed-term
contracts should be extended from 1–2 or 3 years. This change would probably not
have a major impact, as breaches of this rule are rife, with businesses extending
such contracts beyond the statutory maximum by manipulating job titles. Nonethe-
less, this change must be made to give the most compliant businesses (frequently
foreign investors, who are also the ones objecting the most to this provision) more
flexibility in adjusting the volume and structure of their workforce. In addition, a
better general principle is to comply with a good rule than not to comply with a
bad one.
Retirement Rules
An increase in the formal employment of elderly workers, as well as a parallel drop
in their undeclared work, would be achieved by raising the current retirement age
threshold, introducing actuarial adjustment of pensions to reflect the life expectancy
of people who retire earlier, and providing for actuarial rewards for those who
continue to work and pay pension contributions after meeting conditions for full
retirement, regardless of whether they receive pensions or not.
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Welfare Benefits
In Serbian practice, welfare benefits are available almost exclusively to unem-
ployed and inactive persons, which lead those who are able to work to combine
welfare and informal employment. To incentivise employment in the formal sector,
an in-work benefits programme should be introduced along the lines of the US
Earned Income Tax Credit, which would make it possible for workers to combine
formal employment and welfare benefits, with the latter gradually reduced as
earnings increase.
Specific Measures Targeting Informal Employment
Evaluations show that various specific measures targeting informal employment are
more beneficial than a blanket reduction in tax rates, which can have much broader
implications and not sufficiently reflect a reduction in the shadow economy
(Eurofound 2008).
An example of a targeted programme is support for formal self-employment.
This measure is applied in Serbia by the National Employment Service (NES), and
it involves a one-off non-repayable grant and some in-kind support, provided that
the beneficiary regularly pays contributions and taxes for at least the following
2 years. On average, some 3,000–5,000 people per year become self-employed
through this programme; NES staff estimate that most of them merely formalise
their informal businesses. It is interesting to note that evaluations show that
entrepreneurs who have been legalised have higher survival rates than those who
start businesses without previous experience in the informal sector.
Some European countries apply a broader range of support measures to ease the
shift from unemployment or informal employment towards formal self-
employment. A special programme is available in the Netherlands that offers tax
breaks for relatives and other persons who lend start-up money to those without
jobs. Germany subsidises the unemployed who start their own business for 3 years;
the subsidies decrease gradually over the course of the 3-year period (Eurofound
2008). In Serbia unemployed persons can receive the entire amount of unemploy-
ment benefits to which they are entitled in advance, on condition they use the
money for self-employment.
Microlending is also a measure that facilitates the establishment of legal sole
proprietorships, especially for those categories of people who cannot rely on their
own funds or commercial credit. Formal borrowing is believed to increase the
likelihood of a business becoming formal (Eurofound 2008).
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Recommendations for Improving the Efficiency of the Labour
Inspectorate in Tackling Undeclared Work
An analysis of the position, operation, and volume of activities undertaken by the
Labour Inspectorate shows that this body has been achieving relatively good results
in terms of addressing undeclared work, given the constraints on its operation
imposed by regulations, limited human resources, and lack of other capacities.
This finding is further borne out by the fact that 56 % of all respondents in the
Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia awarded good marks (4 and 5 on
a scale from one to five) to the Labour Inspectorate, while a mere 12 % gave it poor
marks (1 and 2 on a scale from one to five). This result is slightly better than that
achieved by the other two institutions in charge of tackling the shadow economy,
the Tax Administration and Market Inspectorate.
As has already been demonstrated using a multitude of examples, one of the key
problems in the operation of the Labour Inspectorate is the lack of co-ordination
and integration with other inspection and oversight services. This problem could be
overcome by integrating the various inspection services into an Inspectorate-
General (of which the Labour Inspectorate would be a part) to achieve synergy
and avoid duplication of activities, while at the same time establishing a consistent
system that would be more efficient at preventing some of the most dangerous
participants in the shadow economy (such as ‘phantom companies’) from operating
with virtual impunity by using loopholes in existing legislation.
Changes to legislation should be considered that would allow labour inspectors
to access and examine all premises where business is conducted, regardless of
whether the entities in question are formally registered or not. In addition, it would
be beneficial to allow labour inspectors to impose fines as part of a simplified
procedure.
A long-standing complaint of the Labour Inspectorate is that they have too few
people and too much work, and that the number of inspectors needs to be increased
substantially if optimal results are to be achieved. Inspectors are well qualified, and
nearly all of them have university degrees. The Inspectorate has limited Informa-
tion and Communication Technology (ICT) capacity. There are electronic linkages
with the Business Registries Agency and an internal analytics and planning data-
base has been developed. However, the Inspectorate cannot establish direct links
with business records, the Tax Administration, the National Employment Service,
or social security organisations.
The key measures for removing administrative barriers are better co-operation
between the Labour Inspectorate and the Tax Administration, social security
organisations, the police, and courts. Moreover, co-operation with the National
Employment Service is tenuous: the database of people receiving unemployment
assistance is not available to the Inspectorate, which is an issue that needs to be
resolved.
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Recommendations for Improving the Efficiency of the Market
Inspectorate in Tackling the Shadow Economy
The broadest recommendation in an institutional sense entails the drafting of a
framework Inspections Law, harmonised with European Union regulations, to
ensure better mutual co-ordination of inspection oversight and better delimitation
of the powers of the various inspection services. This piece of legislation would also
allow the closure of numerous loopholes in the powers of inspection bodies that
have made it possible for the shadow economy to flourish and have hindered the
implementation of activities designed to combat it. A commission to co-ordinate
inspection oversight should be established as quickly as possible. The advantages of
an integrated inspections approach are particularly obvious in the area of authority
of the Market Inspectorate. A unified database of offenders and offences, accessible
to all inspection services, the Tax Administration, the Customs Administration, and
the police, would improve the efficiency of the fight against the shadow economy.
The integration of powers would mean that inspectors that uncover an unregistered
or unreported entity or person engaging in an activity under the remit of another
inspection agency would be both authorised and required to demand that any
deficiencies be remedied and to notify the Tax Administration of the infringement
and the measures taken.
Specific recommendations for improving the efficiency of the Market Inspec-
torate have been made as part of the Regulatory Reform Project and USAID BEP.
In addition to the above, these include the need to re-organise it along territorial
lines and reduce the number of regional units, as well as to strengthen its functional
organisation to ensure more complete oversight of the trade in specific goods
throughout the country. Furthermore, inspectors should act solely pursuant to
audit orders: this would avoid arbitrariness and guarantee adherence to the hierar-
chy and transparency of inspection oversight. A risk assessment system should be
introduced (to focus on the likelihood of non-compliance or infraction), as should a
risk management system for inspection oversight. Among the changes needed are
more training for inspectors, new software development, and better public infor-
mation about the work of the Inspectorate. Periodic outreach campaigns should be
organised aimed at both offenders and the general public; we will go into this issue
in greater detail at the end of this chapter.
9.2.4 Measures Relating to the Financial Sector
Curb Transactions in Cash and Incentivise Cashless Payments
Cash transactions involve money changing hands without the use of bank accounts,
and are also termed ‘cash-in-hand’ payments. These transactions are not formally
registered. In addition, in highly dollarised economies such payments are predom-
inantly made and received in foreign currency.
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Cashless and, particularly, electronic payments are among the means that can be
used to reduce the volume of cash transactions, both formal and informal. Elec-
tronic payments therefore make it more difficult for parties to operate in the
informal sector (Schneider 2011).
In the case of Serbia, an anti-crisis measure exempting certain entities from the
requirement to use fiscal cash registers does not seem to have resulted in better
reporting of cash transactions, nor in a decrease in the shadow economy. On the
contrary, it has facilitated informal cash transactions.
In addition to reducing the volume of cash transactions, greater use of cashless
payments would increase reporting, particularly by businesses and small entrepre-
neurs, and thereby make it impossible to conceal any portion of revenue generated
in cash. Several measures can be implemented to boost the share of cashless
(primarily electronic) payments in Serbia.
Incentives need to be preferred over repressive measures against the use of cash
in financial transactions. Given the rapid pace of technological development, it is
relatively easy to allow payments using electronic money so that sellers of goods
and services are compelled to offer electronic payments in sectors presently dom-
inated by cash payments (catering, taxi cabs, etc.). There are also many incentives
that can be used, such as subsidising point-of-sale terminals for small and micro-
businesses, limited tax incentives for electronic payments (as introduced by Argen-
tina, Colombia, and South Korea), and prepaid cards for people without bank
accounts to enable their inclusion in the formal sector. On the macroeconomic
level, government subsidies and assistance could be paid out electronically, as
could various types of contributions (as is the case in Russia). Further, all govern-
ment payments could be limited to electronic channels only.
Cash payments can be constrained directly. For instance, an Italian law dubbed
the Decreto Bersani (D. Lgs. 7/2007) imposes a €100 limit on cash payments for
professional services on pain of a strict prison sentence.3 Bulgaria is an interesting
example when it comes to applying restrictive measures. In 2011, Bulgaria intro-
duced a law restricting cash payments, which sets out conditions for limiting
payments in cash in its territory, which should reduce the extent of the shadow
economy (Bulgarian Ministry of Finance 2011). Besides the implementation of
measures aimed at limiting cash payments, more effort should be put into educating
users of payment cards about their uses and benefits.
Moreover, economic policymakers should reach a clear consensus on the appli-
cation of a de-euroisation strategy. This would contribute to a substantial reduction
in cash payments—particularly informal ones—throughout the system. The
3 In addition to simplifying start-up procedures (Art. 9), the Decreto Bersani, adopted in 2007
(D. Lgs. 7/2007) introduced strict penalties for activities in the shadow economy. As such, it is a
good example of measures designed to tackle informal activity. The penalty for a construction
company employing undeclared workers is the closure of its construction site. A retail outlet
caught not issuing fiscal receipts three times in 5 years can be closed down permanently. Finally,
theDecreto Bersani prohibits cash payments of more than €100 for professional services rendered.
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environment would then favourably affect macroeconomic stability, further driving
down the shadow economy.
Finally, to ensure that the remaining cash transactions take place primarily
within formal channels, field audits should be strengthened to ensure fiscal cash
registers are used and receipts are issued for all transactions.
Formalise Remittances from Abroad Transferred Through
Informal Channels
In the opinion of businesspeople, greater transfer of funds using formal channels
(primarily the banking sector, money transfer agencies, and the post office) could be
achieved by reducing transfer costs (commissions and fees). Greater formality
would also increase transparency and facilitate the use of these funds to finance
activities that contribute to the growth and development of the recipient country
(Jongwanich 2007; Ratha and Mohapatra 2007; Ratha 2009; Ratha and Silwal
2012).4 Serbia has high transfer costs compared with the global average, which
has been estimated at about 9 % of funds remitted (World Bank 2012). What is
more, in Serbia commission charges on incoming money transfers are higher for
smaller amounts (in percentages), which disincentivises emigrants from sending
money through formal channels.5
Greater competition of entities that transfer funds formally and lower transfer
costs would increase migrant interest in sending remittances through formal chan-
nels and offer numerous benefits to recipients, who are mainly people with lower
incomes. These benefits include easier access to financial institutions, cheaper
finance available to a larger share of the population, lower investment risk due to
easier diversification, and better education of recipients of remittances about
alternative ways of using those funds.
Formal transfer channels should be easier to access, more reliable, faster, and
cheaper than competing informal channels. The choice of more expensive formal
and informal channels is often driven by the loss of anonymity inherent in bank
transfers. Regulators of countries where funds are sent and received should enter
into appropriate bilateral agreements to formalise and facilitate the transfer,
channelling, and registration of funds received (see, for instance, the experience
of Mexico in Hernández-Cos 2005). This process can take the form of a public-
private partnership with the participation of financial institutions. Establishing
closer co-operation between the banking sectors of countries where remittances
4 The costs of transferring funds into Serbia using specialised money transfer agencies are, on
average, 10–15 % (commission plus exchange rate difference), while the individual sums trans-
ferred average between €100 and €300 each.
5 Several commercial banks in Serbia have, of their own accord, successfully cut remittance
transfer costs severalfold to an average of 0.2–0.4 % of the sum remitted. This is an improvement,
but still does not bring Serbia up to par with countries that apply fixed commission charges
regardless of the amount remitted.
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originate and receiving countries should reduce transaction costs and accelerate
transfers using this formal channel.
To ensure adequate competition between institutions that participate in the
transfer process, regulations governing the various players in the market need to
be harmonised, giving due consideration to the protection of the services’ clients.
The role of the regulatory bodies would include oversight of transfers to reduce the
risk of any form of abuse and mismanagement of funds and to increase client
confidence in this transfer mechanism. A greater role for banks in the transfer of
remittances should reduce transaction costs and increase the speed and reliability of
the service. This could be achieved by developing a single clearing system to be
shared by the participating countries.6 Easier access by a greater share of the
population to financial services provided by banks and other financial institutions
should boost domestic savings and the use of remittances for investment.
Greater investment of remittance funds needs to be stimulated by a good
investment climate in the migrants’ country of origin and investment incentives
(e.g., tax breaks). The Law on Foreign Exchange Operations (Official Gazette of the
Republic of Serbia, No. 62/2006, Art. 29) and its amendments (Official Gazette of
the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 31/2011 and 119/2012) make it possible to repatriate
non-resident profits generated in the local economy after taxes are paid, unless
otherwise specified.
Formalising the channels used for remittance inflows would also enhance the
efficiency of the financial sector through economies of scale resulting from greater
inflow of funds and more services provided (Gupta et al. 2009; Aggarwal
et al. 2011). This would also allow for these institutions to become more involved
in encouraging entrepreneurship and other investment by using the funds received
to attract deposits and offer loans, advisory services, insurance, and custody
operations. The largest banks would stand to benefit most from these transactions,
as they could offer the greatest volume of services and reduce transaction costs the
most. By providing affordable remittance transfer services, they could induce both
migrants and their family members in the country of origin to purchase other profit-
making services offered by the bank.
The stability of remittance inflows has led some developing countries (e.g.,
Turkey and countries in Latin America) to use them as collateral in new bank
borrowing and on-lending cycles.
As the greatest share of remittances sent through formal channels are electronic
transfers, appropriate infrastructure to access these funds needs to be put into place
throughout the receiving country. The development of technical and IT infrastruc-
ture at the local level could be funded through public-private partnership, and the
project approved by the development bank of the country in question or another
regulatory body. A well-developed infrastructure to support money transfers from
6According to data made available by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Diaspora, the
number of Serbian expatriates is estimated at about four million. Most remittances are sent from
Western Europe, particularly Austria and Germany, as well as from Serbia’s neighbours.
150 G. Krstić et al.
abroad would also facilitate access to other financial services (such as current
accounts, savings accounts, and credit instruments) for a broader section of the
population.
Further development of formal remittance transfer channels would, in time, lead
to the development of innovative products to help migrants invest directly in their
country of origin by, for instance, purchasing land or real estate.
Moreover, special programmes could be set up to combine remittances sent by
groups of migrants with funds provided by the central government or local author-
ities to jointly finance infrastructure projects of local or public importance (such as
schools, hospitals, roads, sports centres, churches, parks, irrigation, electricity
supply, computers, medical supplies, etc.).
The sending and registration of remittances should be regulated gradually, so
that these flows can be better studied and this segment of the market developed
without excessive and hasty government intervention, which could retard or
disincentivise additional remittance inflows.
These and other possible enhancements of the regulatory environment and the
financial system would contribute to greater inflows of remittances into Serbia
through formal channels and their more efficient channelling into investment,
which can be expected to have a positive impact on the economic growth and
development of the country.
9.2.5 Measures Related to the Business Environment
These measures that have an impact on the conditions for doing business will be
examined from the point of view of whether they are aimed at business entities that
already operate in the formal sector but carry out some or the majority of their
activities in the shadow economy, or are directed at entities completely in the
informal sector.
Measures Aimed at Business Entities Operating Partially
in the Shadow Economy
Resolve the Issue and Consequences of ‘Phoenix Companies’
‘Phoenix companies’, entities that transfer assets to a newly formed business while
leaving debts vested in an old one, make a substantial contribution to the chain of
illiquidity, primarily with regard to small and medium-sized businesses, which in
these circumstances are forced to move part of their activities into the shadow
economy. There are several options for resolving this issue. The first one involves
the ex-post introduction of a special Registry of Bans, similar to the already extant
Court Ban Registry, which would serve as a record of all bans imposed on managers
and owners of businesses facing criminal or other proceedings (e.g., under
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Art. 46 of the Misdemeanours Law, which provides for bans on the performance of
a particular activity). Numerous countries have similar registration regimes in place
(such as Estonia, Norway, the UK, Ireland, and Macedonia). Regardless of this, the
Business Offences Law, Misdemeanours Law, and Criminal Code must begin to be
consistently implemented, as they govern fraudulently causing insolvency and
other business crimes that damage creditors and jeopardise the exercise of their
rights. Another approach would ex-ante prohibit individuals from managing a
business and establishing new entities when their existing business has been
operating with a frozen bank account for in excess of a certain number of days,
has not been filing financial reports, or has not been paying taxes. However,
applying the second option might create the wrong incentives and penalise those
who are not actually responsible so that introducing manager disqualification would
prove counter-productive. In addition, regardless of which solution is adopted to
ban operating in any capacity, both approaches will have shortcomings if regula-
tions are not implemented consistently, as it will not be possible to prevent the
establishment of new entities by other parties or foreign off-shore centres. Another
option open to dishonest businesspeople is to establish several firms in advance as a
precaution, and then use them one by one.
Impose Barriers to the Introduction of New Administrative Burdens
by Requiring the Application of the SME Test and the Standard Cost Model7
The Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise (SME) Test is designed to assess the
impact of new regulation on small and medium-sized businesses in order to avoid
imposing disproportionately large burdens on them. Although Article 40(2) of the
Rules of Procedure of the Serbian Government stipulates that a regulatory impact
assessment should contain information on the costs that a new piece of legislation
will impose on SMEs, this is not sufficiently comprehensive, and should be
replaced by a provision requiring the inclusion of the SME Test as an integral
part of the assessment. The SME Test should, above all, examine the proposed
legislation from the point of view of its suitability for the SME sector to see whether
SMEs should be partly or fully exempt from the new regulatory requirements, as
well as estimate or quantify the annual costs faced by micro, small, and medium-
sized enterprises. The Regulatory Reform Office has already developed the SME
Test but it is yet to be implemented. The second approach involves the Standard
Cost Model (SCM), which measures the overall administrative cost and the burden
of new administrative requirements and has been developed by the Regulatory
Reform Office in the form of a turnkey software application. The use of this tool is
7 Since 2008 the European Union has been implementing the Small Business Act as a new
framework for SME development policy. As the act is part of the acquis communautaire, its
significance for EU candidate countries is also substantial. The SME Test is an integral part
of the EU’s regulatory impact assessment procedure.
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yet to be mandated for amending administrative requirements or introducing new
ones. The consistent and mandatory use of the SCM could prevent undue admin-
istrative burdens. Both methods have become integrated into the European Com-
mission’s regulatory impact assessments and are used in many EU member states.
Simplify Regulatory (Administrative) Requirements
The aim of the Comprehensive Regulation Reform effort and NALED’s8 (2012)
Grey Book V is to identify, with the active participation of businesses themselves,
administrative burdens and procedures that unduly constrain doing business and to
find the simplest solutions for removing them. Practice has shown that the problems
identified are resolved too slowly, which creates additional costs for business
entities. Some issues, such as the removal of ‘turnover and incoming payment
ledgers’ and the abolishing of complicated pregnancy and maternity leave pro-
cedures, have been in the pipeline for several years. Instead of acting on an ad hoc
basis, the government needs to adopt a clear plan for removing unnecessary
administrative requirements and report to the public on its realisation.
Regulate the Public Consultation Process
In contrast to European Union practice, stakeholder participation in the legislative
process in Serbia is often unsatisfactory. In the EU a minimum of 8 weeks is set
aside for public consultation. According to Transparency Serbia, statutory pro-
visions governing public comment periods in Serbia are inadequate. Among other
things, there is no pre-defined form of public debate and no sanctions if a public
body fails to launch such a debate. Non-compliance with the law by public
authorities is compounded by the frequently passive stance of business entities.
There are multiple reasons for this behaviour. Businesses often lack the necessary
time and resources or simply do not feel that they can change anything. Serbian
laws stipulate that a public comment period is mandatory where a proposed piece of
legislation significantly changes the statutory treatment of a particular area, or
where the issues at hand are of particular interest to the public. Except for this
requirement imposed on the legislator, public consultation is not governed in
greater detail. In some cases there is no public comment period but it essentially
takes place by other means (e.g., in roundtables, public gatherings, etc.). To
improve the current situation the minimum requirement could be the posting of a
proposed piece of legislation on the web site of a ministry or other regulator at least
8 weeks before that piece of legislation enters formal procedure. In addition,
depending on the issues to be governed by the proposed regulations, as part of the
8National Alliance for Local Economic Development.
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law drafting process consultation with local authorities and legitimate representa-
tives of business and other professional associations must be improved.
Adopt Bylaws in a Timely Fashion
One of the fundamental causes of legal insecurity is lateness in the adoption of
bylaws, which makes it impossible to implement laws. When bylaws are not
adopted in due time, new laws cannot be implemented, while old legislation
lapses.9 Faced with this legal vacuum, business entities are often forced to make
do without knowing whether they are operating in accordance with the law or if
their activities fall within the scope of the shadow economy. The legal insecurity
created by this situation has major consequences for the economy. There are several
options that can be considered. One (admittedly extreme) option is not to allow a
draft document (or bill) to begin the procedure of becoming law without all bylaws
being ready. Another option is to make the existence of guidelines for drafting
specific bylaws the minimum condition for beginning the procedure. A third option
would be to make it impossible to implement a law without providing a detailed
explanatory note stating how it will affect the private sector, including calculations
of costs and a detailed consideration of the specific requirements to be governed by
bylaws. Finally, realistic deadlines should be set for the adoption of bylaws.
Improved Protection from Unfair Competition
The Law on Trade prohibits unfair competition; that is, actions of a business aimed
against another business that damage or may damage a competitor through untrue
or insulting claims regarding that business, or through the sale of goods whose
labels, packaging, or shape create justifiable confusion regarding the quality or
other characteristics of such goods. However, there are substantial problems with
the application of the law. The Ministry of Trade has introduced a Bill Amending
and Supplementing the Law on Trade, currently undergoing parliamentary proce-
dure, which includes a new article whereby businesses will be able to seek intan-
gible damages for harm to their reputation arising from unfair competition.
However, while this change will improve current legal framework, the implemen-
tation has to be substantially improved.
9According to an analysis carried out by NALED in 2012 (NALED 2012), only three bylaws were
adopted before the deadline, 33 were adopted after the deadline, while in 163 cases the deadline
expired before the bylaws were adopted.
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Measures Directed at Business Entities Operating Wholly
in the Informal Economy
Establish an E-Portal for Licences, Permits, Approvals, and Consents
Although reform of the registration process has made it much easier to incorporate a
business entity, in some sectors of activity there remain a large number of admin-
istrative requirements that an entity must meet. When filing for permits and
approvals, business entities often face administrative requirements that leave
them unsure what to submit, which steps to take, or which body to contact. A
solution already implemented in the region is an e-portal for licences, permits,
approvals, and consents that would contain detailed information, directions, docu-
ments, and contacts to make it easier to start a business. Immediately after being
incorporated, although formally registered, businesses often cannot legally engage
in an activity while they wait for an approval or licence. To bridge this gap
businesses begin doing part of their business in the informal sector, and continue
doing so even when the licences are finally received. This e-portal could be made
part of the e-Government web site and contain instructions for each individual
sector. Another option would be to host it on the Business Registries Agency
web site.
Remove Barriers to Entry in Particular Sectors
Over the past several years new requirements have appeared that business entities
have to meet before they can begin operating in a particular sector of activity. While
in some sectors these are justified, in others they are typical barriers to entry, set up
to protect current participants in the market. Recent examples are the introduction
of a solicitors’ examination and the review of regulations governing the profession
of tourist guide. If a portal for licences, permits, approvals, and consents is
established, existing requirements could be analysed, some procedures could be
simplified, and, finally, some requirements could be abolished. In addition, efficient
implementation of the Competition Law plays a major role in removing barriers to
entry and it must be substantially improved.
Establish an Authoritative Registry of Legislation Accessible to the Public
Free of Charge
Among the constraints faced by new start-ups are the costs they must meet to obtain
information that is, by its very nature, in the public domain. Small businesses
usually rely on their bookkeepers or lawyers, but they should also be allowed to
access a legislation database. Službeni Glasnik (‘Official Gazette’), the public body
tasked with publishing authoritative texts of legislation in the journal of the same
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name, has of its own initiative developed a database of legislation containing
revised texts of current regulations and PDF files of the relevant issues of the
Official Gazette where the regulations and their amendments are published. This
database can be considered authoritative in the sense that all of its users are able to
rely on the authenticity of the contents of the PDF files. Public access to this
database would significantly reduce transaction costs at the level of the entire
economy, and in particular would make it easier for new start-ups to operate and
to reduce their expenses.
Construction Permits and ‘Legalisation’
The construction permit procedure is inefficient and lengthy due to a very compli-
cated system that involves filing for permits with a large number of entities. Unable
to obtain permits, some business entities start construction illicitly, at great risk.
Developers (or investors) hire workers from the informal sector and engage busi-
nesses and entrepreneurs that do not declare such work. Accelerating construction
permit procedures, decentralising authority, establishing ‘one-stop shops’ at local
authorities, changing the role of public entities in the permit procedure,
harmonising procedures, drafting plans, etc. would all greatly contribute to shifting
construction activities into the formal sector.10
Another serious issue is the ‘legalisation’ of buildings, i.e., the subsequent
issuance of construction permits for unpermitted properties. According to available
data, nearly 700,000 buildings constructed without permits have been reported to
local authorities; sources indicate that there are 1.3 million unregistered buildings.
This legalisation procedure must be simplified to incorporate clearly defined and
restricted deadlines, while the fees for subsequent issuance of permits must be
based on economic criteria.
9.2.6 Outreach Campaigns
Outreach campaigns should play a particularly important role in the implementa-
tion of the proposed measures, which should have an impact on reducing tax
evasion and encourage entities to move from the informal to the formal sector.
Outreach campaigns should clearly point out the risks and expenses associated with
operating in the shadow economy and the benefits of formalisation, or aim to
change their audiences’ views of the morality of tax evasion.11
10 Detailed proposals for resolving construction permit issues are presented in the Assessment of
Constraints to Construction Permits in Serbia, prepared for the USAID Business Enabling Project
(2012).
11 The most important outreach campaigns in the region have been ‘Take the Receipt’ in Serbia in
late 2004, and ‘VAT is Your Money’, which is still in progress in Montenegro.
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These campaigns should be aimed at both participants in the transaction: where
they focus on tax evasion their target should be both buyers and sellers and if the
topic is employment they should target both employers and workers. The cam-
paigns should be general but should focus on sectors where the shadow economy is
most widespread (such as construction or transportation), or on particular social or
demographic segments of the population (particularly on those groups, such as
young people, who believe activities in the shadow economy are an acceptable form
of behaviour).
The International Labour Organisation and the European Union recommend the
use of information campaigns to combat the shadow economy. Education cam-
paigns targeting taxpayers, the media, and the general public should be intensified
to maximise impact.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Chapter 10
Executive Summary
Gorana Krstić, Friedrich Schneider, Mihail Arandarenko, Milojko Arsić,
Branko Radulović, Saša Ranđelović, and Irena Janković
10.1 Main Findings of the Study
10.1.1 Survey of the Informal Activities of Serbian
Businesses and Entrepreneurs
Incentives to formalise the shadow economy should be based on knowledge of the
causes and structure of informal activity. A specific problem in designing these
incentives is the fact that information on the shadow economy is inherently
unreliable and incomplete. A survey of the informal activities of Serbian businesses
and entrepreneurs (Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia) was
therefore carried out for the purpose of this study on a representative sample of
1,251 business entities (businesses and entrepreneurs). This made it possible for the
first time to view the Serbian shadow economy from the point of view of businesses,
to assess the various forms that the shadow economy takes, and to analyse them
according to the relevant characteristics of business entities. The survey also
allowed us to see the causes of and motives for informal activity, which is of
particular importance in drafting recommendations for formalising the shadow
economy.
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10.1.2 Causes of the Shadow Economy
We analysed the causes of the shadow economy using elementary theoretical
analysis, comparative data, social partners’ views on how institutions operate,
and the results of the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia. Among
the fiscal causes of the shadow economy are the relatively high fiscal burden on
labour; complicated and costly tax procedures; complicated and opaque tax system;
poorly organised, under-staffed, and under-equipped Tax administration; poor
quality of public services; and high tolerance for the shadow economy. The features
of the labour market that are particularly significant in fostering and sustaining the
shadow economy are high fiscal burden on labour for lower wage earners; a social
security system that prevents entitlement to social welfare benefits and other trans-
fers for people in formal employment; high minimum wage; and certain regulations
governing employment protection legislation, working hours, unemployment ben-
efits, and the pension system. There are many other institutional and economic
factors that contribute to the large extent of the shadow economy. Owing to low
productivity, many businesses can only operate at a profit if they evade paying
taxes. The economic crisis and pervasive liquidity issues have forced even the more
productive businesses to shift a portion of their operations into the informal sector,
and inefficient enforcement and market exit mechanisms incentivise businesses
operating in the informal sector to remain there. Among the other causes with a
significant bearing on the extent of the shadow economy are high administrative
burdens on doing business; low quality of the regulatory environment; and legal
insecurity. In addition to these regulatory causes the decision to operate informally
is affected by widespread corruption and low tax morality. The most important
financial factors are the large share of cash transactions in the total volume of
payments, informal financing, and the unregistered remittances of migrant workers.
10.1.3 Extent of the Shadow Economy in Serbia
The shadow economy in Serbia was estimated using three methods: (a) the MIMIC
method, a modelling-based approach covering Serbia and ten other Central and
Eastern European countries between 2001 and 2010; (b) the Household Tax Com-
pliance (HTC) method based on 2010 data for Serbia, an indirect method based on
macroeconomic data; and (c) the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in
Serbia. The methods used differ in their coverage of the shadow economy in
terms of institutional sector, form of shadow economy, and methodology used.
The MIMIC method has the broadest coverage since it covers all institutional
sectors and all forms of the shadow economy. The HTC method estimates only
those forms of the shadow economy that can be identified and estimated on the basis
of household income and consumption data. The survey was used to estimate the
most important forms of the shadow economy among business entities.
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The results of the assessment using the first method showed that all countries
recorded a decline in the extent of the shadow economy over the observed period,
with the exception of 2009 when there was a slight increase. In Serbia the shadow
economy contracted from 33.2 % of official GDP in 2001 to 30.1 % in 2010
(Table 10.1). The results show that the shadow economy in Serbia (as % of GDP)
declined over the period of economic growth and remained nearly unchanged after
the beginning of the economic downturn. Serbia’s levels were greater than the
averages for the other selected 11 countries throughout the entire reporting period.
Only Bulgaria had a larger shadow economy, as a percentage of GDP, than Serbia.
The HTC method estimated the extent of the shadow economy in Serbia at 24 %
of GDP. The figure obtained using the HTC method is lower than that derived from
using the MIMIC model, since data on household income and consumption cannot
cover some forms of the shadow economy in the business sector (corporate income
and property tax, charges, fees, etc.).
Data from the Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia made it
possible to estimate the extent of the two key forms of informal activity in the
sectors of businesses and entrepreneurs, trade in goods, and partly or wholly
unreported employment. Using the findings of the survey we estimated that these
two forms of informal activity amount to some 21 % of GDP. The extent of the
shadow economy estimated using the results of the survey is the lowest, since
businesses also take part in the shadow economy by evading the payment of other
dues such as corporate income tax, property tax, fees, and charges, and there is also
a portion of the shadow economy that takes place outside the business sector (home
repairs, private tuition, trade in goods at flea markets, etc.). A comparison of these
results with those obtained using the MIMIC method showed that businesses and
entrepreneurs accounted for over two-thirds of all activity in the shadow economy,
and that these were in the form of illicit transactions and the payment of wages
without paying appropriate taxes and contributions.
10.1.4 Estimates of the Tax Evasion Gap
The tax gap is the difference between hypothetical (theoretical) tax revenue and
taxes actually collected. Hypothetical tax revenues are the sums that would be
collected over a particular period of time if all taxpayers paid their taxes in full
compliance with tax legislation. The shadow economy is a broader concept than the
Table 10.1 Extent of the shadow economy according to the various methods of estimation
Year % of GDP
Shadow economy according to the MIMIC method 2010 30.1
Shadow economy—HTC method 2010 23.6
Shadow economy—Survey 2012 21.0
Source: Own calculations
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tax gap, as it encompasses all taxable economic activities that take place informally.
The tax gap, on the other hand, is the amount of tax that should be paid on those
activities. The tax gap is mainly caused by tax evasion, which is why these two
terms are often seen as identical. However, the tax gap can, to a lesser extent, reflect
reported but unpaid taxes, as well as tax revenue lost due to taxpayer bankruptcy,
write-offs of back taxes, etc. Having carried out a detailed analysis of tax rates,
volumes of consumption, etc., we estimated the VAT gap at 2.5 % of GDP
(Table 10.2). By combining the data from macroeconomic accounts with the
findings of the survey, we estimated the tax gap for personal income tax and social
security contributions at about 5 % of GDP. We then extrapolated these tax gap
estimates to all taxes, and by using data from the Household Consumption Survey
we arrived at the figure of 10 % as an approximation of the overall tax gap.
10.1.5 The Shadow Economy in the Business
and Entrepreneur Sector
The Survey on Conditions for Doing Business in Serbia asked respondents to state
their views on whether their own business was engaged in the shadow economy,
and found that 28 % of all business entities in Serbia did so. These businesses and
entrepreneurs employed workers informally and/or made payments in cash even
Table 10.2 Estimated tax gap and fiscal effects of formalisation
Method/
coverage Year Amount








Personal income tax and social contributions gap
(as % of GDP)
Survey 2010 5.0
Personal income tax and social contributions gap
(as % of hypothetical income tax and contributions)
Survey 2010 27.7
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though they were VAT payers. The term ‘informal workers’ is used to describe
workers employed without a contract or those who do have contracts but only
declare part of their wage officially, with the remainder paid in cash. The results of
the survey show that entrepreneurs, new start-ups, construction businesses and
businesses based in Central Serbia are more likely to engage in the shadow
economy. Based on respondents’ views on the participation of their own businesses
in the shadow economy and their estimates of the extent to which other entities in
the same industry take part in informal activities, we estimated the upper and lower
limit of the extent of the shadow economy in this sector. The share of employees
working without formal contracts ranged from 1.9 % (lower limit) to 23.9 % (upper
limit) of the total number of employees. The share of employees with a portion of
undeclared wages ranged between 3.8 and 24.7 %, while the share of cash trans-
actions ranged between 11.3 and 21.6 % of the total volume of payments.
Econometric analysis based on the survey data identified specific factors that are
statistically significant to a business’s decision whether or not to engage in informal
operations. The results obtained were in line with the findings of other studies,
where entrepreneurs were seen to be more likely to take part in the shadow
economy than other business entities. Business entities in the construction sector
were almost twice as likely to operate informally than those in services, while
entities in the trade sector were nearly twice less likely to do so. Finally, the attitude
of the business entity towards the shadow economy was a major and statistically
significant factor determining that entity’s participation in the shadow economy.
The findings of the survey showed that competition from entities operating at
least partly in the informal sector was extremely widespread. As many as 85.3 % of
the business entities surveyed stated that unfair competition was present in their
sector of economic activity. Construction and transportation again led the field,
whilst the presence of competition was also determined to a large degree by the
likelihood of detection. This shows that most problems appear in sectors where
there are greater regulatory obstacles to formalisation and greater difficulty in
detecting informally employed workers. Since such an environment is conducive
to greater operating savings, the pressure of competition coming from the informal
sector is thus also greater.
10.1.6 Effects of Formalising the Shadow Economy
Although the estimated extent of the shadow economy in Serbia is significant,
comparative data show that the average is only about 5 percentage points greater in
Serbia than in other Central and Eastern European countries. This leads to the
conclusion that the tax gap in Serbia is greater by approximately the same amount
as in these other countries. Therefore the optimal aim in reducing the extent of the
shadow economy and the tax gap in Serbia would be to reduce them to the Central
and Eastern European averages over the medium term, while the long-term goal
would be to bring them down to the levels seen in developed Western European
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countries. The potential increase in public revenue that could be generated by
reducing the Serbian shadow economy was estimated at between 0.8 and 1.1 %
of GDP in the medium term (up to 3 years), or some 2 % of GDP in the long term
(7–10 years).
These estimates are the upper limit of the potential additional public revenue that
could be generated through the reduction of the shadow economy, since the
institutional conditions for tackling the shadow economy and tax morality are far
higher in Western European countries than in Serbia as a consequence of their long
tradition of combating the shadow economy. These fiscal effects can only be
achieved in Serbia if all the measures necessary to tackle the shadow economy
are applied in a comprehensive, non-selective, and consistent manner. From the
fiscal policy standpoint, a reduction in the shadow economy will not allow for any
tax cuts or greater public expenditure. Taxing the shadow economy should con-
tribute to a drop in the fiscal deficit and compensate for the decline in tax revenues
due to the expected restructuring of the economy towards less-taxable activities
such as exports and investment.
The findings of the MIMIC method applied to Serbia and the other 10 Central
and Eastern European countries show that the effect of the shadow economy on
registered GDP is statistically highly significant and has the expected negative sign:
if GDP per capita falls by 1 percentage point, the shadow economy will increase by
between 0.6 and 0.7 percentage points, depending on the model used. This means
that any future decline in GDP will increase pressure on the shadow economy, since
business entities will endeavour to compensate for fewer opportunities in the formal
sector by shifting into the shadow economy. This finding underlines the importance
of preserving macroeconomic stability and creating conditions for future growth in
the future, which will be a major component in the successful strategy for
formalising the shadow economy.
10.2 Recommendations for Formalising the Shadow
Economy
10.2.1 Fiscal Policy Measures
Fiscal policy measures are aimed at reducing incentives for operating in the shadow
economy and the benefits of doing so on the one hand, and increasing the associated
costs and risks on the other. The most important fiscal policy measures for tackling
the shadow economy are: reducing distortions introduced by the tax system;
reducing tax compliance costs; reducing the return to tax evasion; and reducing
tolerance for the shadow economy.
Distortions introduced by taxes in Serbia could be reduced by decreasing the
fiscal burden on labour (since other general taxes are moderate), by reducing the
number of tax rates applicable to income from different sources or trade in different
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types of goods, and by significantly reducing the number of tax exemptions
(particularly when it comes to corporate income tax). Tax compliance costs could
be lowered by reducing the number of tax procedures and simplifying them, and by
introducing mandatory e-filing of tax returns and requiring electronic communica-
tion with tax authorities. Thus, the reduction in cost effectiveness of tax evasion
could be achieved primarily by increasing the likelihood of the Tax Administration
detecting tax evasion: to ensure this, the number of Tax Administration staff tasked
with performing audits should be increased, and their training and case selection
methodology improved. In addition, there should be more consistent implementa-
tion of statutory penalties for tax evasion, particularly by courts.
Moreover, there should be co-operation with other government bodies (such as
the Municipal Police) to institute and enforce a ban on the sale of new products at
farmers’ and flea markets. Improving co-ordination between the Tax Administra-
tion and other government bodies, both in terms of exchange of information and of
joint action in the field, is another important precondition for tackling the shadow
economy and combatting tax evasion. The reach of property taxes should be
widened in co-operation with the Property Cadastre and other government bodies,
since a significant percentage of properties in Serbia are unregistered and as such
not subject to property tax. Co-operation between the Tax Administration and other
government bodies is of particular importance in successfully cross checking
property and income, which would project a public message of the state’s determi-
nation to tackle the shadow economy and the tax evasion associated with it. In order
to combat the non-payment of taxes, the practice of periodically writing off nominal
interest on back taxes should be finally abandoned. A portion of the principal debt is
also written off along with nominal interest, which rewards undisciplined taxpayers
and fosters moral hazard behaviour, as taxpayers will intentionally defer payment in
expectation of a new round of interest write-offs.
Finally, in order to reduce the extent of the shadow economy, the education and
public information system must be used to increase public awareness of the adverse
effects of the shadow economy and so improve tax morality. An improvement in the
quality of public goods and services provided by the state would also contribute to
achieving this goal.
10.2.2 Measures Relating to Features of the Labour Market
In terms of the fiscal burden on labour, the tax wedge of labour (expressed as the
ratio of total wage taxes and contributions to total labour costs) is high for low
wages and relatively low for high wages, a consequence of the proportional wage
taxation system with a relatively low tax-exempt allowance. At about the level of
the minimum wage, the tax burden in Serbia is the fourth highest of all European
countries. This is a natural incentive for the preservation and growth of informal
employment, since informal businesses generally enter the formal economy at
approximately that point. Thus, the most important recommendation in the field
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of labour taxation is the need to substantially reduce labour costs for lower-paying
jobs. Any kind of reform of labour taxation (or, in a broader sense, of the taxation of
income derived from work) should ideally entail an increase in the personal
tax-exempt allowance to the level of the minimum wage. Most European countries
employ this practice. In addition, introducing a tax exempt allowance for depen-
dents would reduce the tax wedge for employees with unemployed spouses and
children, and thereby reduce their incentives for joining the shadow economy.
The existence of the minimum social security contribution base makes open-
ended, full-time labour contracts unpopular. Another means of reducing the tax
wedge for lower wages would be to remove the minimum social security base,
which now stands at 35 % of the average wage. While its impact on people working
full-time jobs is negligible, since the minimum wage is far above this level, it
increases labour costs for part-time workers with standard open-ended employment
contracts. An important incentive for formalising informal employees working
part-time jobs could be the introduction of less restrictive tax treatment of ‘mini
jobs’ and ‘midi jobs’, based on the positive experiences of Germany where, for mini
jobs, healthcare and social security contributions are much lower than standard,
while the rate of income tax can even equal zero. Midi jobs attract contributions that
are greater than those for mini jobs but still lower than standard, so that workers in
mini jobs can avoid the trap of in-work poverty, and their transition into standard
employment is eased.
Welfare benefits in Serbian practice are available almost exclusively to unem-
ployed and inactive persons, which encourage those who are able to work to
combine welfare and informal employment. To incentivise employment in the
formal sector, an in-work benefits programme should be introduced along the
lines of the US Earned Income Tax Credit, which would make it possible for
workers to combine formal employment and welfare benefits, with the latter
gradually reduced as earnings increase.
To avoid driving down demand for formal work, the minimum wage should be
reduced from the current level of 50 % to some 35–40 % of the average wage, as
used to be the case in Serbia until several years ago and as recommended by the
World Bank for middle-developed countries. Moreover, the introduction of a
slightly lower minimum wage for under-25 s should be considered in order to
stimulate their open-ended employment. Similarly, the minimum wage could vary
slightly by region so as to partly reflect regional variation in the cost of living.
The most urgent requirement in the area of employment protection legislation is
the removal of the statutory provision obliging employers to pay employees
severance in proportion to each employee’s total years of service rather than only
years of service spent with their current employer. This would foster formal
employment, primarily of elderly workers with work experience. In addition, an
extension of the maximum length of employment under individual fixed-term
contracts from 1–2 or 3 years should be considered.
Retirement rules are characterised by relatively low standard and minimum
retirement age thresholds. Moreover, there are no actuarial penalties for early
retirement, which incentivises pensioners to continue working after retirement,
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particularly in the informal sector. The current retirement age threshold should thus
be increased; in addition, actuarial adjustment of pensions should be introduced to
reflect the life expectancy of people who retire earlier, while actuarial rewards
should apply to those who continue to work and pay pension contributions after
meeting conditions for full retirement, regardless of whether they receive pensions
or not.
In order to support entrepreneurship, specific programmes targeted at reducing
informal employment should be pursued more vigorously and with reference to
experiences of other European countries. Self-employment is supported by the
National Employment Service (NES); this assistance takes the form of a one-off
non-repayable grant and some in-kind support, provided that the beneficiary regu-
larly pays contributions and taxes for at least the following 2 years. On average,
some 3,000–5,000 people per year become self-employed through this programme:
NES staff estimate that most of them merely formalise their informal businesses. It
is interesting to note that evaluations of such ‘legalised’ entrepreneurs show
survival rates greater than for those who started their businesses without previous
experience in the informal sector. Microlending is also a measure that facilitates the
establishment of legal businesses, especially for categories of people who cannot
rely on their own funds or commercial credit, but is as yet virtually non-existent in
Serbia due to an inadequate statutory framework.
Inspection Oversight The Labour and Market Inspectorates are responsible for
tackling informal employment and undeclared and illicit transactions, whilst the
Tax Administration is responsible for preventing tax evasion. In addition to the lack
of equipment and appropriately qualified staff, one of the key problems in the
operation of these institutions is the absence of sufficient co-ordination and inte-
gration with other inspection and oversight services. Closer integration is therefore
required between the various inspectorates, either through an Inspectorate-General,
or, in less demanding form, by means of a co-ordinating body such as a Commis-
sion to Co-Ordinate Inspection Oversight. A framework Inspections Law should be
adopted, harmonised with European Union regulations, to at least ensure better
mutual co-ordination of inspection oversight and to better delimit the powers of the
various inspection services, at the same time closing the loopholes in the powers of
inspection bodies that have made it possible for the shadow economy to flourish and
have hindered the implementation of activities designed to combat it. The advan-
tages of an integrated inspections approach are particularly obvious in the area of
the authority of the Market and Labour Inspectorates. A unified database of
offenders and offences, accessible to all inspection services, the Tax Administra-
tion, the Customs Administration, and the police, would improve the efficiency of
the fight against the shadow economy. The integration of powers would mean that
inspections that uncover an unregistered or unreported entity or person engaging in
an activity under the remit of another inspection would be both authorised and
required to order any deficiencies to be remedied and to notify the Tax Adminis-
tration of the infringement and the measures taken.
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10.2.3 Measures Relating to the Financial Sector
Curb Transactions in Cash and Incentivise Cashless Payments Switching to
cashless (and particularly electronic) payments would reduce the participation of
parties to transactions in the shadow economy. In ensuring this, emphasis should be
placed on incentives that will foster cashless transactions. The use of electronic
money for payment operations can be fostered by allowing electronic payments in
sectors dominated by cash (such as hospitality, taxi cabs, etc.). Other incentives
could include subsidising point-of-sale terminals for small and micro-businesses,
limited tax breaks for electronic payments, and prepaid cards for people without
bank accounts to enable their inclusion in the formal sector. On the macroeconomic
level, government subsidies and assistance could be paid out electronically, as
could various types of contributions. Further, all government payments could be
limited to electronic channels only. To ensure that all remaining cash transactions
take place primarily within formal channels, field audits should be strengthened to
ensure fiscal cash registers are used and receipts are issued for all transactions. A
clear consensus among economic policymakers regarding the application of a
de-euroisation strategy would contribute to a substantial reduction in cash pay-
ments—particularly informal payments—throughout the system.
Reduce the Share of Informal Sources of Finance in the Economy To further
stimulate greater transfers of money through formal channels (and the inflow of
significant funds from abroad in the form of remittances), transfer costs must be
reduced, as was also pointed out by survey respondents. This would increase the
transparency of these flows and make it easier to direct them into investment
contributing to local growth and national development. Greater competition
between formal transfer intermediaries and lower transfer service costs would
increase migrant interest in sending remittances through formal channels, since
these offer numerous benefits to recipients such as easier access to financial
institutions, cheaper finance for the broader public, lower cost of investment due
to more options for diversification, and better education of beneficiaries about
alternate modes of employing funds. Regulatory authorities in sending and receiv-
ing countries should enter into bilateral agreements to formalise and facilitate
transferring, channelling, and registering funds. This process could take the form
of a public-private partnership, with the participation of financial institutions.
Closer co-operation between banking sectors in sending and receiving countries
should lower transaction costs of transfers and accelerate the sending of remittances
through formal channels.
A greater role played by banks in the transfer of remittances should lower transac-
tion costs and increase the speed and reliability of these services. This could also be
achieved by developing a unified clearing system for all countries involved in this
process. Investment using remitted funds could be stimulated by creating a better
climate for investing, as well as by deploying a range of incentives for putting funds
to productive use (e.g., tax breaks). A well-developed infrastructure to support
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channelling money transfers from abroad would also facilitate access to other
financial intermediation services (such as current accounts, savings accounts, and
credit instruments) for a broader section of the population, which would, in turn,
foster the development of the country’s financial sector. Further development of
formal channels for transferring remittances could be harnessed to create innovative
products that would make it possible for migrants to directly invest in their home
countries by purchasing, for instance, land or real estate. Gradual regulation of
sending and receiving remittances would be desirable, so that these flows could be
better studied and this segment of the market developed without excessive and
hasty government intervention, which could retard or disincentivise additional
inflow of these funds.
10.2.4 Measures Related to the Business Environment
Measures related to the business environment are aimed either at business entities
already operating formally or at those wholly in the shadow economy. The existing
regulatory requirements for businesses operating formally need to be simplified and
unnecessary new administrative burdens should be prevented administrative bur-
dens. At between 3.8 and 4.2 % of GDP, Serbia’s administrative costs are among
the highest of all countries that have made similar measurements. Consistent
application of methods such as the SME Test and the Standard Cost Model, as
well as regular stakeholder consultation, could significantly reduce existing admin-
istrative costs, which would foster the shift of some activity from the informal to the
formal sector. There are other areas of the regulatory process that could see major
improvement; in particular, bylaws should be adopted in a timely fashion to reduce
legal uncertainty.
Solving the issues of ‘phoenix companies’ and unfair competition are very
important in tackling the shadow economy. The former would contribute to greater
liquidity, primarily among SMEs, who are often unable to collect receivables from
‘phoenix companies’ and are thus forced to move part of their businesses into the
shadow economy in order to survive. One possible solution would be to set up a
special registry of all bans on operating imposed on managers and owners of
businesses that face criminal or other proceedings. However, what is most needed
to eliminate both ‘phoenix companies’ and unfair competition is greater consis-
tency in applying the existing legal framework.
There are several steps that would facilitate the operation of business entities
wholly in the informal sector and thus promote their integration into the formal
economy. In addition to directly lowering costs by removing barriers to entry in
particular sectors, an electronic registry of legislation accessible to the public free
of charge should be established. Further, existing records should be improved, and a
new e-portal for licences, permits, approvals, and consents should be established.
Integration into the formal sector is also affected by the issue of ‘legalising’
buildings and obtaining construction permits. Unclear and complicated
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‘legalisation’, the subsequent issuance of construction permits for unpermitted
properties–makes entry into the formal sector more difficult, which means that
certain resources are made unavailable for legal transactions and cannot be used by
the economy. In addition to legalisation, entry into the market is hindered by the
very complex construction permit system, which involves filing for permits with a
large number of entities. The resolution of these issues requires a number of
measures to accelerate construction permit procedures, including establishing
‘one-stop shops’ at local authorities, changing the role of public entities in the
permitting procedure, drafting plans in a timely manner, etc.
10.3 Policy Conclusions
The key prerequisites for a successful strategy for formalising the shadow economy
are: (1) to complete the process of transition into a market economy, and (2) to
stabilise the legal and institutional structures of society; these should be followed by
(3) achieving and maintaining macroeconomic stability and (4) creating precondi-
tions for economic growth. The impact of these factors on the shadow economy is
just one among their many desirable effects. The econometric findings presented in
Chap. 6 indicate that an increase in official GDP leads to a drop in the extent of the
shadow economy. In other words, a decline in GDP will increase the shadow
economy as business entities endeavour to compensate for fewer business oppor-
tunities in the formal sector by working in the shadow economy. In these circum-
stances the measures proposed above will not be fully effective.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Arsić M, Ranđelović S, Pejić M (2012) Reform of the system of Quasi-Fiscal charges for the
improvement of business conditions in Serbia. Quarterly Monitor, vol 29, April–June 2012
© The Author(s) 2015
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Ranđelović, S, Ðorđević A (2012) Unapređenje performansi malih i srednjih preduzeća u Srbiji
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